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Introduction 
First Philosophy, Democracy, and Composition 
Those who take the meat from the table 
Preach contentment... 
Those who eat their fill speak to the hungry 
Of wonderful times to come 
Those who lead the country into the 
abyss 
Call ruling too difficult 
For the ordinary. 
—Bertolt Brecht. 1937 
Democracy is government by discussion but it is only effective 
if your can stop people talking. 
—Clement Attlee 
You're tellin" me the things you're gonna do for me. 
Well. 1 ain't blind and 1 don't like what 1 think I see. 
—The Doobie Brothers 
"Takin" It To the Streets" 
1 was frantically working my way through what I expected to become my final 
chapter when the twin towers of the World Trade Center were toppled by terrorists. 
Suddenly, the most urgent thing in my life lost its urgency. Over the next few days, as I 
moved from denial to grief to despair. I came to understand that in my attempt to be 
properly academic, my work was failing to describe the urgency I felt even before this 
crisis. An urgency that has been in my classroom since the day I began teaching: that 
remains there still, now with greater potency. I resolved to return to the beginning, to step 
up my arguments by setting them against the circumstances from which this and many 
other tragedies have arisen. 
No doubt this will frustrate my committee, for my project is large and delay 
frequent as my concerns as teacher, wife, mother, daughter, sister, and community 
member command my attention. From the beginning, my committee, acting in my 
interest, has seen this project in practical terms—a means to achieve an honorific, maybe 
even a professional position. They're anxious to see me safely tenure-tracked. I. on the 
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other hand, have seen this as my first, possibly my only opportunity to say something 
significant. 1 want to make sure I get it right—even if only a handful of people read it. I've 
never been sure I have anything really remarkable to say. but I've always been damn sure 
it's pretty remarkable to get this chance. 
Some readers may find what follows a bit unsettling, the blend of the personal, 
political, and scholarly too provocative. But the precedent was set long before this 
dissertation. Scholars throughout the humanities have argued for many years that personal 
experience may serve scholarship by making diverse experiences visible within the larger 
culture ( Brandt: Spigelman: Vtllanueva): by challenging assumptions about the validity of 
"ways of knowing" (Belenky. et. al.: Gere: Tannen): and by revealing the clash between 
our expectations and our experiences (R. Miller: Rose). It has also been maintained that 
personal writing may be ethically imperative to certain types of research ( Brodkev: 
Herrington). Indeed. Protagoras, from whom I derive my paradigm of rationality, argues 
that social, i.e. personal and political, context is the very wellspring of both knowledge 
and virtue. For Protagoras, the search for truth and personal experience are not 
dichotomized, as truth and justice consist of negotiation between ourselves and our 
communities. It is therefore from personal context that I begin my inquiry. 
I was bom in Storm Lake. Iowa—a pretty little town next to a silty pond in the 
middle of a corn field. But my conscience was bom in Viet Nam—a ruined jungle: a 
flickering glow of carnage and casualty lists cast upon a brown-eyed little girl and a fat 
pinkish terrier snuggled up on nylon loop carpet: a bundle of photographs, more carnage, 
taken bv a desperate boy. my brother, far. far from home. 
In the free exchange of ideas that is America. I began to read what I was not 
supposed to read. Alongside Shakespeare. Dickens. AlcotL Euripedes. Reader's Digest. 
John Wesley. Browning. Dickinson, and The Bible. I read Alan G ins burg. Marx. Lenny 
Bruce. Ursula LeGuin. The Bhagavad-Gita. The Book of Mormon. Mother Jones. The 
Tao. Carlos Castenada. Joseph Heller. Sylvia Plath. Marshal McLuhan. Dalton Trumbo 
and The Bible. I began to learn bit by bit that my education was peppered with "noble 
lies" that acted against my liberty, the rights of others, and my dream of global justice. I 
teamed that risking one's life to escape religious persecution does not necessarily translate 
into religious tolerance. So many women burned. So many stoned. So many drowned. 
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That civilization comes at the expense of civilization. So many trails. So many tears. That 
freedom sometimes means only freedom to suffer by one's own wits in a land that denies 
one's wits. That material progress was bought on the backs of strangers. Not only were 
these streets not paved with gold, people like my grandparents were expected to pave 
them. To make themselves too soon old breaking soil for grain, breaking rock for ore. 
breaking hearts over grandsons surrendered to a war no one really understood. And the 
TV flickered on. 
I began to learn that good ideas contend and that bad ideas sometimes gain 
dominance. That each idea does not build upon the last unless "noble lies™ are told. 
Meanwhile. Cambodia. Ho Chi Min. Kent State. Wounded Knee. JFK. MLK. Bobby. 
Malcolm. The Nixon Tapes. Three Mile Island. Silent Spring. The Pentagon Papers. My 
cousin Larry. Agent Orange. My brother David. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
I dug deeper and learned more. Indentured servitude. The Homestead Strike. 
Japanese-American internment. Immigration quotas. McCarthyism. Anti-semitism. Anti-
Catholicism. Eminent domain. Urban renewal. Mavaguez. Migrant workers. The Ludlow 
Massacre. Attica. Cold War. In the midst of all this. I watched an American walk on the 
moon. I witnessed the civil rights and women's movements. Ads appeared for the Peace 
Corps and. later. Americorps. As the Hubble telescope began to bring us closer to our 
cosmological origins. I watched millions leave their geographical origins. The face of my 
hometown changed as scores of immigrants planted themselves in Iowa soil. First, the 
"boat people"—my first taste of Lao food. Then Latino-Americans. Bosnians. Somalians. 
Sudanese—all searching for the freedom and promise that brought my grandparents to 
these shores. So even as I grew more critical. I came to love my country more—its 
plurality, adaptability, doggedness. proclaimed values, promise, endurance, and myth. In 
deconstructing the American myth ( I had never even heard of deconstruction ). ' in the 
process of recognizing our collective failures in living up to this myth. I grew committed 
to making equality, liberty, democracy, and justice for all a deeper reality. 
' Deconstruction is "a sceptical approach to the possibility of coherent meaning initiated by the French 
philosopher Derrida" which denies any "privileged point, such as an authors intentional itv or a contact with 
external reality, that confers significance on a text only the limitless opportunity for fresh commentary or 
text" ( Blackburn 95). 
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Still it continued. Iran/contra. The School of the Americas. Campaign finance 
corruption. Education cuts. Trickle-down economics. Skyrocketing CEO salaries. 
Declining wages. Layoffs. Sweatshops. Facing such disappointments. I came to see a 
certain moral diffidence underlying America's promise. Somehow, this diffidence came to 
be blamed on the people. The War on Drugs. Welfare Reform. Prison expansion. 
Mandatory sentencing. Three strikes. Then it came to be blamed on educators. A Nation at 
Risk. Reclaiming a Legacy. The De-Valuing of America. The Closing of the American 
Mind. Illiberal Education. Tenured Radicals. 
The conservative commentators I am about to take to task—whom I call "moral-
traditionalist™—praise the European West. America in particular, for a unique impulse to 
self-scrutiny and critique. Yet when faced with ugly truths by those who encourage this 
impulse, they condemn the messenger, seeking to return our youth to a mythical world, an 
education of "noble lies.™ ethno- even egocentricallv claiming they hold the universal 
answers to the questions of first philosophy—What is truth? What is justice? What is 
being? Questions that remain unanswered after twenty-five-hundred years of asking. 
Questions the very power and significance of which lie in the asking and re-asking, in the 
self-restraint to hold all answers tentatively. In the meantime, whatever answers we 
stumble upon provide our paradigms, constructs we think with but too rarely think about. 
The democratic world has long claimed the need to teach our children to deeply 
question the tentative answers of their forebears. Our efforts to do so comprise what we 
call "liberal education™ and we consider this education the foundation of our democracy. 
Yet too often the primary purpose of public education has been assimilation to the "noble 
lies™ that characterize the American myth. At bottom, a broad, deep liberal education has 
been too often limited to an elite; only these few sanctioned to grapple with the conflicts 
which characterize inquiry and debate. Alas, without access to the kind and depth of 
education allotted the few. the many will never hear the full range of voices and so will 
never enter the democratic dialogue as peers. 
Against this backdrop, moral-traditionalists claim nostalgic ownership of a past 
education which somehow did a better job of transmitting both knowledge and skills. As 
usual. I turned to Mom for perspective. Mom. educated for eight years in a one-room 
school, another four in a rural high school, just laughed. We talked about my education. 
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Mom reminding me how difficult it was. how much trouble I got into trying to feed my 
curious mind. We talked about my kids, marveling at how much more knowledgeable and 
sophisticated they are than I was as a young adult. And yet. from the vista I have gained as 
a teacher, my children's public education has not yet proven adequate. Too many students 
still enter my classroom uncritically accepting the status quo. comfortably assured that 
America embodies justice, that national prosperity is evidence of American justice, and 
that the unfortunate among us and abroad are uncivilized, unenlightened, or unwilling to 
pay their dues. And they don't want to learn otherwise. Faced with the task of critically 
examining assumptions, both theirs and mine, and armed with popular rhetoric about 
"tenured radicals.™ they balk at anyone who asks them to seek a greater good than athletic 
shoes and designer jeans. Perhaps something has been pushed aside as students are 
compelled to absorb vast amounts of highly specialized information preparing them for 
careers. Coming to focus less on community than on self, they lose the naive faith in 
democracy that drove their grandparents, even their parents, to the polls (at least)— 
replacing it with an equally naïve faith in the marketplace, the field of perceived 
opportunity which promises (at least hope of) material comfort. 
No doubt academic philosophical debates seem far removed from daily life. But in 
fact, "the problems central to our everyday social and practical lives™ are often rooted in 
the questions which "engage the specialized attention of academic philosophers™ 
( Maclntyre Virtue 36). Truth is. the answers offered determine what our children are 
taught, how they are taught, and to what purposes they are taught. But frankly, as 
discussion is most often carried out in obscure language.2 those who have the greatest 
stake in the answers often find the questions bewildering or cannot offer answers in voices 
respected by authority. One result is that citizens feel alienated from governance of our 
democracy. Fewer and fewer citizens participate in political processes, including the 
simple act of voting. Even as an economic elite command the ear of our government, we 
put our trust in an intellectual elite who employ conceptual and verbal tools that serve to 
~ Michael W. Apple notes that much theoretical and empirical research on the "relationship between 
education and class, race, and gender" is inaccessible to a broad audience because "it is published in 
academic journals or scholarly books less than totally visible" to the general population and rt "has been 
carried on in something of a private language noted for its involved theoreticism and. often, the abstract 
nature of its arguments" (Shor Culture Wars xi-xii). 
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shut out the average citizen. Yet to place both political and economic power in the hands 
of a few is contrary to democracy. Therefore, it is imperative that all those who lead these 
"everyday social and practical lives." comprehend the conversation regarding the roots of 
these most pressing questions. This imperative has only intensified now that our lives are 
not so "everyday." 
In the meantime. English Studies has only touched the tip of the philosophical 
iceberg. Although many in English engage with Continental literary theory, few engage 
directly with first philosophy, that is. epistemology. metaphysics, cosmology—questions 
about human nature and the nature of knowledge. And in light of the attacks on academia. 
many English teachers are reluctant to address the discourse of dissent and the 
accompanying study of ethics, for tear of inappropriately "politicizing" education. Even as 
our disciplinary literature is increasingly marked by dissent and charged with ethics, 
classroom treatment of ethics is often shallow: dissent too often relegated to a literary past 
or limited to a host of "safe" topics toward which we can point in the name of diversity 
and freedom of thought—AIDS, the death penalty, animal rights, gun control, abortion— 
topics which command our attention though only symptomatic of deeper concerns. More 
concerted efforts are all too often narrow attempts to open students* minds to new options 
of belief, particularly ideologies of oppression, to gain a forum for silenced voices; what 
some might call "political correctness." But such efforts often do little to improve the poor 
understanding many students show regarding the historical and contemporary contexts 
from which conflicting ideologies arise and in which they contend. Meanwhile, the 
continuing worth of long-cherished ideas and the fresh insight new readings bring to these 
ideas are too often treated as though they cancel each other out. Time and time again, 
moral- and counter-traditionalists, simply negate, even belittle the other s views rather 
than seriously engage them, leading to contentious and nearly irreconcilable debate both 
within and without English Studies. Therefore, to re-engage one another (as well as the 
lay audience who. directly or indirectly, depends on our teaching), we need to demonstrate 
self-restraint, cross disciplinary boundaries, and revisit the roots of this conversation. 
As my arguments are. therefore, inter-disciplinary and potentially esoteric to lay 
readers. I have put this introduction to use to define and contextualize some of the 
vocabulary 1 will use in the following discussion. Likewise. 1 have attempted in the 
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following chapters to define and link specialized vocabulary and concepts. So while some 
readers may feel I belabor certain concepts or neglect subtle distinctions, while others 
continue to find my arguments esoteric. I ask my readers to indulge the democratic spirit 
behind my attempt to reach diverse audiences. Certainly I cannot exhaustively address 
such huge questions, but I can both have my say and invite Mom. her neighbors, my 
children, and my students into this very important conversation. 
The Roots of the Conversation 
A central issue of this conversation is how to mark out belief, knowledge, and 
truth. The dominant paradigm—traceable from Plato through the scientific revolution—is 
grounded upon two notions: I ) that humanity is "capable of deep and accurate insight into 
the nature of being" ( Farrar 48): and 2) that humanity "in general exhibits] seriously 
defective judgment about such matters" (48). Upon these two premises is established the 
conclusion that only certain individuals can gain "privileged insight" (48) This position, 
often called rationalism, is constrained by the assumptions that reality is unchangeable 
and invariant, that by employing the right method rationally gifted individuals can access 
reality, and that, in light of the timeless and universal nature of reality, a given proposition 
either must or must not be true regardless of circumstances. 
These claims are both epistemologicaT and ethical. As to epistemology. 
rationalism asserts that truth is timeless, stable, objective, neutral, knowable. and 
applicable to human problems. Called by the Greeks sophia. this stable concept of 
knowledge is associated with the "essences" of things (Aristotle Metaphysics 1016b). 
"first causes and forms" ( 1032b). things that cannot be other than what they are.4 An 
"The nature and grounds of knowledge, especially with reference to its limits and validity" ( Webster). 
1 The Greeks developed a complex vocabulary for knowledge. As Aristotle produced the oldest extant 
rhetoric handbook, it seems apt to employ this vocabulary as would he. His most common term, episteme. is 
alternately translated to include knowledge of any sort and to specify- scientific (Rhetoric 1364b) or analytic 
knowledge ( 1359b). often indicating an object of knowledge rather than an act of knowing. The generality 
and flexibility of episteme and its association with objects make it unsuitable as a contrast to phronesis. or 
practical wisdom—which concerns "matters of action- on "human issues" ( Eudemian Ethics 114lb9 
Ostwaid). rather than the production of things as in sciences and arts. Hence, because Aristotle identifies 
both sophia and phronesis as types of episteme ( l246b5X I have selected sophia as a contrast to phronesis. 
Sophia describes the most precise and perfect form of knowledge." a -combination of nous and episteme' 
( 1141 a 15)—nous defined as "the faculty of intellectual apprehension, as distinct from mere empirical 
knowledge" (Blackburn 265X 
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absolute and unchanging reality that transcends the human condition, sophia is thought to 
stem from discovery through logical reasoning and scientific analysis of unshifting dam 
within humanity's environment. As to ethics, rationalism asserts that such truths can be 
applied to values as well as facts. Under this construct, the goal of inquiry is to discover 
truths that transcend the material and human world—stable, timeless, and invariant 
abstractions upon which we can ground science, ethics, and government. Possession of 
such knowledge is thought to allow mastery of both the physical and social worlds." 
But the 20th century ultimately cast doubt upon these assumptions, as "scientific" 
industrialization polluted our water and air. as nuclear annihilation became a palpable 
threat, as we paved over communities in the name of progress: in sum. as modem life 
seeded greater problems than we had ever imagined. In response to these problems 
emerged postmodernism—an intellectual reaction against the foundational claims and 
social consequences of Modem rationalism, seen as a "naïve and earnest confidence in 
progress" and "confidence in objective or scientific truth" ( Blackburn 294). Although it 
takes many forms, postmodernism suggests, by contrast, that notions of objectivity, logic, 
and rationality do not transcend time, culture, and situation but are determined by the 
worldview of the dominant culture. Postmodernists question objectivity, demonstrate 
alternative logics, and object that Euro-western (ostensibly male) notions of rationality 
ignore the valuable resources of other ways of thinking. Although they seem radical and 
revolutionary, many of the questions raised by postmodernism are as ancient as 
democracy. In fact, they arise from democracy—for democracy shifts attention from 
abstract philosophical problems of truth and being to concrete, political problems of 
knowledge and justice: from the search for certain truths ( episteme) to problem solving in 
the face of many opinions (doxai). 
Yet this democratic shift does not represent an abandonment of philosophical for 
the political, for plurality of thought is the highest ideal, not only of liberal education, but 
" As political theorist Thomas A. Spragens. Jr. points out. ~[ajt first glance, epistemology and politics might 
seems seem strange bedfellows — Epistemological questions appear to be highly abstract and reflexive 
quite removed from the sphere of political beliefs and behavior... however tacit assumptions about the 
who. the what, and the how of reliable knowledge profoundly shape basic orientation and arHniHr 
toward a whole range of important political concerns Revolutions within the tradition of political theory 
— are very often intimately associated with new departures in epistemology- ( 10—11 ). 
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of the Euro-western philosophy from which it springs. As political scholar Benjamin 
Barber notes: 
From their earliest encounters with belief (the claims of subjectivity). 
knowledge (the claims of intersubjectivitv). and truth (the claims of 
objectivity), pedagogy and scholarship have tried to balance the need to ask 
questions with the need to offer well-grounded but tentative answers. 
(Aristocracy 113)b 
In ancient Athens, as in the contemporary U.S.. these encounters took place in the public 
and political arena of civic, democratic discourse—formally, in the law courts or the 
assembly; informally, in the agora. or marketplace. In such arenas, success is not 
guaranteed by accident of birth nor is it a matter of force. It is instead a product of the 
citizen's rhetorical skill. To gain these skills. Greeks turned to the Sophists, the first 
professional teachers in the Western world. Rhetoric, loosely defined as the art of 
persuasive speaking, was the key skill needed by the citizens of Athenian democracy and 
so was the center of the Sophists" curriculum. 
Yet the age of the Sophists was marked, as our own. by a conflict between 
conservative values and the needs of democracy. Theirs was a functional epistemology 
with the aim of arriving at knowledge by agreement within concrete situations calling for 
guided action. Concerned thus with practice more than theory, "the Sophists gave people 
not only a philosophical base for liberalizing outlooks but also the specific skills for 
implementation** ( Barrett 38). Doing so. the Sophists furthered the aims of democracy and 
thus ran into conflict with proponents of the conservative view that only a naturally 
superior few have sufficient virtue to guide the populace in accordance with divine or 
natural law. Above all. the Sophists mark out a distinction between truth and justice, fact 
and value, between what is true and what is good, which acknowledges the uncertainty of 
the social realm. 
While marked differences exist in the philosophies of individual Sophists, 
particular trends appear. First, they mark a shift from the poetic, or mythic, tradition, in 
which the gods were seen as the source of wisdom, to the philosophic, or logos tradition. 
" Subjectivity - individual perception: Intersubjectrvity - the relationship between the perceptions of two or 
more separate conscious minds: Objectivity - the theory of knowable reality apart from perception. 
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in which human reason gains force and which is continued in the works of Plato and 
Aristotle. In brief, they challenged received theology and the rules of social order which 
followed upon it. Second, they introduced the concept that virtue (arete) can be taught, 
thus challenging the notion that virtue springs from noble birth. Third, they introduced a 
notion of knowledge in the human realm as contingent upon perspective and context. 
Finally, they furthered the notion that democratic decision-making is a process of 
rhetoric. As teachers of rhetoric, they thus promised skill in argument and consequent 
power in the legislature and law courts: a result that has been placed in opposition to the 
quest for truth which Plato names as the province of philosophy and which exists apart 
from, or despite, situational and cultural context. No doubt because rhetoric was often 
seen as mere persuasion, a tool for winning rather than uncovering truth, the Sophists 
became subject to attacks that they were relativists.8 
Such is the view of the Sophists that emerges in Plato's dialogues as Socrates 
interrogates them as to what kind of knowledge rhetoric can claim. In one such dialogue, 
pointing to various other disciplines, such as astronomy. Socrates clearly defines the 
parameters of each in an attempt to demonstrate that rhetoric does not possess knowledge 
of its own. as do these, but merely constitutes a "knack™ for packaging knowledge gained 
by other means so as to affect belief ( Plato Gorgias 463b)/ Without access to any truth to 
call its own. rhetoric is thus subject to the whims of dilettantes and liars. 
At the root of the conflict between Plato and the Sophists is a distinction between 
nature, physis. simply speaking, that which is. and human convention, nomos. that which 
we create. The tension arises from Protagoras.10 whose assertion "humanity is the 
measure of all things™ appears to do away with sophia. leaving truths to be "only what 
they are according to one individual in a particular situation" (De Romilly 98). The 
implications for maintaining social order are immense. Among other things, this doctrine 
was extended to question religious foundations upon which the laws were given their 
legitimacy. In the arena of justice, then, there comes to be "no difference between justice 
See Harold Barren. The Sophists. Novato. CA: Chandler and Sharp. 1987.: Susan C. Jarratt. Rereading the 
Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refieured. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP. 1991.: G. B. Kerfêrd. The 
Sophistic Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 1981. 
* See Richard Brett. "The Sophists and Relativism.- Phronesis 34 ( 1989): 139-169. 
* Unless otherwise indicate. Classical citations represent Greek editions. 
10 Protagoras. (485? - 405? BCE (before the common era)) is considered foremost among the Sophists. 
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and legality" (112); justice ceases to be a matter of preordained truth, coming into being 
as a matter of human convention. At the extreme, governance comes to be seen by some 
Sophists as no more than a matter of competitive power, the victors being those whose 
notions of knowledge and virtue attain cultural dominance: justice becomes merely the 
advantage of the stronger" (117 cf. Thrasymachus1 '). The very possibility of justice 
becomes unsettled, shaking the foundations of governance. 
Yet despite such anti-democratic undertones, the distinction between physis and 
nomas bears humanist and democratic potential as well. If "humanity is the measure." 
then each human is capable of measuring. Of such persuasion. Antiphon12 points out that 
"we are all by nature bom the same in every way We all breathe into the air through 
mouth and nostrils" ( De Romilly 115 cf. B44b. col. 2 in Freeman), a statement which 
classicist Jacqueline De Romilly asserts is "the first time that the thesis of a brotherhood 
of man had ever been put forward" (115). In this light, democracy takes advantage of the 
"humanity is measure" doctrine to build an ethic of egalitarianism which foregoes 
competition and power in favor of cooperation and rhetoric. Democracy, in short, is an 
agreement to talk. 
Along these lines. Protagoras defends rhetoric as a realm of knowledge concerned 
with "prudence in affairs private as well as public" (Plato Protagoras 319a). while 
nonetheless recognizing that in the social arena, one person's word is pitted against 
another's. How then is the truth to be determined? To Protagoras, the task falls to rhetoric, 
not to uncover stable truth, but to arrive at the best decision in the light of conflicting 
doxai. Hence, while the realm of rhetoric so defined is not nearly so tangible as that of 
astronomy, it is clear that Protagoras is attempting to identify a kind of knowledge which 
is not so certain, stable, or foundational as sophia. More clearly defined by Aristotle, this 
alternative is phronesis or prudence, the citizen-ruler's, i.e. orator's, "practical wisdom." 
thought "directed to some end and concerned with action" (Nichomachean Ethics 
1139b I ). Phronesis is not a product of inquiry but a process of deliberation, a movement 
1 
' Sophist. 460? - ? B. C. E. 
Athenian orator and Sophist. 480 - 411 B. C. E. 
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toward concrete action in solving problems (Il41a3l). concerning imminent justice rather 
than immutable truth.Ij 
Firmly seated in the public (in ancient Greece, oral) sphere of problem solving. 
phronesis invokes a perception of knowledge which presupposes dialogue between two or 
more parties with varying points of view—an inherently dynamic, local, and contingent 
process. Seen as the practice of phronesis. rhetoric aims neither for static truth nor merely 
effective manipulation in self-interest, but for contingent knowledge contextualized to the 
problem at hand. Rhetoric is thus, like more tangible disciplines, epistemici it produces 
some kind of knowledge. Understanding this, although we may claim to arrive at 
absolutes by means other than rhetoric, we must acknowledge the flux of human 
experience, the native, nonrational qualities of the human psyche, as well as the 
imprecision of the language in which claims are voiced, and conclude that foundations for 
universal claims are by no means absolute, but accepted by cultural consensus with a 
degree of faith. Rhetoric serves the purpose of making possible this consensus by the 
sharing of multiple viewpoints, the public weighing of the benefits of each: rhetoric aims, 
at least in part, for /crisis, or judgment ( Lunsford and Ede 44). It concerns good decisions, 
rather than true propositions. 
1 
' Phronesis is both named as a virtue < Rhetoric 1306b) and contrasted to vimie. arete ( 1378a: Politics 
1281b). as a kind of wisdom or decision-making capacity ( Eudemian Ethics 1214a). distinguished from 
episteme ( 1216a) and sophia ( Rhetoric 1366b). Phronesis is closely associated with language, which "serves 
to declare ... what is just and what is unjust" ( 1253a11 )—language is among the "arms" which "serve the 
purposes of phronesis and arete" ( 1253a 16). Yet Aristotle maintains that rhetoric has been given too much 
credit for phronesis. which, he claims, requires analytic knowledge and knowledge of human characteristics 
( Rhetoric I359b4~5)—so indicating his resistance to Sophistic doctrine. Defined as both particular and 
necessary to rulers ( 1277b 17). phronesis is an internal good (Politics 1323a-b) named as one of the three 
highest goods—goodness, wisdom, and pleasure. Using phronesis almost exclusively to represent wisdom 
in the Eudemian Ethics. Aristotle associates it with "the life of philosophy" rather than with "the life of 
politics." which is associated with goodness, arete ( 1215a). This ambiguity is cleared up in the 
Nichomachean Ethics where it is clearly defined as the ability to determine what is good or best, as opposed 
to sophia. which is composed of scientific knowledge and intelligence and concerns what is true. As 
phronesis is a virtue of deliberating about action ( 1140b24) rather than a techne of reasoning, therefore it 
does not achieve excellence but is itself an excellence ( 1140b25). Although it does not concern absolute 
truth, phronesis differs from doxa because it is informed by reasoning and virtue, while doxa may be 
arbitrary. Phronesis is a "Truth-attaining rational quality, concerned with action in relation to the things that 
are good for human beings™ ( 1140b20 Rackham) or "a truthful characteristic of acting rationally in matters 
good and bad for men" (Ostwald)—the virtue of the rational part of the soul that forms opinions. While 
Aristotle differentiates somewhat between practical wisdom (phronesis) and political wisdom (palilike 
techne or politike arete), the latter is a component of the former (Books 6-8). 
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A rhetorical view of knowledge thus acknowledges the political dimensions of 
knowledge formation, i.e. the ways in which the canon of knowledge is influenced by 
questions of citizenship or social status, audience psychology, ethics, and individual bias 
reflected in the questions asked and the manner in which they are answered. Politics is 
herein defined broadly as not only the means by which humans establish government, but 
the means by which humans interact in all arenas, from the elevated theory of scientific 
inquiry to the pragmatics of interpersonal interaction. Such a view presupposes that truth 
is influenced by the varying experiences and dispositions of individual humans, that truth 
is determined in a context of culture, events, and persons, a context of justice. The primary 
purpose of epistemic rhetoric14 is to account for the way in which subjective human 
experience influences knowledge making. It is a politike techne. a skill for sorting through 
particular viewpoints in the social arena so as to arrive at a decision upon which action 
may be taken. 
Eighteenth-century Italian humanist Giambattista Vico aptly explains the 
difference between abstract knowledge, sophia. and phronesis. which he terms prudence: 
In science, the outstanding intellect is that which succeeds in reducing a 
large multitude of physical effects to a single cause; in the domain of 
prudence, excellence is accorded to those who ferret out the greatest 
possible number of causes which may have produced a single event, and 
who are able to conjecture which of all these causes is the true one. (720) 
As Vico explains, in substance phronesis deals with particulars rather than universale— 
the events, individuals, and concerns of the moment rather than static truths which 
transcend the moment: it is an ability to reason correctly with respect to the variable 
(Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics 1140b 29). Primary to such an active concept of 
knowledge is the connection between human contingencies and intellectual pursuit. Rather 
than "seeing- the truth, the seeker interacts, or dialogues, with the data of existence, as 
with other seekers, in an attempt to arrive at a good decision. Accordingly, the seeker does 
not operate autonomously, but socially. We do not find subject matter just waiting for us 
but create subject matter to fit the needs of the present social situation. Hence, while an 
14 Epistemic rhetoric produces knowledge, as opposed to merely packaging knowledge for an audience. 
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investigation may begin with the general question "does it exist?.™* it culminates in the 
particular question, "why does it exist?'" or "what purpose can it serve?" (McKeon 60). 
Rhetoric, in this sense, is the substance of the conversation regarding relative truth, the 
"science" of society, of relationships between oneself and others, whether one defines 
these as individuals or communities, even a community as expansive as humanity. 
Essentially, the aim of rhetoric is to arrive at the best decision when truth is uncertain, to 
deliberate what action is most prudent and just. 
Objectives 
It is this basic conflict between two visions of knowledge which underwrites the 
current debate regarding humanities education. Quite simply, this debate has tended to 
polarize, one side arguing that the humanities tradition is to explore universal social truths. 
sophia. the other claiming that social truths cannot be conflated with sophia because such 
truths vary from culture to culture, circumstance to circumstance. Meanwhile, both 
positions are underwritten by philosophical assumptions regarding truth which are in some 
ways both incoherent and incommensurate. To illustrate these points of incoherence and 
incommensurability, in the following chapters I will explore the ways these assumptions 
serve to construct diverse self-concepts which underwrite the theory and practice of liberal 
democracy and. therefore, the theory and practice of democratic education. 
In Chapter One. I will clarify the divisions that mark the debate over the canon of 
literature, history, and philosophy and the treatment of this canon in the classroom—the 
educational end of what has been called the "Culture War."* I will examine the broad 
debate as it applies to English Studies, as well as the debate within English Studies, 
contrasting the epistemological and moral assumptions in this apparently polar conflict-
Drawing a parallel between the Culture War and traditional hostility toward the Sophists. I 
will argue that, as democracy is embodied in rhetorical practice rather than foundational 
truths, the English classroom is a natural site for education in the virtues of phronesis. In 
fact, study of virtue is particularly relevant to rhetoric—as virtues are themselves 
rhetorical constructs rather than universal truths and as virtues can be used to describe the 
way in which the rhetor comports herself. 
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In Chapter Two. I will identify the central concern of this conversation as a tension 
between moral excellence and political effectiveness. Employing an Aristotelian 
vocabulary. I will illustrate the ways in which the assumptions of philosophical liberalism 
may undermine the pursuit of excellence in the realm of justice. In particular. I will argue 
that the liberal self-concept identifies the individual apart from and in conflict with others 
and the community; that liberal thinking is undercut by marketplace assumptions which 
discourage civic participation and provide an inadequate model of inequality, domination, 
and oppression. I will conclude that liberalism misidentifies social goods as it misdirects 
social practices, and hence provides insufficient grounding for ethical discourse. 
In Chapter Three. I will examine the assumptions of Euro-western rationalism 
which underlie liberalism and their implications for democratic practice. I will argue that 
the dominant paradigm of inquiry, dependent on a concept of the calculative rational self, 
misconstrues the Good as an abstract, timeless, and unitary form, misrepresents the 
practices of reasoning as transcending "the oral, the particular, the local, and the timely™ 
(Toulmin Cosmopolis 30). and mishandles social institutions by according the 
"misrepresented™ rationality of individuals. Among the consequences are rhetorical 
practices which suppress dissent, conceal bias, and fail to challenge existing social 
hierarchies, so excluding most people from public deliberation. I will conclude by raising 
the specter of the fragmented self, a passive subject, citizen of nowhere, who conflates 
material acquisition and the right to personal privacy with self-determination and ethical 
social progress. 
In Chapter Four. I will employ the Platonic cardinal virtues to illustrate the way in 
which contemporary constructions of these virtues are used to silence dissenting voices. I 
will then propose a rhetorical way of looking at these virtues which draws its force from 
the teachings of Protagoras, provisionally resolving the somewhat artificial binary drawn 
between episteme and doxai so providing a more democratic vision of rhetorical ethics. 
As the Chapter Five I had planned toppled with the towers, in my final chapter I 
will return to our "everyday lives™ in the classroom, offering a glimpse into what has been 
called by many a "radical™ pedagogy. My experiences and those of my students as we 
attempt to work our way through the grief and terror will serve as illustration of the 
advantages of this approach to inquiry and teaching. Drawn from the work of Brazilian 
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revolutionary educator Paolo Freire. radical pedagogy not only promises to bring to lite 
the ideas of Protagoras, but serves as a means for both student and teacher to reflect, to 
self-scrutinize, as we reflect and scrutinize the context against which this tragedy 
occurred. In this context, radical pedagogy offers a step toward healing through 
intellectual growth and with that growth, to move each of us closer to becoming 
peacemakers. 
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Chapter One 
Culture War and the Moral Imperatives of 
English Studies 
Men who are more familiar with books than with affairs are apt to over-estimate the 
influence of philosophers. When they see some political party proclaiming itself inspired 
by So-and-So"s teaching, they think its actions are attributable to So-and-So. whereas, not 
infrequently the philosopher is only acclaimed because he recommends what the party 
would have done in any case. 
—H. G. Wells 
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding. 
—Judge Louis D. Brandeis 
If education worked, the rich would stop it. 
—Oscar Wilde 
As the only academic from a large and opinionated family. I occasionally find 
myself targeted at family gatherings, fielding (sometimes ducking) an onslaught of 
opinions regarding the current "crisis** in humanities education. Depending on the political 
leanings of the individual, these range from claims of declining literacy to assertions that 
the humanities have been "politicized" by radical leftists (like me. according to some). 
One brother expresses concern that his daughters may not be learning the skills they will 
need in the marketplace. Another laments that students are not being taught values. A 
sister worries that her sons will be indoctrinated into a woridview that excludes her and 
their sister, perhaps even her developmental^ disabled son. My mother asks whether the 
values being taught are the traditional values we want our children to be taught. Often 
they seem to see these as unrelated issues. Yet in their frequent calls for "back to basics.™ 
many seem nostalgic for an education which did a better job of teaching both skills and 
values. While I frequently disagree with their proposed causes, as well as with their 
solutions, the concerns they name have been at the root of my pedagogical, curricular. and 
research efforts throughout my graduate education and teaching career. 
Meanwhile, they don't really understand what I teach, or for that matter, what I 
research. Most of them remember English class as the place where they were compelled to 
read "great" literature. Some of the boys clearly preferred Mad. Hot Rod, and Bart Starr. 
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American Champion, while the girls preferred Teen. Archie, and Trixie Belden. One 
sister remembers not even learning to read well until after high school. "Rhetoric.** at 
worst, was something that took place in Washington: at best, a class where the college-
bound learned to compose a five-paragraph theme. My love of literature and particularly 
my affinity for writing poetry marked me as the bookish type. Today they recognize me as 
a writer and a writing teacher, but they don't understand what I write about and their 
vision of writing instruction hasn't gone beyond five-paragraph themes. 
Once in awhile, someone asks. "What's a rhetorician?" Explanation is difficult: I 
usually settle for describing myself as a teacher and analyst of human symbolic behavior, 
and explain that I look for. and teach others to look for. the meanings hidden between the 
lines, within the images, in the communicative behavior of human beings. Like 
Protagoras, who plays a major role in the following arguments. I believe all people 
capable of practicing my discipline. Not only that. I believe everyone must practice this 
discipline for democracy, equality, and liberty to flourish. Unfortunately, we live in a 
world which numbs this capacity—sometimes through poverty and oppression, sometimes 
through education that suppresses rather than encourages thought (sometimes in the guise 
of encouraging it), and sometimes through excess material satisfaction. As an heir of the 
rhetorical tradition. I believe it the responsibility of everyone in the humanities to embrace 
our legacy and re-enliven this capacity in our students and in our community. 
As a rhetoric teacher. I am therefore faced with a vast array of interlocking and 
sometimes conflicting challenges. Clearly, my students must learn to write in such a way 
that they will be not only understood but respected. To deny them this skill is to deny 
them social, political, and economic self-determination. Yet rigid standards of correctness 
often inhibit the content, tone, or style of what they write, frequently in effect silencing 
them, and so likewise inhibiting their self-determination. At the same time, my students 
need something to say. But those who have led comfortable lives too often wear blinders 
to all but their most immediate fancies while those who have struggled often feel that no 
one will listen. For most of these students, learning to write is merely a painful task "to get 
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over with.**1 Asked why they need to learn to write, they give varied, unsatisfactory 
answers. "To get a job.** "To write papers in my major classes.** "To succeed in business." 
Even. "I don't know. In my career. I won't even have to write." They do not see writing 
romantically as a way to express their deeper souls. Nor do they see writing as a 
fundamental element of their exercise of free speech. Frankly, most of these students see 
the right to free expression as freedom from government intrusion rather than as the 
privilege of participating in self-governance. The point is. I must not only teach my 
students to write. I must give them a purpose for writing beyond the classroom and a 
forum in which they feel free to try their wings. Above all. t must teach them to write, and 
to speak, so that their tree exercise of expression does not misrepresent, mislead, or 
unfairly silence others. To do so. I must teach them to respect dissent, to reflect on the 
roots of dissent, perhaps recognize their own dissent. And this means teaching, or at least 
facilitating development of. values. Among these values are the ideal of human equality 
upon which civil rights are grounded and the impulse to self-governance, the 
responsibility of democratic participation that attends these rights. 
Meanwhile, school shootings. Washington moral scandals, increased sex and 
violence in the media, and declining civility in the political arena have elicited heated 
debate regarding moral virtue. Though the notion of virtue is itself conservative, 
commentators across the political spectrum have entered the tray, nearly all sharing the 
assumption that at least partial responsibility for inculcating virtue lies with schools. 
History backs them up. as the American university and public education have generally 
been characterized as having a moral purpose in the service of democracy. In the words of 
Thomas Jefferson, the only sure reliance for the preservation of our liberty" is to 
"educate and inform the whole mass of the people" ("Comments" 123). that they may be 
raised "to the high ground of moral respectability necessary to their own safety, and to 
orderly government" ("Aristocracy" 285). 
1 Susan Miller argues that administrative discrimination between students required to take composition and 
those sufficiently qualified to "avoid™ h_ as well as division of majors and non-majors into separate 
composition courses, defines composition as ~a task to be got out of the way" (86). 
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Yet recent discussions of moral crisis have largely focused on domestic behavior, 
sensationally that of our elected officials, but particularly that of our youth.2 Though 
noteworthy, this focus has two consequences: 1) it deflects our moral gaze from the 
practices of governments and economic institutions which, in a democracy, are morally 
answerable to the people: 2) it threatens to define virtue as passive cooperation with these 
practices, so denying the average citizen opportunity to participate in their improvement. 
There is no better time to expand our focus than the present. Indeed, against the context of 
"America's New War™ (CNN), public debate regarding liberal and democratic virtue may 
escalate as we try to identify what went wrong. Or it may cease as fervent patriotism and 
national security concerns silence dissent and self-critique. I take the position that the 
latter must not be permitted, that in our efforts toward justice and. ultimately, peace, we 
must hold ourselves accountable to the values we have so long professed. 
With this in mind, among my primary concerns is the failure of U.S. public 
education to prepare the average citizen to critically analyze the central concerns of 
democracy and attendant economic sy stems. In the spirit of "equal access to all." we have 
come to interpret access in economic terms and so our schools have become little more 
than centers of job training." With their rights reduced to "a piece of the pie" and their 
responsibilities reduced to production and consumption, students are often denied the very 
education they need most, that in which "future citizens learn to critically engage politics 
and received knowledge both inside and outside the classroom" (Giroux Stealing 2). The 
- This "moral decline"* may be exaggerated- Political analyst Michael Lind cites journalist Barry O'Neill 
(New York Times Maeazme. 6 Mar. 1994) which reveals as a hoax "two lists of behavior banned in public 
schools, one from the 1940s and the other from the 1980s"—the former listing ~( I) talking: (2) chewing 
gum: (3) making noise: (4) running in the halls: (5) getting out of turn in line: (6) wearing improper 
clothing: (7) not putting paper in wastebaskets**: the latter listing "*( I ) drug abuse: (2) alcohol abuse: (3) 
pregnancy: (4) suicide: (5) rape: (6) robbery; (7) assault" (164). 
' Stanley Aronowitz asserts that vocationalism motivated the GI bill and other higher education funding 
(Factory). Ira Shot identifies three phases of school reform between 1969 and 1983. each focused on the 
creation and/ or management of a labor force. The earliest, careerist reform, offered the elite a broad liberal 
education and tracked majority non-elites into job-oriented programs. This movement's failure led to "back-
to-basics.- which Shor describes as a "blame the victim" movement with the depressant effect of lowering 
expectations of the non-elite (Culture Wars 93-96). The third phase disguised "education for high tech 
corporate growth" as "education for economic growth" ( 129). Shor argues that these measures are largely 
conservative reactions to the turbulence of the 1960s and sets out to debunk, many of the myths and to reveal 
the political machinations that support arguments for such plans. Clark Kerr, meanwhile, calls knowledge 
the "product" of the university, calling for a two-tier system—the upper to train knowledge-makers, the 
lower to produce technical personnel for the labor market (Uses). 
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domestic consequence is a narrowing of the democratic vision—as evidenced by 
drastically low voter turnouts.4 and a growing economic, as well as political, power gap.6 
The global consequence is that our citizenry often seems to accept U.S. economic 
dominance as unproblematic evidence of cultural and moral superiority—a woridview 
which has elicited international hostility toward the U.S.. at times even from allies. We 
must therefore expand our moral focus to encompass the practices of governmental and 
economic institutions and we must bring this focus into the classroom as we prepare our 
students as occupants of these. In short, we must produce citizens answerable to a greater 
good than the bottom line, willing and able to scrutinize U.S. governmental and economic 
practices, that they may hold excess in check. Such focus will likely meet with resistance, 
for engagement in self-critique is liable to unsettle both cherished beliefs and seats of 
power. Nevertheless, it must be done, tor if we fail to recognize U.S. culpability for global 
crisis, we cannot become better, we can achieve neither justice nor peace. This will 
require humility, tor we have long held up America as moral exemplar. This will require 
12000 Voter turnout was 51.1% (National Public Radio), up only slightly from 49.08% in 1996 (Federal 
Election Commission). 
' CEO salaries increased on average 17% from 1998-99. reaching an average S 12.4 million—475 times the 
average blue collar salary. 6 times the 1990 CEO average (AFL-CIO). nearly 1200 times the minimum 
wage. Michael Lind points out that "between 1973 and 1995. the wages of the 80 percent of the American 
work force whom the government classifies as "production and nonsupervisorv workers" fell by 18 percent, 
in dollars adjusted for inflation, from S315 per week to S258 dollars per week... most of the income gams 
have gone to a small group within the upper 20 percent of the work force. A mere I percent of families in 
the United States received 79 percent of all the income generated in this country between 1977 and 1990. 
with much of that bonanza going to the top tenth of that I percent" (247). 
™ Industry gives huge sums to campaigns and spends millions lobbying. For example, the drug industry gave 
S2.4 million to Democrats and S6J million to Republicans between 1999 and 2000 to further legislation 
extending patents and blocking generics. Past successes loosened advertising regulations, leading to a profit 
increase from S16 billion in 1990 to $25 billion in 1996. Tax code changes allowed the drug industry to pay 
an effective tax rate of 16_2% from 1993-96. compared with a 27 J% effective tax rate for other major 
industries. Oil companies have likewise benefited from heavy campaign and lobbying expenditures—S100 
million in direct contributions since 1991. nearly $58 million on lobbying in 1998 alone. Their aims include 
repeal of gasoline taxes and increased domestic drilling, notably in the Alaska Wildlife Refuge (The Center 
tor Responsive Politics). Meanwhile, facing the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history, energy giant Enron 
avoided federal corporate income tax in four of the last five years by hiding profits in nearly 900 offshore 
subsidiaries—yet it received $382 million in tax refunds (Cohen I3A) Enron contributed half a million 
dollars to the Bush campaign as well as contributing to the campaigns of 71 senators and 188 congressmen 
and has enjoyed remarkable influence over government energy policy (Rich 2). Against this backdrop. 
Michael Lind argues that politics in the U.S. is controlled by an "overclass — based in the university-
credentialed professions'* ( 10). distinguished from faculty at colleges and research institutes by employment 
in independent think tanks funded by "large individual and corporate donors and ideological and 
professional groups'* whether left, right, or centrist (II). 
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restraint, for justice without restraint is vengeance. And this will require dissent: for peace 
without dissent, we call tyranny. 
Education at Cross Purposes 
In the meantime, a market emphasis in our schools and colleges threatens this very 
task. The market pressures placed on academia are apparent from elementary school 
through post-doctoral research. Increasingly, the need to compete for research dollars 
places universities in the service of industries which may profit from new knowledge. 
This very real financial burden filters down not only to undergraduate education, but to 
the public schools which prepare our children for college. Under these conditions, much 
education is passive preparation as product for the labor market7 and consumer of goods 
produced: * each seen as a central civic duty. Even that lofty goal, "research for human 
improvement." is not spared, as research has come to be cast primarily as a profit source, 
often in the form of consumer products and services.4 Meanwhile, concerned that their 
children will be unable to compete in the global marketplace and conflating economic 
security with the benefits of democracy, uninformed parents seek greater focus on 
technology and job-related skills.10 In the eyes of many, while once the marketplace of 
ideas, the university is now a mere training ground for the material market. 
Describing this ""commercial/technological/business emphasis'* (Corrupting 10) as an educational "cold 
war* (9). J. Peter Euben quotes The Gardner Report ( Reaean-ap pointed National Commission on Excellence 
in Education): "knowledge, learning, information and skilled intelligence are the new raw materials in 
international commerce"* (7). For counter-arguments, see John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe. Politics. 
Markets, and America's Schools. Washington. D. C.: Brookings Institution. 1990: and David Kearns and 
Denis Doyle. Winning the Brain Drain. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies. 1988. 
1 Jean Bethke Elshtain argues that the "ideology called Progress... celebrated a world of endless growth. 
which meant more and better consumerism. It was essential to move from the glorification of producer 
to the glorification of consumer because the conclusion was that underconsumption leads to declining 
investment" ( 13). Bill Readings concurs that education is no longer defined by "its civic function; rather it is 
primarily a commercial venture in which the only form of citizenship is consumerism" (85). 
* Aronowitz notes that theoretical research has come to be seen as useless because it bears no industrial or 
consumer application, citing funding cuts for "non-dedicated research such as particle physics" (42). See 
also Martin Kenney. The University Industrial Complex. New Haven: Yale UP. 1986. 
10 Composition theorist G wen Gorzelsky points out that this "utilitarian" view of "education s meaning and 
uses." particularly among working-class students and their families, encourages the market—driven forces 
within the university which currently threaten the humanities and thus "ironically help[sj to resolidify 
working-class students" exclusion from higher education" (307). 
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Indeed, the dual demands of career and moral training often appear to be at cross 
purposes. At least since the 1984 release of William Bennett's To Reclaim a Legacy.11 a 
host of scholars and commentators from across the political spectrum have expressed 
concern that the humanities, traditional site of the liberal democratic conversation, have 
been sidelined by science, technology, and business administration.12 Literature professor 
Bill Readings, for one. sees this trend as an indicator that the mission of the university as 
"producer, protector, and inculcator of an ideas of national culture™ (3). has fallen prey to 
economic globalization and the accompanying ascendance of corporate culture over 
national. That is. the need to secure wealth and global dominance for multi-national 
corporations and their investors has forced the university to legitimate itself in economic, 
rather than cultural, terms. As this market focus may "signal the end of "culture* as a 
regulatory ideal that could unite community and communication™ (89). Readings 
maintains that 
either we seek to defend and restore the social mission of the University by 
simply reaffirming a national cultural identity that has manifestly lost its 
purchase — or we attempt to reinvent cultural identity so as to adapt it to 
changing circumstances [or wej abandon the notion that the social 
mission of the University is ineluctable linked to the project of realizing a 
national cultural identity, which is tantamount to ceasing to think of the 
social articulation of research and teaching m terms of a mission. (90) 
Despite Readings" pessimism, humanists throughout North America, unwilling to 
abandon this mission, are eagerly engaged in defending or reinventing it. 
'
1 Produced during Bennett's tenure as director of The National Endowment for the Humanities. 
~ Allan Bloom calls the humanities the almost submerged Atlantis" (371 ). while Roger Kimball notes 
declining enrollments. Euben questions the Gardner Report claim that the "humanities must be harnessed to 
science and technology" (Corrupting 9) because of their "creative and humane" and "civilizing" (9) 
qualities—a move which gives primacy to science technology and "given the military metaphors." reduces 
"civility" to "politeness and good form rather than an active, informed, and critical citizenry" ( 10). See also 
Stanley Aronowitz. The Knowledge Factorv: Dismantling the Corporate University and Creating True 
Higher Learning. Boston: Beacon. 2000: Robert Hoilmger. "On Democracy. Culture, and Education 
Today." The Dark Side of Liberalism: Elitism vs. Democracy. Westporc Praeger. 1996: James £_ Kinneavy. 
"Restoring the Humanities from Exile." The Rhetorical Tradition and Modem Writing, Ed. James J. 
Murphy. NY: Modern Language Association ( 1982): 19-28: Bill Readings The University in Ruins. 
Cambridge: Harvard UP. 1996. 
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Bennett, for example, sets out to defend the humanities against market pressures 
on the premise that the mission of the humanities is to impart values. O f course as might 
be expected in our pluralistic society, this effort has raised the question. "Whose values?" 
The variety of answers offered have culminated in an often contentious debate known as 
the "Culture War."*1'' frequently characterized as a tug-of-war between the Judeo-Christian 
or Euro-western tradition and a diverse body of theories and practices which have come to 
be identified as cultural studies, multiculturalism. deconstruction. and a variety of other 
monikers. Without a doubt, the central question of the Culture War—whether to 
"reaffirm™ or "reinvent™ this culture—represents academic resistance to abandoning our 
cultural mission. Setting aside disagreement as to what constitutes this culture, what 
values it promotes, or which developments are legitimate, there seems to be general 
agreement that our educational mission is to strengthen and further democracy. 
In the meantime, as a correlation between literacy and moral values has had a long 
history as rationale for English departments, it comes as no surprise that journalists and 
scholars outside the discipline have identified English Studies as a central battlefield in 
this so-called war. Against this backdrop, a number of interrelated movements are taking 
place within English Studies. First. English departments increasingly look to their role in 
teaching Composition—seen in utilitarian terms—as rationale for their place in academia. 
Yet certain problems emerge from an emphasis on Composition as a skills-based, service 
profession. Seen as having no subject matter. Compositionists are considered "mere™ 
teachers, rather than scholars.14 They can thus be drawn from the ranks of graduate 
students and the surplus of English Ph.D.s in search of permanent, tenure-line positions in 
their areas of specialization—saving departments and their colleges vast sums of money, 
though at the high human cost of low salaries, overwork, and lack of job security. While 
the high cost paid by these teachers is clear, it is not yet clear what impact their subjection 
! 
' Lind argues that the "so-called culture war- serves as a means fbr the conservative elite "to divert the 
attention of voters from the ongoing class war of the overclass against wage-earning Americans" ( 12). 
" The status accorded Composition reflects the arguments of Socrates that Rhetoric has no subject matter. 
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to overwork, and undue economic stress may have on the quality of education their 
students receive.1* 
Second. Composition is engaged in an effort to overcome an image as a remedial16 
course—an image that marginalizes Composition research as internal to the discipline, a 
private conversation geared toward improving our product, teaching. At many colleges, 
this results in lower salaries even among the ranks of the tenured and less opportunity for 
tenure than comparable disciplines in the humanities. To overcome this image. 
Composition has been working to define a public body of knowledge specific to itself to 
serve as rationale for its existence as a research discipline. One strategy is to follow the 
market model and develop a body of knowledge directly beneficial to industry—theories 
and applications for improving internal corporate communications, as an example. A 
second strategy, the subject of my interest, is to resist market pressures and develop 
theories and applications of civic discourse—which, of course, involves discussion of 
values. While these strategies frequently intersect, it is the second strategy in particular 
that places Composition at the center of the Culture War. 
Third. Literature is engaged in a concurrent effort to reassert its relevance to public 
life. Long understood as peripheral to market concerns. Literature gained its place at the 
core of English Studies as "the major discipline entrusted by the nation-state with the task 
of reflecting on cultural identity™ ( Readings 70). This trust has operated on the premise 
that a stable canon of virtue underlies the Euro-western and/or American ethos, that great 
5 Teaching assistant salaries, often unaccompanied by health insurance or tuition assistance and not subject 
to unemployment benefits, are often below poverty level—although "assistants" may teach heavier course 
loads than tenured faculty while attending classes full time. Temporary instructors, usually employed 
semester to semester with no unemployment benefits, may also teach heavier loads at pay often lower than 
the US. average tor a beginning public school teacher—often with no benefits, cost-of-living adjustments or 
raises. Robert Connors chronicles the poor working conditions, low pay and status, and high workloads of 
writing teachers since the beginning of English departments ("Overwork"). The American Historical 
Association documents that, in all but three humanities disciplines surveyed, part-time faculty comprise 22 
to 42 percent of teaching staff Freestanding composition programs rate the lowest percentage of tenure or 
tenure-track faculty ( 14.6). while in broader English departments, "just over a third — were full-time tenure 
track" ("Summary" 2). 
16 Aronowitz argues that "in the wake of the failure of secondary education to equip students with basic 
writing and reading ability (where this means more than "skills." connoting genuine facility with language), 
postsecondary institutions of all types have an important role to play. In this sense, even many so-called elite 
colleges are. in part, remedial" (29). See also James Berlin. "Conclusion and Postscript to the Present." 
Rhetoric and Reality: Writing Instruction in American Colleges. 1900-1986. Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
UP ( 1987). 180-189: and Susan Miller. Textual Carnivals: The Politics of Composition. Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois UP ( 1991). 84-120. 
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literature ameliorates these virtues, and that the business of English teachers is to teach 
appreciation of such literature so that students may be encouraged to emulate these virtues 
in their writing and daily conduct.17 It is both resistance to and insistence on this history 
that places Literature at the center of the Culture War. 
Values and Literacy 
While it is not difficult to envision a link between moral education and the reading 
material to which our children are exposed, it may seem strange to regard language usage 
as a moral issue. Yet historically, arguments regarding functional literacy often bore a 
surprising moral component. This is nowhere better illustrated than in George Bernard 
Shaw's Pvgmalion which satirizes not only the way in which language usage bears on 
social class, but the way in which social class subsequently bears on moral assessment. 
Simply put. Henry Higgins' goal is to raise Eliza Doolittle from the status of a guttersnipe, 
"a person of the lowest moral or economic station" (Webster), to that of a duchess, merely 
by changing her dialect. That Eliza herself understands that her poverty and the language 
which reflects it cast her in poor moral light becomes clear as she persistently defends her 
sexual honor and sobriety. As for Eliza's father. Higgins maintains that "sentimental 
rhetoric the Welsh strain in him — accounts for his mendacity and dishonesty™ ( Shaw 
25). Even Doolittle himself points out that the poor "can't afford" morals (27). Plainly, 
adopting the language or dialect of the dominant class has long been seen as necessary to 
acculturation, moral as well as civic and economic. 
In the U.S.. as increasing numbers of immigrants and other low-status individuals 
entered public education in the late nineteenth century, the English curriculum "uneasily 
divided in its allegiance to a utilitarian vocational objective... and a class-inspired 
doctrine of culture, of linguistic and moral propriety" which emphasized "common moral 
values and the development of general vocational abilities" (Piche 18-19). "Exclusive and 
' For the history and politics of English departments see: Arthur Applebee. Tradition and Reform in the 
Teaching of English: A History. Urbana: NCTE. 1974: James Berlin. Rhetoric and Reality: Writing 
Instruction in American Colleges. 1900-1986. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP. 1987: Gerald Graff 
Professing l ifpramre: An Institutional History. Chicago: University of Chicago P. 1987: Susan Milter. 
Textual Carnivals: The Politics of Composition. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP. 1991. and James F. 
Slevin. "Depoliticizmg and Politicizing Composition Studies." Politics of Writing Instruction: 
Postsecondarv. Ed. Richard Bullock and John Trimbur. Portsmouth. NH: Boynton/Cook. 1991.(1-21). 
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compulsory instruction in English" came to be seen as a way to release students from the 
"thralldom and tyranny"" of "un-American" language, ""traditions and associations'" 
which foreign tongues carry with them (20).18 Consequently. 
with linguistic propriety and correctness so intimately associated with civic 
responsibility, absolute accuracy in these matters assumed the attributes of 
a moral imperative. Slipshod spelling rose from slipshod thinking which 
rose from "inadequate moral ideals." (Piche 21) 
Yet moral concerns regarding literacy education go far beyond the linguistic assimilation 
of immigrants, from an early emphasis on public oratory to arguments regarding the place 
and purpose of English literature in the curriculum.19 
Without a doubt, one argument for the establishment of Literature as an academic 
discipline was that literature "as an instrument of moral and aesthetic education" would 
"exercise that influence on taste, on tone, on sentiment, on opinion, on character, on all 
... which is susceptible of educational impression" (Collins 78). Several leading 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century educators argued for English departments as a site for 
molding character, including President Woodrow Wilson, who asserted: 
If this free people ... is to keep its fine spirit, its perfect temper amidst 
affairs, its high courage in the face of difficulties, its wise temperateness 
and wide-eyed hope, it must continue to drink deep and often from the old 
wells of English undefiled. quaff the keen tonic of its best ideals, keep its 
blood warm with all the great utterances of exalted purpose and pure 
principle of which its matchless literature is full. (89) 
This "moral touchstone" view of literature is perhaps best known through the works of 
18 The shift from the Greek/Latin canon to the English was also, in paît, a means for "initiating unruly 
immigrants into the superior culture of the English-speaking races" (Eufaen Corrupting 24). Composition 
likewise arose in response to admission of the "common masses" into schools fbr "gentlemen"—a means for 
"indoctrinating them into openly middle-class values of propriety, politeness, and cooperation" (S. Miller 7). 
Gregory Clark and S. Michael Halloran argue that, influenced by 18th-century oratorical culture. 19th-
century rhetorical education initially assumed that rhetoric "was to form and sustain a public consensus, 
intellectual and moral, as the basis of civic action" ("Transformation** 2). As oratorical culture gave way to 
literary culture, the locus shifted from enlistment of "communal consensus" to development of "the expert 
and autonomous individual" (5). "the good man skilled in speaking" whose civic duty it was to articulate an 
established wisdom and focus it on particular issues" (7 cf. Quïntiltan (Institutio Oratorio 12:1). While this 
shift may mark a development in the theoretical underpinnings of English Studies, it does not extinguish the 
moral imperative but shifts it from the community to the individual ( 13). 
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nineteenth-century literary theorist Matthew Arnold whose "ideal of broad general culture 
and literature as a coherent criticism of life" ( Graff Professing 4) had enormous 
influence on English departments through the twentieth century. Arnold, objecting to the 
research orientation of philology (linguistics) and historical literary studies which 
dominated English departments in the nineteenth-century, preferred to see the study of 
literature as "capable of higher uses, and called to higher destinies to interpret lite for 
us. to console us. to sustain us™ ("Poetry™ 403). Indeed, a study of student-written themes 
at Harvard reveals not only that "Europeans and Americans considered the essay an 
essentially moral form™ (Joliffe 170) but that many "writers felt a moral obligation to 
foster a vision of "culture" that stems directly from the works of Matthew Arnold" (169). 
Much of this argument rests on assumptions about aesthetic "taste." Eighteenth-
century rhetorician Hugh Blair, for example, maintains that cultivation of "taste"— 
defined as "the power of receiving pleasure from the beauties of nature and art" (803)—is 
"in its native tendency, moral and purifying" (802). Blair goes on to say 
The moral beauties — exert an influence ... on a great variety of other 
objects of taste. Wherever the affections, characters, or actions of men. are 
concerned... there can be neither any just or affecting description of them. 
nor any thorough feeling of the beauty of that description, without our 
possessing the virtuous affections. (805) 
Blair further suggests that the superior taste to be cultivated is a Western product of 
Western values, "reflecting on that immense superiority which education and 
improvement give to civilized, above barbarous nations" (804). Likewise, he asserts that 
the "high, manly, and forcible eloquence" necessary to such expressions of taste are "to be 
looked for only, or chiefly, in the regions of freedom [the] democratical states" (821). 
Doing so. Blair connects aesthetic considerations with those political. 
The sentiment that literature embodies and implants virtues continues to have great 
force. Writing fbr the public eight years following his report as Humanities chief. Bennett 
argues that Euro-western philosophy, history, and literature "are a rich quarry of moral 
literacy" ( De-Valuing 48) which will ensure that youth uphold "the principles, sentiments, 
ideas, and political attitudes that define the permissible and the impermissible, the 
acceptable and the unacceptable, the preferred and the disdained, in speech, expression. 
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attitude, conduct, and politics™ ( 10). These "principles, sentiments, ideas, and political 
attitudes" he identifies as those of the American middle class (13). 
Moral-Traditional Values 
Bennett has led the charge for critics who see attempts to multiculturalize 
humanities curricula and to critique Western culture as threats to the Euro-western canon 
of philosophy, history, and literature and the values it allegedly represents. This 
position—which I call "moral-traditional™20—has dominated the media for some years 
and has thus raised alarm among the general public. Moral-traditionalists hold that 
movement away from the "best that is known and thought" (Arnold "Criticism" 257 in 
Cheney Truth 14) and toward analysis of power relationships represented by such texts, as 
well as study of alternative literatures, histories, and language conventions, have resulted 
in excess intellectual liberty, diminished literacy, and moral decline. 
Among these critics, philosopher Allan Bloom calls for shoring up the Western 
tradition by means of education in the "Great Books." claiming that "courses in "values 
clarification* springing up in schools" are "little more than propaganda" which introduce 
students to "issues the significance of which they cannot possibly understand" (61). 
Unlike Bennett. Bloom faults the middle class, claiming that "parents do not know what 
they believe, and surely do not have the self-confidence to tell their children much more 
than that they want them to be happy and fulfill whatever potential they have" (61). Yet 
Bloom locates primary fault in the universities where, he claims, by opening inquiry to 
"all kinds of men ... lifestyles ideologies" (27). scholarship has been thrust into a 
state of reiativistic chaos, the consequence of which is a lack of foundation for claims, 
moral or otherwise. Bloom maintains. 
Relativism is necessary to openness [the{ only virtue which all primary 
education21 ... has dedicated itself to inculcating. The point is not to 
3 While Republican cabinet members and advisors often voice this position, it has no consensus along party 
lines but represents a taction vying tor dominance on the right. Michael Lind identifies tour U.S. political 
philosophies which illustrate divisions within the parties as well as between them—left liberalism 
(economic and social liberalism); neoliberaiism (economic conservatism, social liberalism): conservatism 
(economic and social conservatism): national liberalism (economic liberalism, social conservatism). 
21 While Bloom here indicts primary education, his purpose is to describe the state of mind with which 
students enter college. Bloom goes on to argue that college further encourages this alleged "relativism." 
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correct the mistakes and really be right: rather it is not to think you are 
right at all. (26) 
[n short, he charges, openness results in a closing of the mind to the truth of our traditions 
and history, plunging the student or scholar into an ineluctable condition of radical 
skepticism. Likewise, writer and editor Roger Kimball warns against 
the destruction of the fundamental premises that underlie our conception 
both of liberal education and of a liberal democratic polity. Respect for 
rationality and the rights of the individual: a commitment to the ideals of 
disinterested criticism and color-blind justice: advancement according to 
merit, not according to sex. race, or ethnic origin, (xii) 
Kimball calls multicuituralism "thoughtless egaiitarianism" in which "differences of race, 
class, sexuality, and ethnic heritage must be given priority over our common humanity.™ 
culminating in an "Orwellian™ demand for "strict intellectual conformity™ in which 
"tolerance is reserved exclusively for those who subscribe to one's own perspective™ 
(219). Arguing that the canon is by no means elitist but a "deeply democratic — tradition 
before which all are equal™ (78). Kimball further contends that multicuituralism is 
antidemocratic as "the phrase "multi-culture* and its variants have become code words fbr 
an approach to the humanities that is in effect a/zf/-cultural—at least anti-high-cultural™ 
( 81 ). so denying the multicultural student body equal access to the allegedly unique 
enlightenment of Euro-western civilization. 
Former Reagan domestic policy analyst Dinesh D'Souza similarly takes issue with 
the ways in which the terms "culture™ and "values™ are used among those he labels 
members of the "victims* revolution™ ( 14): 
The term cultures signaled a new pluralism—not one culture but many. 
Values suggested a certain relativism, in which various systems of thought 
would be considered on a roughly equal plane. Certainly any hierarchy of 
cultural values would be alien to the spirit, if not the letter, of the new 
requirement. Both physically and culturally, "other voices™ would find 
themselves included and indeed emphasized. (67) 
D'Souza sees the core of this problem as pollution of the academy by the unworthy, 
arguing that affirmative action admits unworthy students as well as hires and promotes 
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unworthy faculty. Denigrating the "new canon** for lack of timelessness and universality, 
as well as an alleged focus on victimhood. D'Souza argues that the new curriculum and 
the scholarship which attends its formation lack necessary academic rigor. For example, 
he contends that Rigoberta Menchu—whose autobiography about Indian victimization by 
the Guatemalan army has become standard fare in multicultural curricula—has entered the 
curriculum, not because her work has literary merit but because "she simply happened to 
be in the right place at the right time** (72)." The consequence of such a particular, as 
opposed to universal, curricula is lack of objectivity among students, says D'Souza. 
In like mind. Lynne Cheney, former Chair of the National Endowment for the 
Humanities, insists that the humanities are being turned into a "political tool** at the hands 
of feminists and multiculturalists. Hence, she decries a student activity which places John 
D. Rockefeller on trial for ""knowingly and willfully participating] in unethical and 
amoral business practices designed to undermine traditions of fair and open competition 
for personal and private aggrandizement in direct violation of the common welfare"* 
(Truth 27). Here Cheney commits an error of self-contradiction by failing to note that a 
trial shows both sides. 
Cheney, too. calls for a humanities curriculum in which "the enduring truths that 
emerge from the study of great authors: Homer and Euripides. Milton and Shakespeare. 
Locke and Montesquieu™ ( 14) are examined in "a disinterested endeavor to learn and 
propagate the best that is known and thought in the world** (Arnold "Criticism** 257 in 
Cheney Truth 14).^ Although both she and D'Souza give a nod to texts from non-
Western. non-European, and female perspectives, presumably these are to be evaluated by 
the Euro-western standards which gave birth to the canon and their political implications 
are to be excluded from the classroom as "ideological.** It is certainly telling that Cheney 
wrote her dissertation on Arnold. 
At any rate, while D'Souza laments a diminishment of the elite and a consequent 
failure to prepare our students for membership in this elite. Cheney warns that "many 
~ One wonders how D'Souza might assess the commonly canonized Anne Frank's Diary of a Young Girl. 
23 Though Arnold is often quoted "the best that is known and said" (Culture). Cheney. Kimball, and 
D'Souza prefer "the best that is known and thought" from "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time." 
delivered at Oxford in October 1864. 
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feminists—and other political activists as well—maintain that we should do away with the 
idea of excellence not only on the grounds that it is oppressive but because it is an 
illusion" (Truth 36). Meanwhile, journalist George Will24 leads the cry that "the elites 
have abandoned an ethic of character" (in Bennett De-Valuing 13). And. while 
nonetheless arguing that all students should be educated in the canon. Allan Bloom baldly 
identifies the elite as "the kind of young persons who populate the twenty or thirty best 
universities" (22). According to Bloom, the students who will benefit most from his self-
defined liberal education are few and "become the models for the use of the noblest 
human faculties and hence are benefactors to all of us. more fbr what they are than fbr 
what they do" (22).~ 
By contrast. Bennett plays on fears that the elite excludes the average American. 
Decrying a "soft curriculum" (De-Valuing 49) developed by a "liberal elite that today 
dominates our institutions and who therefore exerts influence on life and culture." Bennett 
maintains that education is dominated by political liberalism—as distinguished from 
philosophical liberalism—which is out of touch with "the most important beliefs of most 
Americans" ( 11 ).26 These beliefs are. of course, those we have come to know as the 
American dream—which apparently includes "conventional morality, patriotism. Ronald 
Reagan, or even Rocky, light beer, cookouts. or Disney World" ( 13). Bennett, too. is 
caught in a contradiction as he claims these values are best represented in elite literary 
texts. 
~
l Will condemns the "democratization" of the arts, faulting then-current chair of the National Endowment 
of the Arts. Bill tvey. for "auto-intoxicated. faux-intel!ectuai[ismj™ ("Artists"). 
~ Lester Faigley calls attention to ~a reversal of the longstanding American belief that the public schools 
should give everyone equal opportunity to education" (52). correlated with the U.S. Dept. of Education's A 
Nation at Risk which calls upon schools to provide a supply of trained workers for the labor market" (51). 
26 Lind claims that realignment of the left from representation of working and middle class white immigrants 
and their descendants to "affluent white left-liberals" (29) and minority, female, and gay "caucuses" has 
"given credibility to claims of conservative politicians to represent the forgotten majority' against a 
supercilious cultural elite™ (30). He notes that working class whites have defected from the Democratic 
party at a remarkable rate largely because of the perception that their economic interests are no longer 
represented (30). Yet Lind argues that these conservative claims are a smokescreen for economic policies 
destructive to most working people. Calling conservative populism an "oxymoron." he notes that 
conservatives have long beat "defenders of elites and establishments, and American conservatives, in 
particular, have been defenders of the prerogatives of the rich and the business class" (2). 
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Politics and English Studies 
In light of concern over the traditional canon, it is no surprise that college teachers 
of English have come under direct fire from moral-traditionalists who see focus on diverse 
literary traditions and political conflict as inappropriate in classrooms traditionally 
devoted to the study of Euro-western literature and Standard Academic English.27 The 
villain named in this crisis is theory, specifically postmodem Continental literary theory, 
which holds, on the one hand, that the meaning of text is not fixed and. on the other hand, 
that texts reproduce the power relationships of the cultures in which they are produced. 
Although Continental theories are many and varied, they are often lumped 
together, along with the curricula and pedagogies they inspire, under the rubrics 
"deconstruction™ and "multicuituralism.™ On the one hand, this move allows opponents to 
ignore debates among theorists, so allowing a great body of distinguished scholarship to 
be dismissed with a wave of the hand. Liberal arts professor Cary Nelson explains: 
the term "deconstruction™ now functions as something like a traveling 
suitcase that can be crammed — with every prominent theory of 
interpretation over the last several decades; "multicuituralism™ serves 
for them as a convenient meeting ground for affirmative action efforts in 
hiring, along with every research or pedagogical effort to revise and rethink 
the dominant canon of literary texts. (98) 
On the other hand, ignoring these debates allows some proponents to embrace such 
theories tout court, so giving some credence to moral-traditionalist claims. 
D'Souza comes down directly on literary criticism, using selective examples to 
effect the charge that literary theory is a primary source of the relativism which he claims 
now plagues scholarship throughout the university. Among the consequences he cites: 
There is no determinate standard against which classroom evaluations, or 
student papers, can be measured. Thus grading assumes a pointless 
character: it doesn't reflect what the student produced, only the arbitrary 
and politically motivated preferences of the teacher. ( 180) 
~ See Maxine Hairston. -Diversity. Ideology, and Teaching Writing.- College Composition and 
Communication 43 ( 1992): 179-194: and Lester Faigley. Fragments of Rational itv: Postmodemitv and the 
Subject of Composition Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh P ( 1992). 74-75. 
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Similarly. Cheney asserts, "the usual grades are A"s and B's. with feminists arguing that 
even that much hierarchical ordering is patriarchal and oppressive aesthetic standards 
are nothing more than white male constructs"* (Truth 18). Above all. D'Souza and Cheney 
claim that new voices are not merely being added to the curriculum but are displacing 
Homer. Aristotle, and Shakespeare, among others.28 
Likewise invoking selective comments from literary theorists. Kimball bemoans 
that the idea that college students should acquaint themselves with the 
great ideas which have influenced the actions of men in the past, and 
continue to do so in the present would instantly elicit a whole range of 
objections ... [including} that there is no agreed-upon set of "great ideas" 
that speaks equally to every ethnic and racial constituency. ( 14) 
In unison. Will decries the "supplanting of esthetic by political responses to literature" 
which he charges "aims at delegitimizing Western civilization by discrediting the books 
and ideas that gave birth to it" (in Nussbaum 102). The assessment is simple: theory-
driven literary practice inserts politics into an arena which should be culturally neutral. 
Not only does curricular content come under tire from moral-traditionalists, but 
pedagogical practice does as well. In keeping with their view that the Euro-western canon 
represents universal truths, moral-traditionalists see the purpose of pedagogy as 
transmission of these truths. Hence. Allan Bloom sees the task of teaching as assisting 
"his pupil to fulfill human nature against all the deforming forces of convention and 
prejudice" (20) through exploration of "the permanent concerns of mankind" (19). Under 
this construct, the text, as traditionally read, is authoritative. "Alternative" readings such 
as spring from gender and minority studies are simply misreadings. Likewise, the 
instructor, insofar as she is a traditional literary scholar, is authoritative; her job is to 
present proper interpretations and to correct misreadings. Moral-traditionalists tend to be 
disturbed by "critical" pedagogies in which both canonized and uncanonized texts are 
examined for the power they represent, as well as those considered "radical." in which the 
teacher resists her intellectual authority to make way for new readings from students. 
3 D'Souza claims universities are "expelling Homer. Aristotle. Shakespeare and other "white males (20) 
whom Cheney claims multiculturaiists view as "icons of the corrupt civilization of the West" (Truth 15). 
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Yet not all who would defend the canonical tradition are comfortable grounding 
their defense in values education. Echoing criticism that market forces subvert the 
disinterestedness and objectivity which are the mark of true scholarship, humanities 
professor Harold Bloom, for one. maintains that 
the silliest way to defend the Western Canon is to insist that it incarnates 
all of the seven deadly moral virtues that make up our supposed range of 
normative values and democratic principles The West's greatest writers 
are subversive of all values, both ours and their own.** (Canon 28) 
To Bloom, the question is not whether students are obtaining appropriate values from the 
humanities curriculum but whether the university exists to serve the marketplace or 
something vaguely defined as "pure scholarship" which seeks knowledge "for its own 
sake" rather than for gain, material or moral. Bloom rejects moral arguments on the same 
terms as market arguments—that they place scholarship at the service of interests. 
However. Harold Bloom's argument for a non-moralistic aesthetic is itself a set of 
moral values. He stresses that the "authentic reader" will be "an illumination to others" 
("Praise" 103) and that "the quest to be canonical" is a striving to "join communal or 
societal memory" (Canon 18). Certainly, the ability to illuminate others is a quality of 
character, hence of values. Likewise, communal and societal memory embodies the values 
of a community and society. Whether these values are reflected in or challenged by 
canonical works, the struggle to read "authentically" builds a kind of character which 
includes the "capacity to form judgments and opinions" ("Praise" 102). By Bloom's 
lights, the right kind of reading is carried out by an elite "few who have the capacity to 
become highly individual readers and writers" (Canon 17). As for democratic education. 
Bloom believes, "literary criticism, as an art. always was and always will be an elitist 
phenomenon. It was a mistake to believe that literary criticism could become a basis for 
democratic education or societal improvement" ( 16). In addition to being elitist, here 
Bloom reduces the purpose of English Studies to literary criticism, ignoring its role in 
writing instruction, linguistics, and English as a Second Language. 
Despite Bloom's objections, in the end. moral-traditionalists argue that defense of 
the Euro-western canon is not a defense of a political point of view, but a defense of moral 
truths which, having withstood the test of time, should be considered absolute, universal. 
36 
and transcendent. Of such a mind. Allan Bloom asserts that "the West is defined by its 
need for justification of its ways and values fbr discovery of nature... for philosophy 
and science" (39). going on to lament that "cultural relativism succeeds in destroying the 
West's universal or intellectually imperialistic claims, leaving it to be just another culture" 
(39). Likewise, despite giving some credence to great works in other cultural traditions. 
D'Souza claims that "curiosity about other cultures appears to be a distinctively Western 
trait" and that "Western culture was [sic| distinctive in that it was so introspective" (88). 
"Self-scrutiny" is the term Roger Kimball gives this allegedly unique Western moral 
quality as he maintains that "the civilization represented by that much maligned [white | 
race has been ... considerably more enlightened politically than any other civilization in 
world history" (xvii). 
Yet classicist Martha Nussbaum directly challenges Allan Bloom's assertion that 
"only in the Western nations ... is there some willingness to doubt the identification of 
the good with one's own way" (Nussbaum 132 cf. 36). Nussbaum also chastises Kimball 
and Will. who. she stresses, "caricature the activities of today's humanities departments 
by focusing only on what can be made to look extreme or absurd" (298). While conceding 
that "literacy, including cultural literacy, confers both strength and independence" (35). 
she maintains that, "introduced as cultural authorities." Western civilization or "Great 
Books" are "all too likely to become products of veneration and deference, sitting in the 
mind without producing strength in the mind itself* (35). Moreover, she argues that 
Harold Bloom's professed alternative, teaching literature without reference to values, 
would likely succumb to "an extreme kind of aesthetic formalism that is sterile and 
unappealing" (35). So while she agrees with moral-traditionalists that the Euro-western 
aesthetic tradition has shown an "intense [though not unique] concern with character and 
community" (89). Nussbaum asserts that the values explored should represent global 
diversity and that exploration must include examination of historical and contemporary 
conflicts which have arisen from this diversity. 
Political theorist Benjamin Barber concurs that "if education is treated as or 
reduced to nothing more than giving the right answers—the proper values, the canon, the 
moral Truth—it becomes a kind of indoctrination" (Aristocracy 82). In Barber's view. 
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The aim of introducing gender and racial categories into curricular 
discussions and the aim of challenging formal roles of equality and 
universalism need not be to fragment and subjectify knowledge or deny the 
possibility of a true universal theory ... The aim. rather, is to show that 
supposedly objective knowledge is already subjectified and fragmented in 
covert ways. ( 104) 
Barber asserts that the canon's claim to truth stems from arguments as to its authoritative 
origins—"revelation, or nature as read by reason, or of wise philosophers in possession of 
a unique rational faculty" (214)—origins the legitimacy of which Barber doubts and 
which are fundamentally undemocratic. Such a static canon tails to account for alternative 
historical experience and cultural expression and so "fails the test of truth as well as 
pertinence" (214). Hence. Barber concludes, "the ancient canon choking on its dusty 
claims to legitimacy can suffocate" (213). 
Above all. particularly at this historic moment, proclamations of Euro-western 
superiority may fuel the resentment and hostility that increasingly colors non-Western 
perceptions of the European West: may inhibit insight into our commonalities with non-
Western traditions: may blind us to fresh insight into problems of justice: and may retard 
scrutiny of the ways in which we have failed to uphold our beliefs in practice. 
Unfortunately, the events of September 11 * may have served to exacerbate Euro-western 
claims of moral and cultural superiority. Almost immediately following the attack. Italian 
Premier Silvio Berlusconi, for example, was pressured by Muslims worldwide to recant 
his assertion that Euro-western civilization is superior to Islamic culture ("Premier" 2). 
But certainly the women of Afghanistan, as well as the victims of other oppressive 
regimes, cherish the ideals of freedom, equality, and justice. Even so. underlying media 
commentary on the war on terrorism is the premise that "moderate" Islam represents their 
enlightenment by Western values. Meanwhile, the Bush administration and U.S. military 
and intelligence agencies scramble for recruits with capacity for insight into the language, 
culture, beliefs, and grievances, not only of extremists, but of the Islamic world as a 
whole. Should such insights prove damaging to America's self-image, the question may 
arise as to whether they will be heeded. Indeed, current events cast a shadow over our 
claims of superiority—for when we consider the long war waged by the Taliban and other 
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oppressive regimes against their own. we must ask ourselves. "Why were we not outraged 
before September 11?"*29 
Concerns such as these are often voiced by representatives of the position which 1 
will call "counter-traditionalist." While this term is inadequate to cover the diverse body 
of theories and practices about which moral-traditionalists are alarmed, it will for present 
purposes suffice to say that the theories it encompasses number among intellectual 
reactions to the assumptions of Modernism. In this, they can be called "postmodern." 
Counter-Traditional Values 
Educational theorist Henry Giroux submits that the moral-traditional position is 
underwritten by three myths—"the end of history." "childhood innocence." and 
"disinterested scholarship." The first "assumes that liberal democracy has achieved its 
ultimate victory and that the twin ideologies of the market and representative democracy 
now constitute ... the universal values of the new global village" (Stealing 2). That is. 
this myth assumes that human history has reached its culmination: all that remains is to 
extend liberal democracy throughout the world. But as this myth holds "liberal culture" as 
"synonymous with market culture." democracy is likewise "conflated" with the market, 
"canceling] the tension between market moralities and those values of civil society ... 
that are critical to democratic public life" (2). As I will later argue, this myth, in part a 
product of philosophical liberalism, depletes democracy of its vital core. 
Meanwhile, the second myth suggests that students must be protected from 
alternative viewpoints lest they succumb to immoral choices or plunge into relativism. In 
Giroux s view, such protection denies students autonomy and self-determination as it 
absolves adults of their responsibility for teaching children how to negotiate moral terrain 
and the "dictates of marketplace mentalities that remove the supportive and nurturing 
networks that provide young people with adequate healthcare, food, housing, and 
educational opportunities" (Giroux Stealing 2). In fact, he asserts, the viewpoints from 
which this myth claims students must be protected are those that don't buy into the third 
myth, which disconnects teaching and learning from "improving the world" (3) and 
3 The United States contributed $43 million dollars to the Taliban in May 2001 fbr their efforts in the war 
on drugs, despite our knowledge of rampant human rights violations in Afghanistan (Scheer I ). 
39 
defines teaching as a "technical and instrumental practice" (3) of disseminating 
"objective" knowledge and "neutral" skills. Culture has come to be ~exclude[d] from 
the political realm enshrin[ed] as a purely aesthetic discourse or as a quasi-religious 
call to celebrate the "great books" and "great traditions" of Western Civilization" (4). 
Giroux thus proclaims that the moral-traditionalist argument "betrays a racist discourse 
and rising fundamentalism in American society that impairs the possibility for schools to 
address the democratic imperatives tor civic courage, social responsibility, and critical 
citizenship" ("Pedagogy" 180). He is not alone in his assessment. Bill Readings concurs 
that "the canon is an ethnocentric and non-representative basis on which to ground the 
claims that have been historically made fbr literature" (85). More diplomatically, liberal 
arts professor Carv Nelson points out that while the texts themselves may or may not 
betray racism, they "have a history of racist and sexist use" and that "the Right confuse(s) 
efforts to reinterpret texts with efforts to remove them from the curriculum" ( 102). 
At the heart of these arguments is the issue of agency—"the ability to interpret 
events as well as the ability to influence, change, or redirect them within a specific 
situation" ( Ewald and Wallace 343). Composition theorist Nina Schwartz, for one. raises 
concerns about '"ideological abuse* a culture's representation of itself in the media 
and elsewhere as an unproblematic "translation* of natural law into social practices and 
institutions" (60)/° Because practices and institutions appear unproblematic. Schwartz 
asserts, "students failing to distinguish between the natural and the social, the 
inevitable and the conventional, cannot help but develop a world view that keeps them 
relatively inarticulate" (61). Schwartz shares with other counter-traditionalists the concern 
that because public education has primarily focused on economic access to the material 
benefits of United States capitalism, students are unable to perceive the forces working to 
reduce them to worker bees and. hence, cannot be active makers of meaning. From this 
position, corporate ideals represented by "outcome based" instruction in standardized 
practice contribute to passivity like a carrot on a stick—if only the student can master this 
standard, she can attain a place among the elite and enjoy the material rewards that attend 
such a place. Moreover, counter-traditionalists fear, ideals represented by the Euro-
•° Referencing Roland Barthes. French literary theorist and philosopher of language ( 1915-1980). 
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western canon may serve to silence voices, both historic and contemporary, which offer 
fresh insight into problems of justice. At bottom, they argue that standards are never 
neutral but are infused with the cultural values of those they benefit. 
At any rate, while moral-traditionalists suggest that English departments are 
generally unified in their alleged allegiance to relativism, the debate within the discipline 
has been fierce. For example. Vtaxine Hairston bemoans "a new model emerging for 
freshman writing programs" which "puts dogma before diversity, politics before craft, 
ideology before critical thinking, and the social goals of the teacher before the educational 
needs of the student"* ("Diversity" 22). At the center of her concern is a shift away from 
traditional literary topics as the content of student writing. Response to Hairston *s tears 
has been vast and varied. Ron Strickland, among the responders. contends that 
the concept of "canon" doesn't apply in composition studies in the same 
way that it does in literary studies, and composition scholars have long 
been concerned with extending social power through literacy in ways that 
are frequently at odds with literary studies" traditional emphasis on the 
preservation of elite culture. (250) 
Strickland asserts that composition studies has long operated on the democratic premise 
that widespread literacy levels the playing field. The albeit optimistic goal is to produce 
citizens who participate in the creation of culture rather than watching from the sidelines 
or reading on the bench. 
But in fact, "the concept of a canon" often plays a major role in Composition. At 
many colleges and universities. Composition represents a majority of courses taught in the 
English department. To meet this high demand. English faculty in other specialties, such 
as literature and linguistics, are often rotated into teaching Composition. Likewise, 
graduate assistants who teach Composition are often drawn from other specialties and 
most, regardless of graduate specialty, received their undergraduate degrees from 
Literature-dominant departments. The upshot is that Composition students need subject 
matter for writing: Composition teachers have a close affinity to Literature departments: 
so subject matter for Composition is often drawn from Literature. Even when subject 
matter is drawn from elsewhere. Literature frequently serves as the "touchstone" for 
writing standards. Hence, the battle over the literary canon intersects with Composition. 
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Even so. the teaching of writing raises additional concerns. 
First, the standard language taught is that of the powerful. Yet students are often 
better able to express themselves in their own dialects. Hence, the National Council of 
Teachers of English has adopted the "Students* Right to Their Own Language.™ The 
NCTE. after compiling rigorous research, concluded that "differences in dialect derive 
from events in the history of the communities using the languages, not from supposed 
differences in intelligence or physiology": that "designations of prestige" are "externally 
imposed." shifting "as the power relationships of the speakers shift": that "dialect is not an 
impediment to reading" and does not "impede the child's ability to learn to write" or 
"limit the ability to think." They thus conclude that failure to understand a speaker of a 
dialect in one's own language is "attitudinal" and that "the claim that any one dialect is 
acceptable amounts to an attempt of one social group to exert its dominance over another" 
(NCTE 2-4). Second, emphasis on mastering grammatical standards at the expense of 
critical reading, textual analysis, and other literacy skills threatens to prepare students only 
to be cogs in the machine. Third, emphasis on structural exactitude and purportedly 
"objective" style reduces language to a neutral, non-moral medium through which passes 
knowledge discovered by other means, effectively ignoring the practical matter of 
communication ethics. 
These things in mind, rather than model good writing after that of dead white men. 
composition teachers often prefer to examine political conflicts, including those embodied 
in grammatical, literary, and rhetorical standards. These scholar/teachers hope no less than 
to facilitate the ability of students to become meaning-making subjects, to challenge 
accepted wisdom and. by doing so. to deepen both cultural knowledge and democratic 
justice. Looked at in this way. counter-traditionalists espouse "not so much a politics of 
composition as what might more accurately be called a rhetorical ethics " (M. Clark 168). 
This ethical concern is two-fold: one. that to teach students to emulate a "standard** 
grammar and rhetoric is to reproduce a culture that benefits a privileged elite which few-
will ever join: and two. that failure to examine the political implications of standards gives 
tacit agreement to the privileged and oppressive authority of those few who will join, or 
are already members of. the elite. 
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On this note. Patricia Donahue and Ellen Quandahl argue that "learning to write 
conventionally ('correctly') is at odds with reading complicatedlv." leading to "prose that 
suppresses conflict and encourages the unconscious reproduction of social norms" 
("Reading" 14). Mariolina Salvatori similarly maintains that "adoption of a theory of 
reading that privileges and counts on prior background information can — obliterate the 
understanding and the practice of reading and writing as interrelated, self-reflexive, and 
reciprocally illuminating activities" (20). According to John Clifford, one result is that 
"the status of the *1* that "writes" the essay is so decentered. so alienated from actual 
experience that many students have as much emotional identification with their school 
writing as they do with geometry" (48). The goal, says Don Bialostosky is to "authorize 
our students to reaccent, not just reproduce, the disciplinary languages we and our 
colleagues impose on them" ( 18)."1 
Other defenders of this "new model" share concern regarding Hairston's 
characterization of students. John Trimbur. for one. worries that Hairston "reveals a 
predilection to look at differences as threatening, confrontational, and potentially violent" 
and "doesn't trust her students" ability to handle the social and cultural differences that 
organize the realities of contemporary America" (249). Trimbur argues that the "low-risk" 
classroom Hairston envisions "can only have the effect of reproducing students as 
spectators, perpetually on the verge of being overwhelmed by the experts who have the 
credentials to speak" (249). Similarly. William H. Thelin asserts that Hairston 
"characterizes students as apprehensive and timid, nervously testing their teachers and 
freezing in high risk situations ... mak[ing] it seem that students are incapable of 
discussing political and ideological stances that threaten their own ideas" (252). Trimbur" s 
and Thelin*s comments are reminiscent of Giroux's argument regarding the myth of 
childhood innocence. College students are not children. They may marry, drink alcohol, 
vote, have babies, hold down jobs, attend PTA. fight with in-laws and. as we have most 
chillingly been reminded, fight our wars."'2 
1 Referencing Bakhtin. Russian literary theorist and philosopher of language ( 1895-1975). 
^ Susan Miller argues that placement of Composition at the beginning of an -imagined continuous and 
sequenced collegiate curriculum- (87) constructs the student as "a young beginner... presexuaL 
preeconomic. prelrterate- ( 87). although the "typical college student is an adult... unlikely to complete a 
degree in fewer than five or six years, and is most likely to be part of the approximately 60 percent of 
entering freshman who do not graduate at all from the institution at which they begin"* (87). 
43 
So while counter-traditionalists are in tacit agreement with moral-traditionalists 
that citizenship is an underlying purpose of English Studies, many see functional literacy 
as inadequate and cultural literacy as arbitrary, elitist, oppressive, or itself inadequate, and 
so endeavor to encourage political literacy. As an example. Trimbur identifies "a move to 
reconceive (or perhaps restore is a better word) First-year Composition as rhetorical 
education for citizenship ... and to place public discourse squarely at the center of the 
curriculum"* (248-9). Trimbur asserts that in such a curriculum, "students can learn an 
ethos of collaborative disagreement that casts differences as matters of negotiation instead 
of as fearfully violent"* (249). Similarly. Donald Lazere maintains that 
our primary aim should be to broaden the ideological scope of students" 
critical thinking, reading, and writing capacities so as to empower them to 
make their own autonomous judgments on opposing ideological positions 
in general and on specific issues ... within a rhetorical framework quite 
different from anything students are apt to encounter in political science or 
other social science courses.- ("Teaching"* 36) 
Indeed, from assorted theoretical camps and political perspectives, compositionists 
frequently point out that practical ethics is an integral part of writing education. 
For example. Sandra Stotsky. herself leaning toward traditionalism, asserts that our 
task is to introduce students to "the academic principles that should guide thinking and 
learning about any topic academic manners as well as academic mores"* ( 795). Stotsky 
suggests renewed focus upon the responsibility of the writer to all audiences "independent 
of the reader's needs'* (798). correlating academic writing to "participation in a republican 
form of self-government" ( 798). Thomas Miller takes a similar approach, redefining 
professional writing as "social praxis."* an "effort to negotiate between the pragmatics of 
public life and the abstractions of the academy" ( 59). Miller argues that the assumption 
that rhetoric can exist apart from ideology renders knowledge irrelevant to the public 
forum, concluding that political context is central to composition. For Miller, too. this is 
an ethical issue because "when we broaden our frame of reference to focus instead on 
the ideal of the public citizen, we can then begin to place the organizational context in the 
larger context of public life" (67). 
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Postmodern Sophists 
As these writers exhibit, some writing theorists and teachers perceive citizen 
education as more appropriately grounded in rhetoric than in literature. Among them. 
James L. Kinneavv asserts that "one of the most promising saviors of the humanities 
might be the restoration of rhetoric."* as "rhetoric made the humanities relevant to the 
political and religious life of society" ("Restoring" 20). According to Kinneavv. the loss 
of this "core and this vital link" (20) is to a large degree responsible for the ebb of the 
humanities. In a similar vein. John Schilb posits that composition studies "can even more 
powerfully illuminate [cultural studies and postmodernism j and examine the wisdom 
linking them" ( 175) than can literary studies. Certainly, this focus on rhetoric serves, in 
part, to explain the importation into English departments of the work of Continental 
philosophers of language. Yet many composition scholar/teachers draw their impetus from 
canonized literature as well, notably Aristotle, whose rhetoric handbook not only well 
serves such purposes but addresses familiar questions of culture and values. Others, like 
me. draw their impetus from the Sophists, to whom Aristotle responded as much as he did 
Plato. 
Certainly, the accusations moral-traditionalists level at counter-traditionalists bring 
to mind another trial 2500 years ago—that of Socrates. There is irony in the way moral-
traditionalists so often rely on Plato as exemplar of the search for truth. Despite Plato's 
near reverence for Socrates, as political scientist J. Peter Euben points out. the charges 
they assert—as those against Socrates—are that counter-traditionalists are 
corrupting the youth by seducing them away from their parents and 
traditional authorities and distracting them from the pursuit of wealth. 
honor, and power of not believing in the gods — with being 
unpatriotic and lacking proper respect for the achievements and sanitized 
self-representation of their native lands of making the worse argument 
the better by engaging in logical shenanigans that trick the youth into 
transgressing proper boundaries and repudiating normal ways and rightful 
hierarchies as they are defined by those with political and cultural power. 
(Corrupting 33) 
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Notably, "when these conservatives appeal to the ancients, it is the rationalist Plato to 
whom they turn, rather than the subversive Socrates" ( Barber Aristocracy 111 ). it is 
further notable that it is the Sophists whom "the rationalist Plato" chose as the foolish 
"relativists" at wise Socrates* feet. 
Clearly because moral-traditionalists claim the role of cultural protectors, counter-
traditionalists. like the Sophists, are subject to attacks that they are furthering the ills 
which beset U.S. democracy. Thus a poster found in a corridor at my university warns: 
Knowledge Under Fire 
Your Professors' War Against the Mind: 
The Black Hole of Post-Modernism and Xfulticulturalism 
Vlulticulturalism and deconstruction are the new rage on college 
campuses—and they are destroying a student's ability to think and to 
value. The two movements teach students that Objectivity is a myth, and 
that a student's subjective whims determine the meaning of a text. These 
ideas are responsible for the ever-growing racism on campus. 
In this talk. Dr. [Smith} explains the essence of post-Modemism. and how 
philosophers for the past two hundred years have paved the way for today's 
[nationalism by systematically divorcing reason 60m reality. 
While this poster goes on to specifically argue in support of Ayn Rand's Objectivism.""' it 
is nonetheless emblematic of the moral-traditional critique of multicultural or 
deconstractive curricula and alternative pedagogy in the humanities. 
Particular to my concerns, it appears that moral-traditionalists would deny teachers 
in English Studies the role most appropriately assigned literacy classes—to introduce 
students to the conversation of democracy. Certainly, by means of electives and new 
Russian-bom novelist and philosopher ( 1905-1985) who founded a philosophical school of radical 
individualism, summed up as "man—every man—is an end to himself, not the means to the end of others. 
He must exist for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself The 
pursuit of his own rational self-interest and of his own happiness as the highest moral purpose of his life [my 
emphasis("Introducing Objectivism- I ). 
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"diversity™ requirements, some students may gain the liberal outlook that constitutes this 
conversation. But both students and teachers too often see the purpose of these classes as 
merely to foster "tolerance** in the workplace rather than to engage in scholarly inquiry 
into global conflict and difference. Again, the market prevails. What's more, only in 
literacy education can democratic education be carried out en masse}4 
Without question, as literacy education has its roots in the study of Rhetoric, 
renewing this role tor English departments can be seen as the most recent development in 
a twenty-five-hundred-year tradition of education for the political arena. Viewed in this 
tradition, the purpose of literacy education is to facilitate students* practical and political 
reasoning, that is. phronesis. Such education must have a moral component, for phronesis 
is not abstract thinking but judgment in the messy context of human affairs. 
Rhetoric and Virtue 
Since phronesis is the wisdom to sort out social problems, it is clearly an ability to 
arrive at a decision in light of competing claims, each of which is likely to appear to the 
claimant as truth, even as the truth of sophia. If one were to assume a foundational stance, 
such as the moral-traditionalists, one would reason that only one claimant may be correct. 
A view of human knowledge as phronesis. by contrast, holds that each claim may possess 
a grain of truth, relative to each claimant's perspective. The method of phronesis is to 
weigh the merits of each claim against the other; to debate, critique, reconsider, concede 
or refute all or a portion of a given claim; to integrate claims with one another, i.e. to 
engage in rhetoric until a decision is reached which seems just to all or most. Naturally, 
the ethics of both judge and claimant in such circumstances are of utmost importance. 
Hence, to arrive at a judgment, both judge and claimant must possess not only knowledge, 
but arete, commonly translated as excellence or virtue. 
The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines virtue as a "trait of character that is 
to be admired: one rendering its possessor better, either morally, or intellectually, or in the 
conduct of specific affairs.** Alasdair Maclntyre calls virtue "an acquired human quality" 
which "sustain(s) us in the relevant kind of quest for the good" and "furnish(es) us with 
14 At many colleges, at least one semester of First-year Composition is required for most students. Most 
colleges and degree programs also require advanced Composition and additional literature courses. 
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increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good" (Virtue 219). Both 
definitions distinguish virtue from other formulations of ethics by embodying the notion 
that ethics may reach beyond surface abidance of cultural rules to penetrate the very self. 
Ethics are culturally determined rules of conduct. Virtues are those qualities which enable 
us to determine to which ethics we must adhere in a given moment. While canons of 
virtue and definitions of individual virtues within them have not been historically and 
culturally consistent, notions of virtue bear social weight because respect and esteem for 
those with whom we disagree is often the defining element that inclines us to engage them 
in discussion. In fact, it was virtue, arete—"the knowledge and attitude for effective 
participation in domestic, social, and political life** ( Barrett 5)—which the Sophists 
claimed to teach. 
Classicist Erik Havelock elaborates, "in sophistic theory excellence or virtue is 
used to symbolize that condition of mores which makes any society stable and politically 
effective and its members likewise** ( 178). This is not to suggest that virtues are pre­
existing stable "entities but over-lapping attitudes, and shifting ones at that" (200). 
The method of political judgment, since it involves the estimate of given 
human beings and their actions, is two-fold You begin by viewing a 
human being as sharing in a common humanity with all others ... 
Presumably it is proper to go further and formulate the outline of this 
common humanity or common morality. (200) 
To facilitate this goal, "certain types of behavior are fundamental as being sociologically 
necessary" (200). Havelock maintains that this "instrumental** or "operational** view, 
particularly furthered by Protagoras, envisions humanity's "social organization, justice, 
and law" as a technology, "that same kind of faculty which lit the first fire" ( 184). As it 
serves our collective interest, it is imperative that we be taught collectively to employ this 
tool. By analogy. Protagoras maintain?; that if everyone were taught to play the flute. 
everyone would be adequate enough in comparison with anyone 
without professional status at all and with no training in flute-playing 
you may visualize a man. Mr. X reared in the midst of laws and of 
other humans beings as excessively unrighteous. But evaluate him in 
comparison with a Mr. Y. who has enjoyed neither and educational system 
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nor law courts nor laws nor any compulsion continually forcing him to 
concentrate on excellence... It would be quite right to conclude that your 
... Mr. X. by comparison with Mr. Y. was actually a qualified craftsman. 
(Havelock 186 cf. Plato Protagoras 327b) 
Without question, the "qualified craftsman." is adequately skilled to participate in the law 
courts and legislature, despite the presence of those few who possess either money or 
natural talent enough to be "great and famous.** In fact, the craftsman must participate in 
self-governance for democracy to be possible. Havelock explains, "technologies cannot be 
fully effective without the cooperation that the presence of the social sense guarantees. In 
short, human morality is also human utility** (185). Virtue, that is. is not divinely 
ordained, an accident of birth, or a characteristic of aristocracy, but something which must 
be learned by all capable of self-governance. 
But despite this history, judgments concerning character often arise from anti­
democratic foundations. As our country's founders saw it. one such foundation is 
institutional religion. Hence, they made a decidedly anti-foundationalist move to establish 
our government upon the conviction that religious disagreement should be tolerated and 
thus that governance cannot justly proceed from religious truth. Still, in so doing, they 
fixed our government upon an alternate set of secular foundations—equality and 
inalienable rights—grounded not in God's unchanging law but in the equally formless and 
universal notion of "self-evidence." In this. U.S. democracy may be seen as a response to 
the Enlightenment vision that science holds the key to truths uncontaminated by 
disagreement between partisan concerns: that as some truths are "self-evident" 
governance can proceed scientifically from them. As I will later discuss, it may be said 
that in rejecting theological foundations. Enlightenment thinkers divinized reason. 
Upon this paradigm of reason, moral-traditionalists cling to the notion that truth, 
knowledge, and justice are one—embodied in the principle sophia. While claiming that 
through equal access to education, any intellectually normal individual may attain sophia. 
contemporary advocates of this position nonetheless hold out that the masses are limited 
in such ability and so an educated elite is needed to manage governance and secure 
democracy against the "irrational** mob. Casting their beliefs as absolute and advocating 
rule by a knowledge elite, they succumb to an anti-democratic ideology. What they 
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propose, in fact, is the silencing of unpopular ideas (at least those they believe should be 
unpopular)—the very ideas the First Amendment was established to protect/2 
Yet counter-traditionalists can be equally dogmatic, likewise attempting to silence 
ideas they believe should be unpopular. Consequently, concerned with the potential for 
ideological abuse in the classroom, many teachers ask. "In this era of tolerance, multi-
culturalism. and postmodernism, how do we address the sometimes bigoted and cruel 
voices raised in our classrooms without undemocratically imposing our own systems of 
belief?" For while persons of good character may express differing viewpoints, the way in 
which a viewpoint is arrived at or expressed may exhibit good or bad character. That is. 
rhetors demean themselves when they express their viewpoints in ways which demean 
others, seek to impose their beliefs, or arrive at viewpoints unretlectively or without 
sufficient knowledge. The point is. both teachers and students must learn to negotiate the 
contingencies of justice in democratic ways, for the results of unexamined action by any 
of us may result in our victimization of others or. conversely, our own victimization. 
In this way. the poster in my university corridor holds a grain of truth. While it 
exaggerates both the claims and consequences (not to mention the motives) of postmodern 
arguments, it nonetheless points toward the dogmatism to which some postmodernists 
resort, as well as toward nihilistic extremes to which others seem to resort. Meanwhile, 
however, the author of the poster's claims fails to recognize the politics which 
underscores his own position. Frankly, in the postmodem Culture War. the distinction 
between a politicized education—in which an ideological position is presented as 
foundational—and a political one—in which citizens are educated to critically judge 
political conflict in democracy—seems to elude most factions (Euben "Reading" 330). 
Certainly notions of virtue lie in tension with postmodern notions that "excellence" 
is an arbitrary cultural measurement bound up with power as well as with democratic 
5 In the I960"s. the positivism of the social sciences against which "radicals'* object was a major concern 
for conservatives as well—including Leo Strauss, mentor of Allan Bloom and William Bennett. In their 
view, the "centrist liberal academic establishment" (Barber Aristocracy 90) forwarded a highly political 
liberal agenda under the "pretense of Universalisai and neutrality" (89). However, upon gaining dominance 
in American cultural institutions, conservatives abandoned their skepticism. Having found it useful to 
question standards of neutrality and objectivity when condemning scholarship to their Left, they were forced 
to cease when such arguments operated against the Right. With "the cloak of 'neutrality" they once exposed 
as fraudulent now draped over their own opinions conservatives now find themselves charging the 
university with violating a neutrality in which they never believed" (89-90). 
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notions which would extend the right of self rule to some whom tew of us would consider 
virtuous or excellent. Yet postmodernism has offered no alternative to "excellence" while 
democracy both demands excellence and shuns elitism. Benjamin Barber says it well: "the 
question is not whether we prefer excellence or democracy. It is whether the excellence 
we naturally wish for can be democratic" (Aristocracy 265). 
Regrettably, as religious scholar James Davison Hunter asserts, moral-
traditionalists and counter-traditionalists "do not operate on the same plane of moral 
discourse" (Culture 118)/6 Noting that all individuals, even those non-religious or anti-
religious "base their views of the world in unprovable assumptions about "being" and 
"knowledge" (119). Hunter points out that "public discourse over the various issues of the 
Culture War is almost always framed in rhetoric that is absolute, comprehensive, and 
ultimate" (62). The resulting shrillness seems to preclude any possibility of resolution or 
compromise, not to mention internal analysis of the contradictions of any given position. 
The matter is not simply one of competing ideologies but of incoherence and 
incommensurability within arguments. Hence. Alisdair Maclntyre contends that Barber's 
question is underscored by a "fragmentation" of contemporary moral debate; an 
unarticulated conflict between narratives of justice which are at odds even within the 
individual and are "constructed out of an amalgam of social and cultural fragments 
inherited both from different traditions and from different stages in and aspects of the 
development of modernity" (Justice 2). Maclntyre suggests not that disagreement persists 
among conservatives and progressives'" within the same system of thought but that the 
positions of both operate upon assumptions taken from different and conflicting systems 
altogether. That is. opponents in moral debate are not only not on the same page, they are 
not even reading from the same book. Indeed. Maclntyre extends this claim to suggest that 
the thought of all positions is muddled because all ground their claims upon multiple and 
conflicting systems: thus the claims of any given disputant are often incommensurate and 
lack internal coherence. 
" I find Hunter s terms "conservative."* "orthodox"* and -progressive"* problematic as they I ) are less 
descriptive of curricula and pedagogy than mine: 2) imply that "orthodox" has a history, "progressive"* does 
not; 3) carry political "baggage" from loose usage: 4) imply that these positions share "ideals of moral 
community and national life" but only "diffèrent strategies for getting there" (Culture 118). 
' ' My use of progressive to describe the left is not to be confused with Progressivîsm as a fully fleshed out 
philosophy nor as a political party, but only as a general description of the political left. 
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It is my contention that because philosophical liberalism embodies the 
fragmentation of which Maclntyre speaks, it has failed to fulfill its potential as a 
foundation for democracy. I further contend that liberalism underwrites the arguments of 
both positions of which Hunter and I speak. With these concerns in mind, in the following 
chapters I will identify points of incommensurability and incompatibility within the liberal 
narrative. Doing so. I will draw an outline of the liberal self-concept, identifying the 
problem as resulting from the confluence of three narratives of self—the determinate self, 
the autonomous self, and the rational self—which are commensurate only to the extent 
that they exclude most people from the realm of practical deliberation. The determinate 
self, the Classical subject, constructs the individual as causally determined by outside 
forces and defined by the constraints of social role. The autonomous self, the modern 
political subject, constructs the individual as an isolated entity of paramount ethical import 
whose agency operates in contrast to and in conflict with the community. The rationalist 
self, the modern knowing subject, fashions the individual as a seeker of abstract, 
systematic certainty that transcends "the oral, the particular, the local, and the timely" 
(Toulmin Cosmopolis 30) and promises mastery over both natural and social forces. 
Ultimately. I argue that the fragmentation of contemporary moral debate is underscored by 
a fragmented self-concept which enables powerful distinctions between the elite and the 
masses, so defining liberty negatively, as limited governmental interference, while 
minimizing democracy through institutional constraints and forceful cultural myth. 
In the next chapter. 1 will focus on the autonomous self, contrasting it to the 
determinant self of the Classical world, tracing its historical formation: clarifying its 
internal claims regarding what is good and the role of the individual in attaining the good: 
and examining contemporary consequences which follow upon these claims. Upon this. I 
will argue that the practices of liberal democracy in the U.S. are underwritten by a rhetoric 
of elitism and conflict which conflates justice and economic effectiveness, excludes most 
individuals from political deliberation, and thus limits the primary benefits of liberal 
democratic justice to a few. The consequences of this elitism inflect rhetoric pedagogy 
and curricula in myriad ways with ominous implications for our students both in and 
outside the classroom. 
52 
Chapter Two 
Liberalism and the Decline of 
Public Excellence 
Justice is incidental to law and order. 
—J. Edgar Hoover 
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. 
—John Raw is 
There will be no justice as long as man will stand with a knife or with a gun and 
destroy who are weaker than he is. 
—Isaac Bashevis Singer 
There is no crueler tyranny than that which is perpetrated under the shield of law and 
in the name of justice. 
—Montesquieu 
As the question of whether excellence can be democratic is at its core a question of 
justice, the Culture War can be seen as the latest skirmish over competing views of justice. 
Consequently, this debate clearly goes far beyond disciplinary boundaries, reaching across 
and outside academia. To better examine this conflict, therefore. I. too. wish to step 
outside these borders, calling upon the opinions of a variety of scholars throughout the 
humanities to examine the tension between liberty and democracy: the consequences for 
justice of this tension: and the implications of these consequences for the study and 
teaching of Rhetoric. Adapting to familiar frames of reference a Classical vocabulary of 
justice and practical rationality.1 I shall begin by defining practices and goods and the 
relationship between them. 
Practices and Goods 
Human practice, as opposed to mere movement or action, is activity which in and 
of itself possesses something good toward which humanity strives. More particularly, a 
practice is a "coherent and complex socially established cooperative human activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
' t am indebted throughout to contemporary philosopher Altsdair Maclntyre. whose reading of Aristotle has 
been invaluable to clarifying this vocabulary. 
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achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to. and partially definitive of. 
that form of activity" ( Maclntyre Virtue 187). Picking up a pencil may be a coherent 
action but it is not complex. Moving a piano is cooperative but is not a socially established 
activity. Tic-tac-toe. while cooperative, socially established, and somewhat more complex 
than picking up a pencil, has no standard of excellence appropriate to nor definitive of it. 
while chess fulfills both criteria. Neither does tic-tac-toe hold the potential for human 
powers to achieve excellence nor offer potential for systematic extension of human 
conceptions of the good, while again, chess does (187). In short, a practice establishes a 
relationship between human beings who share in it in which there is agreement as to what 
is good as well as an allegiance to the standards of excellence and obedience to the rules 
which define the practice and its goods ( 190-191 ). As justice has. at least in theory, 
traditionally fulfilled these criteria, it can be considered a practice. What then are the 
goods toward which justice aims? 
While it is nearly habitual to think of goods as material, there is more to justice 
than mere distribution of material resources. Goods can be social, such as prestige; 
intellectual, such as understanding the movement of quarks; political, such as freedom of 
speech; or any number of things which real people call "good." Key to all considerations 
is that a good is anything "identifiable with — some compound of happiness, virtue, 
freedom from care, and success" (Blackburn 160). Goods are not necessarily in and of 
themselves good; they may also be good because they lead to other goods. To illustrate. I 
may decide to obtain a fine automobile, a material good, for the purpose of prestige, a 
social good; or for the ease of moving from place to place, a practical good; or for many 
other goods, alone or combined, acquirable by possession of a car. But by the above 
definition, if justice is to be considered a practice, it must aim for internal goods.2 
Internal and External Goods 
An internal good is that which cannot be obtained except by the practice to which 
it is particular (Maclntyre Virtue 188). We do not. for example, play music merely to earn 
cookies, gain prestige, or attain some other material or social benefit. Instead, we perform 
~ See Aristotle's Rhetoric < Kennedy I -5.4) and Politics ( 1323a - 1325b). 
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for personal challenge, appreciation and improvement of the art form: the internal goal is 
the excellence of the performance itself, that which is in itself good for the musician, her 
community- and the nature of music. Because recognition of what is good in music can 
only result from experiencing music and can only be described by reference to music, our 
performance must be measured against some "concept of the best, of the perfected" which 
enjoys "canonical status" (Justice 31). Music, or any other practice, must aim at some sort 
of excellence which has priority over any other goods obtained (31). 
For the sake of argument, let's say that Miles Davis is greatest jazz trumpeter in 
history. Then along comes some kid who turns the jazz community upside down. Before 
long, fellow musicians, critics, and fans alike are touting him as the "new Miles." As he 
matures, his community marvels at the way he redefines the art form. They begin to say 
he has surpassed Miles: they even begin to call him by his first name. Does this mean that 
Miles is no longer an excellent trumpet player? Of course not. Nor would he (were he still 
living) be denied the internal goods of excellent jazz—the gratification of a beautiful 
chord, the satisfaction of a well-chosen quote, etc. Despite the new voice. Miles' music 
will continue to provide internal goods to succeeding generations as he continues to 
represent what is excellent in music. Meanwhile, as the new kid contributes fresh 
understanding of musical excellence, the entire jazz community will debate the merits of 
both players, which will provide internal goods for everyone by refining the standards, the 
goods of excellence, in ways that make them better (Virtue 190). 
Of course excellent jazz performance may in fact lead to wealth or prestige. Yet 
these goods may likewise be obtained through excellence at football or even theft—an 
activity which by no means meets the criteria of practice. These goods are external to 
practices, "objects of competition in which there must be losers as well as winners" ( 190). 
Also characteristic of these goods is that when one person obtains a larger share, another's 
decreases ( Maclntyre Virtue 190). So. should a new voice take command of the market, 
not only will Miles' estate and record label lose profit, according to this line of thought. 
Miles will lose relative prestige—as this and other social rewards, too. are external goods. 
To be brief, these goods of effectiveness are analogous to commodities in a competitive 
market. 
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While internal and external goods are distinct, it should be kept in mind that 
excellence and effectiveness are not mutually exclusive. First, effectiveness "often enough 
requires — some kind of genuine excellence" (Justice 35)—no one will buy CDs 
featuring a lousy trumpet player. Second, excellence most often requires "acquisition and 
retention of some degree of power and ... wealth" (35)—someone has to pay for the 
trumpet and studio time, not to mention the rest of the band. In fact, according to this line 
of thought, practices require institutionalized settings to sustain standards of excellence 
which, in turn require the goods of effectiveness (Virtue 194). So while excellence and 
winning are not the same/ "there is no suggestion that the pursuit of the two is 
incompatible or that it might be necessary to choose between them" (Justice 50). 
Nevertheless, historical debates concerning justice tend to hinge on their distinction. 
Justice as Excellence 
Although justice may be seen as both a virtue and a practice which embodies 
virtue, for the present I will focus on justice as practice, usually thought of in terms of 
correction or distribution. Corrective justice has the purpose of restoring "a just order 
which was partially destroyed by some unjust action or actions" (Justice 105) while 
distributive justice defines this order ( 105). Each takes on a different cast according to 
whether justice is viewed as pursuit of excellence or as effectiveness in the midst of 
competition. 
Justice as excellence rests on "a judgment as to what way of life is best and what 
human flourishing consists in" (Maclntyre Justice 34). Justice as excellence has a telos. a 
predetermined purpose or end which is defined by the good that it pursues. It is 
maintenance of the best social order, principles regarding the best way to resolve conflict, 
and reduction of social ills so as to maximize what is best. As distributive justice, it is the 
distribution of goods so as to meet some standard of the best. 
' Maclntyre argues that while under maximally fair conditions winning and excellence are likely to coincide, 
bad luck, momentary errors, and so forth may cause the more excellent to lose. Standards thus depend on 
~the concept of a certain kind of fairness" (Justice 28). Moreover, as both excellence and victory "require 
effective practical reasoning." one must learn "how the kind of practical reasoning necessary for the 
achievement of excellence differs from that necessary for the achievement of victory* (28). 
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Alisdair Maclntyre offers examples of justice as excellence in both the Aristotelian 
and Augustinian narratives. In the former, telos is determined by a pre-existing order 
which governs both the natural and social worlds. Society is a part q/nature. a physis 
(something which is), rather than apart from nature, a nomos (something which we create) 
(Justice 14).4 The aim of inquiry is to understand this physis so that individuals may 
behave according to its dictates and so model society in accordance with its laws. Justice 
is a themis. something laid down prior to society, which transcends society and is 
universally applicable in all times and places ( 14). Similarly, in the Augustinian narrative, 
justice corresponds to divine law ( 153)—again something laid down—which 
predetermines the telos of humanity and the individuals who make up humanity. As these 
narratives illustrate, justice as excellence is thought to be metaphysical in that it 
corresponds to a cosmic order, divine law. or some other foundation that is stable, 
ahistorical. transcendent, universal. 
Justice as excellence is therefore "definable independently of and antecedently to 
the establishment of enforceable rules" (39). Rules simply serve as maxims which 
characterize "the best practice so far" (31). In fact, to exceed what has been the best so far 
requires a capacity for judgment which "cannot be specified by further rules" (39). as well 
as the freedom to violate current maxims to develop better ones (39). To use my analogy, 
excellence in jazz requires the musician to improvise, to push the boundaries of the form, 
even exceed them, in redefining ways. With regard to justice, such a capacity is virtue— 
the purpose of which is to "sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by 
enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we 
encounter" and "furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of 
the good" (Virtue 219). Under these terms, to violate community standards without 
redefining them is to act against self-interest because rule-breaking denies the violator 
internal goods—regardless of any harm it causes others (Justice 37). The purpose of 
corrective justice is thus to educate both the individual and the community as to what 
excellence consists in (37). In short, in pursuit of justice as excellence, practical 
1 Maclntyre notes that the modern contrast between nature and society cannot yet be expressed (Justice 14). 
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rationality, or phronesis. is governed by the rule of morality, it is akin to sophia. 
possessing the certainty of a pre-established moral order. 
For the individual, then, justice as excellence holds potential for internal goods 
even in the face of community hostility: to an extent, morality may be self-defined. That 
is. I may rationalize that I serve a higher morality or that I live in the wrong community, 
so attaining the internal goods of self-proclaimed enlightenment. Such a position need not 
deny that justice is teleological. but may instead subscribe to an alternate teleology. 1 may 
likewise view education as the aim of corrective justice, but see the community from 
which I dissent as uneducated. While such self-rationalization seems futile at first blush, it 
is just such a situation in which both Socrates and Jesus found themselves. While both 
were executed for their attempts to define justice as excellence, their definitions have been 
paradigmatic for millennia. Yet as these historic examples demonstrate, the degree to 
which the individual is accorded agency to self-define justice as excellence is largely 
dependent on how the dominant community defines the self in relationship to others. 
For my argument, the Aristotelian self-concept—what I call the determinate self— 
will serve as sufficient contrast to the modem liberal self/ In this tradition, the practice 
which embodies justice as excellence is politics and the polis [Greek city-state | is the 
institutional site of this practice. Far more than a place of mass habitation, the polis is a 
sy stem which "constitute^ | a higher-order integrative form of activity.™ a tightly ordered 
communal lifestyle, if you will, in which humans seek their telos. "not this or that good, 
but the good and the best as such (Maclntyre Justice 44)." Defined by Aristotle as 
eudaimonia. "the state of being well and doing well in being well, of a man's being well-
favored himself and in relation to the divine** (Virtue 148). this telos is not achieved "at 
' Although he roots this narrative in both Plato and Homer. Maclntyre contends that Aristotle completes 
Plato's project of reason, arguing that "those who have thought their way through ... justice and practical 
rationality, from the standpoint... pointed out first by Aristotle and then by Aquinas, have every reason ... 
to hold that the rationality of their tradition has been confirmed in its encounters with other traditions" 
(Justice 402-3). For my purposes. Aristotle stands in contrast to the Sophists, one in particular. Protagoras, 
from whom I will draw my arguments in Chapter Four. 
* Ethics scholar Martha Nussbaum cautions against trying to neatly fit Aristotle's ethical theory into the 
teleological category as Maclntyre seems wont to do. Indeed, in the emphasis on duty and merit. 
Aristotelian ethics also bear the mark of deontological ethics ( 119)—those "based on the notion of a duty, 
what is right, or rights as opposed to ethical systems based on the idea of achieving some good state of 
affairs or the qualities of character necessary to live weir (Blackburn). Maclntyre's reading is nonetheless 
useful in distinguishing between justice as excellence and justice as effectiveness—a distinction which 
underlies moral-traditionalist defense of the canon and canonical standards. 
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some future point, but in the way our whole life is constructed" ( 175). The self is defined 
by determinate roles which maintain this way of life. Virtues are simply "qualities which 
enable an individual to do what his or her role requires" (Justice 15). As this lifestyle is 
best, to fulfill one's roles is to act not only in the interest of the polis but in self-interest: 
even a slave justly serves both community and self by being an excellent slave. 
Given such mutual interest, distributive justice maintains social, i.e. cosmic, 
balance by awarding goods according to what the actions of each citizen merit in 
accordance with this order and what each deserves by way of his role—merit and desert 
gauged by "how important the role and how well he has performed in it" ( 107). 
Practical rationality is no more or less than understanding and acting upon the order of 
things, the proper roles of individuals in given contexts, and the merit and desert accorded 
each role. As premises for reasoning are "good reasons for action for anyone whose telos 
is the good and the best" (Justice 45). justice, a condition of ethics, and phronesis. a 
condition of epistemology. are one and the same (Marcuse 125). Corrective justice serves 
to facilitate phronesis by educating the polis in "the good and best as such" and in the 
virtues their roles require. In all respects, injustice is "failure in respect of the 
metaphysical, political, and psychological order" (Maclntyre Virtue 157). which as 
personal vice is taking more or less than one merits and deserves. 
Yet as the determinate self does not so much choose a course of action as identify 
the right course by what she knows of the transcendental order, she surrenders her agency 
to the demands of her role. She does not employ reason to independentiy "interpret — 
influence, change, or redirect" ( Ewald and Wallace 343) events according to her needs or 
desires but to prov ide a stable form to which she may subordinate her impulses and 
desires. This lack of self-determination stands in stark contrast to the defining principles 
of liberalism and modern democracy. In fact, both liberalism and democracy have been 
historically linked by critics and proponents alike with justice as effectiveness. 
As pieonexia (taking more) is ~a disposition" (Liddell and Scott), it may effect judgment even if not acted 
upon. Aristotle also saw its opposite as a vicious violation of one's role fNtcfaomachean Ethics 1106). 
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Justice as Effectiveness 
Unbound by community agreement as to what is good or what human telos 
consists in. justice as effectiveness is reduction of conflict and social ills simply to 
maintain order. Justice as effectiveness aims for solving problems in light of competition 
for external goods. It is therefore limited to material distribution and protection of 
property and persons, consisting of principles of negotiation and contract: adjudication of 
competing self-interest. The boundaries of justice as effectiveness are much more clearly 
drawn than those of excellence because ~a perfectly just person is no more and no less 
than someone who always obeys the rules of justice" (Maclntyre Justice 39). In fact, 
without clearly articulated enforceable rules, this concept of justice "lacks any content" 
(39)—anything goes as long as the law is not broken. Rule-breaking, seen as self-
interested. is considered harmful to the community without regard to the rulebreaker's 
well-being. Corrective justice serves as deterrence and punishment: justice as 
effectiveness ascribes to the rule of law. it lacks the certitude of sophia. depending instead 
on human convention. 
Given such clearly defined limits, justice as effectiveness cannot be self-defined: 
the individual must abide by community agreement or be denied the external goods of 
respect and cooperation. Living on personal terms, she will not be perceived as effective, 
much less excellent, nor will she be effective in any community context. She may even 
lose her freedom. Serving only self-interest, the individual is only incidentally a member 
of her community: she may come or go as she pleases and she owes the community 
nothing. So long as she follows the law. moral matters belong to her private realm. 
As a Classical example of justice as effectiveness. Maclntyre offers Thucydides* 
who presents arguments reflecting those of certain Sophists. First, noting as above that 
winning and excellence are neither the same nor mutually incompatible. Thucydides 
argues that ~arete [virtue or excellence! is one thing and practical intelligence quite 
another and their conjunction is merely coincidental" (Justice 69)—that is. being good 
does not necessarily render you effective. And since governance requires effectiveness, 
this thesis comes to be seen as promoting the notion that morality is secondary to results 
* Greek historian. 471? - ?4Q0 BCE 
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in the political realm. Second, responding to the perpetual warfare and Greek imperialism 
of his era. Thucydides asserts that "the stronger may and always do impose their will upon 
the weaker* (69): justice is what the powerful say it is. Third, because people disagree 
about the good. Thucydides comes to believe that the concrete issues which lead to 
conflict are rationally undebatable. As this leaves "only non-rational forms of persuasion" 
(69). he concludes that "rhetorical deliberation is the best way for human beings to 
answer questions about what to do" (Maclntyre Justice 69). For Thucydides. then, 
humanity has no common telos to fulfill and no way to appeal to a metaphysical or divine 
order other than that in which the audience believes. Practical reasoning gives way to 
demotes politike or cleverness in politics. It is rhetorical rather than philosophical, 
argumentative and persuasive rather than in pursuit of transcendent truth. The individual, 
having full agency, is at least partially causal of "human actions and their outcomes" (67). 
As practical reasoning pertains only to external goods, "cooperation with others demands 
recognition of their reasons for action as good reasons for them, not as good reasons as 
such." in turn requiring "the creation of a framework for bargaining" (45). Virtue exists in 
addition to practical reasoning, its function to balance the interest of the community with 
self-interest. So. as one may be quite effective without virtue, allegiance to effectiveness 
often raises charges of moral relativism. It is just such a charge which moral-traditionalists 
level at counter-traditionalists. 
Clearly, moral-traditionalists see themselves allied with excellence, accusing 
counter-traditionalists of allying with instrumental effectiveness in pursuit of ideological 
objectives. So. Allan Bloom charges that they present "relativism" (26) and "propaganda" 
(61). while Kimball calls them "intolerant" (219) and "anti-cultural" (81) and Bennett 
argues that they are "hostile" to the white middle class (De-Valuingl3 )—which, he 
presumes makes up the bulk of our student body and maintains values represented by the 
Euro-western canon. Meanwhile. D'Souza insists that canonical authors are being 
replaced with "mouthpiecejsj for a sophisticated left-wing critique of Western society" 
( 72) whom Cheney denounces for attempting to "do away with the idea of excellence" 
(Truth 36). In that vein. D'Souza condemns the admission of minority students who. he 
implies, have high school grade point averages and standardized test scores too low to 
6! 
indicate potential for academic success (2).4 Above all. these critics present their criteria 
as universal, arguing that teaching their values is not ideological—as theirs are canonical. 
Counter-traditionalists are suspicious of "excellence"*—some, like Bill Readings 
because, lacking "external referent-* and "internal content" (23). the term has come to be a 
means to conceal criteria for judgment (24); others, such as Benjamin Barber, because it is 
often defined in exclusionary, elitist terms which discount persons and cultures outside the 
white. Euro-western, predominately male tradition.10 Many, myself included, argue that 
the liberal tradition has equated excellence with domination, power, and control—goods 
of effectiveness—and that the results have been neither excellent nor effective for those 
oppressed and dominated. Moreover, the appearance that moral-traditionalists are allied 
with excellence while counter-traditionalists are allied with effectiveness is deceiving. As 
an example, while moral-traditionalists frequently cast their moral gaze upon domestic 
values, they hesitate to impose moral regulation on industry. Others promote market 
capitalism as an inherently moral system—measuring its benefits by material prosperity 
and economic growth. At the same time, some counter-traditionalists, in arguing for 
openness and tolerance, simply protfer their viewpoints as more moral than those of 
moral-traditionalists, while others measure excellence in terms of effective distribution. 
Meanwhile, moral- and counter-traditionalists seem to agree, on one hand, that human 
telos. that toward which humanity strives, is embodied in some delicate balance between 
liberty and the constraints of government: on the other, that the government which makes 
possible this balance is democracy. In short, we collectively recognize liberty and 
democracy as mutually dependent—the former seen as an internal good, the latter as the 
practice which makes possible this good. Indeed, our common dilemma is that liberty does 
not itself aim at any excellence beyond itself. 
* While D'Souza may be accurate m saving that minority students with lower g-P-a's and standardized test 
scores are sometimes admitted to some institutions before majority students with higher g-P-a's and test 
scores, he fails to acknowledge that the numbers he cites are still well within admission requirements. He 
also overlooks cultural factors in education and testing that some researchers claim are biased against 
minorities and women and wholly neglects to mention the tradition of legacy (child of an alumnus) 
admissions to the nation's most competitive universities. At the very least, when two equally qualified 
students vie for the same space, the legacy wins. As elite schools have traditionally been the milieu of 
whites, legacy policies are highly biased in their favor. See Sarah Winkeller. "Silver Spoons? The Legacy 
System at Harvard." Diversity and Distinction Online [Il ( 1998). wwwJtcs.harvard.edu. 
10 As an example. George Will argues that "neither the studying nor the achievement of [excellence) is 
something to which every one has equal "access- ("Artists"). 
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Liberalism 
Freedom—the defining doctrine of the United States. As individuals, we invoke it 
when we do not get our way. As a nation, we go to war over it. As a culture, we allow it to 
serve as evidence of the superiority of our way of life. Yet the concept of liberty is not so 
simple. Liberty can be simply negative—absence of constraint. Or it can be positive— 
liberation from social forces which impede self-actualization. And in the absence of 
sufficient constraint, dominant groups often in fact impede the self-actualization of 
minority groups and individuals. While such impediments seem clearly unjust to many, to 
others, constraint from such domination is itself unjust simply because it denies liberty— 
as is apparent in the resistance to civil rights and women's movements. 
Often in contemporary society, liberalism is mistakenly associated with any form 
of left-leaning thought: as when so-called conservatives cry out against "big government 
liberals'* or label members of the Democratic party "liberals." Sometimes it is mistaken 
for mere rejection of traditional sexual and behavioral mores, for openness to or tolerance 
of formerly taboo practices. But this meaning is too limited to constitute the liberal 
tradition.'1 Indeed, in the U.S.. because liberalism serves as "a background theory or set of 
presuppositions and sentiments of a supposedly neutral and universal kind" ( Bellamy I ). it 
is as much a conservative as a progressive value. For example, the political Right invokes 
freedom when arguing for the right to possess handguns or to engage freely in commerce. 
Conversely, the Right rejects liberalism in support of abortion bans and drug laws. The 
political Left is likewise ambivalent about liberty. On the one hand, the Left embraces 
liberalism in support of the right of gays and lesbians to live. work, and recreate where 
and as they see fit. On the other hand, the Left supports restrictions on trade and limits to 
land use.12 With these examples in mind, it is clear that "political liberalism, economic 
liberalism, and the many discourses that constitute the "philosophy of liberalism* do not 
11 Lind notes that the political use of "liberal- refers to left-liberals, aligned with both economic and social 
liberalism. Economic liberalism, equated by Lind with "higher taxes on the rich and more government 
services'* (32). is contrary to philosophical liberalism which is more closely aligned with what Lind calls 
~nco-liberalism- which advocates low taxes, small government, free trade, and a liberal social agenda. 
Lind identifies eight potential U.S. political positions (only five of which are represented in Washington) 
resulting from the ambivalence of the terms "liberal" and "conservative."* To simplify. I have represented 
only two—the former what Lind calls "consistently" conservative: the latter what he calls "left liberal"" (32). 
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form a single doctrine (Mouffe 20). Yet there is a common thread in the fabric of 
liberalism which is none other than a concept of the autonomous self. 
Liberalism and the Autonomous Self 
Alisdair Maclntyre maintains that the failure of political negotiation and rational 
theology to "embody a cogent shared conception of the good" (Justice 210). coupled with 
"the persistent and savage conflicts" of the 17th century, culminated in the realization that 
"no appeal to any agreed conception of the good for human beings ... was now possible" 
(209). The resulting focus on human competition and conflict paved the way for "the 
individual" to become "one of the fondamental categories of social thought and 
practice" (210). Identity and individual capacity come to be held "apart from and prior to 
... membership in any particular social and political order" (210). No longer could the 
individual be defined by roles which uphold a particular telos nor could "good reasons for 
accepting and valuing the constraints imposed ... by the social and political order" be 
limited to those in concert with "some ideologically understood, divinely legislated 
order" (210). Imbued with full agency in her personal realm, the self became autonomous. 
tree to determine her own telos. ascribe to any of a number of teleological doctrines, or 
abandon the notion of telos altogether.1"' In the place of such questions came to rest 
questions of how to balance agreement and coercion in maintaining social order in light of 
competition for the goods of effectiveness. 
It seems fair to say that this tradition was first fleshed out in the philosophy of 
John Locke ( Russell 600) wherein he posited a state of nature prior to society in which 
men "lived together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with 
authority to judge between them" ( Locke Treatises 307). In nature, he argued, humans are 
free to do as they wish so long as they observe the laws of nature, primarily the law that 
"no one ought to harm another in his life, health. liberty, or possessions" (309). As this 
country's founders saw themselves as liberating individuals from the restrictions of 
society, monarchy, and the "tyranny of tradition" (Maclntyre. Justice 335). it is no 
L
' Political theorist Thomas A. Spragens. Jr. calls autonomy a "central motif in the new epistemology"* (81). 
arguing that autonomy is "clearly a political situation as well as an epistemological precondition — An 
important implication of the new epistemology. then, was that men must be free to follow the natural light of 
their intellectual faculties'* (81). 
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coincidence that Locke's words reverberate in the Declaration of Independence. Theirs 
was a new age in which liberal reason14 would bring order to the public realm, leaving the 
chaos of competing beliefs to the privacy of home and church. 
Above all. each individual was henceforth "his own boss ... free to be good, bad 
... moral, immoral... tolerant, intolerant." to "act property or improperly" whether "he 
gets away with it or not." All that matters "is that he has his own way" (Dietze 8).13 At 
such an extreme, liberty may destroy the individual's own life, through suicide or acts 
which lead to imprisonment, execution, poverty, or disease: or it may be used to deprive 
others of the right to act how they choose, where they choose, and to possess what they 
choose. Political theorist Gottfried Dietze names such freedom "liberalism proper" ( I ). 
Yet while liberty "can mean freedom of the stronger to do down the weaker." it 
can also mean "effective freedom of all to use and develop their capacities" (Macpherson 
I ). As "the latter freedom is inconsistent with the former" ( I ). liberty must be bound to 
maintain the initial premise of equality. Liberalism proper must become proper liberalism 
( Dietze I ). Yet restriction must likewise be limited so as to maintain the initial premise of 
liberty. Since liberalism can "never be totally replaced by propriety we turn to an 
ethical minimum, the law" (13). Beyond the law. the individual is free to determine her 
own morality. ~l want. I need. 1 believe" serve as "statements of a reason for action." as 
"premises for practical reasoning" (Maclntyre Justice 338). 
Operating on such premises, distributive justice ensures only that competition 
proceed according to law. while corrective justice is punitive, operating on the basis of 
costs and benefits—the costs of getting caught theoretically outweighing the benefits of 
criminal success. With practical reasoning thus reduced to a means-end process, 
disagreement begins to appear to be as problematic as Thucydides claimed, for here 
14 Contemporary philosopher Susan Bordo argues that "the separate self conscious of itself and of its own 
distinctness from a world "outside" it. is born in the Cartesian era" (7). The significance of Cartesian 
rationalism to the formation of modern liberal self-identity will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
15 Spragens points out that due to "ambiguity, overlap, and confusion, any attempt... to identify coherent 
accounts of the relationship between intellectual and political progress can only produce "ideal types™ (76). 
He then identifies four "liberalisms" that hearken to Locke—~( I ) politically conservative liberalism. (2) 
democratic natural-right liberalism. (3) natural-reconciliation-of-mterests liberalism, and (4) artificial-
reconciliation-of-mterests liberalism" (76). While Spragens" distinctions are useful and important, 
discussion of them strays too far from my purpose. Liberalism is. therefore, here discussed as an extreme 
abstraction. 
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conceptions of virtue have no bearing on practical rationality. Practical rationality 
becomes no more than a capacity to identify the most effective means to one's personal 
ends. Moreover, as virtue "is a function of liberty rather than power." only **by limiting 
the popular exercise of political power" (so as not to inhibit individual liberty) can 
democracy be "virtuous" or excellent (Wallach 322). A virtuous democracy is a liberal 
democracy. Yet how is such a society to determine a just or excellent result? What is the 
proper balance between permitting the liberties of one individual while protecting those of 
others? How can liberalism be made proper? 
Certainly, to maximize liberty, constraints should be minimal as possible. Hence 
liberalism, contrary to political rhetoric, distrusts government, preferring "small" 
government which tightly limits constraints to "big" government which optimizes 
constraints to ensure equality of individuals at the expense of personal freedoms. As 
liberalism assumes that the demosif> desires maximum liberty, it seems that democracy 
should ensure such a government. Yet there is. in fact, a tense balance between liberalism 
and democracy as the latter holds the potential to limit the former by guarding against 
imbalances of power which result when liberty is not constrained by personal virtue: in 
short, when one group or individual takes advantage of liberal principals to gain power 
over another. Despite concern over liberal excess, this potential limitation has often led to 
democracy being seen negatively, as an impediment to liberty, rather than positively— 
minimally as a constraint against excess, more fully as a means to justice. Undoubtedly, as 
liberalism "is not so much a positive theory about how political power ought to be 
organized and directed as a negative theory about what the limits on that power ought to 
be... liberalism ... limits democracy" (Wallach 321): freedom is not to be curtailed to 
ensure equality of power. Despite rhetoric about "saving the world for democracy." 
democracy does not represent what is good and best for humanity, but is simply one 
mechanism among others by which individual liberty might be realized. 
Nonetheless, the ability of democracy to constrain liberal excess is a fundamental 
principle of our unique form of government—which extends a democratic hand to the 
demos via our right to elect representatives and which provides a means, our system of 
16 Demos, meaning "the people" or "the citizenry." is the root of democracy. 
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checks and balances, by which elected and appointed officials may deliberate toward ends 
which are made more or less democratic through public accountability. While it is true 
that our founders favored republican government over majoritarian participatory 
democracy, the fundamental assumption that the "fabric of American Empire ought to rest 
on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE (sic)** (Hamilton "Federalist" 
No. 22) was never denied. 
By this point, it should be apparent that the association of liberalism with the 
political Left is arbitrary. As a matter of fact. the tension between liberalism and 
democracy manifests on both left and right. The political Right, as represented by the 
Republican party, sees the economic sphere as essentially private and so properly 
governed by liberal principles, while seeing the cultural sphere as public, i.e.. in "accord 
with shared public values" (Hollinger 114). They "define freedom economically (as 
individual economic initiative) and justice socially (as righteous living)" ( Hunter Culture 
Wars 115). Conversely, the political Left, as represented by the Democratic party, 
considers the cultural sphere "private and pluralistic." that is. democratic, while believing 
that liberalism in the economic sphere should be checked by "some sort of public action." 
( Hollinger 114). They ~define freedom socially (as individual rights) and justice 
economically (as equity)" (Hunter Culture Wars 115).17 
Still, many critics are concerned that preference for negative liberty, i.e. absence of 
constraints, "implies that collective decision making and democratic practice are 
inherently dangerous, and must be checked" ( Hollinger 7-8). In fact, as liberal democracy 
"is concerned more to promote individual liberty than to secure public justice, to advance 
interests rather than to discover goods" ( Barber Strong 4). in its current form in the U.S. it 
alienates those who have little economic power, concentrating power in the hands of a 
few. Liberty, under these conditions, is not synonymous with agency, for it privatizes the 
17 Elshtain similarly asserts that the political Lett continues to argue for taming the market in an economic 
sense" but "follows the market model when social relations are concerned." while "many on the political 
Right love the un trammeled operations of the market in economic life, but call for a state-enforced 
restoration of traditional mores" ( 16). Lmd observes a similar split within the right, as represented by the 
ILS. Republican party, which is "divided rather sharply into a culturally and economically populist tar right 
and a more or less consistently libotarian right" (5). Lind contrasts the suspicion of religious 
fundamentalists toward big business, international finance, and big government to the liberality of economic 
conservatives on social issues, even though these liberal and social views are often suppressed "in the 
interests of Republican unity" (5). 
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agency of the masses while the vast public agency of economic entities drives the public 
policy which determines the constraints within which these masses must function. Among 
the liberal limitations of democracy relevant to my pedagogical concerns are the 
application of market logic to justice, a misidentification of goods resulting in a 
misdirection of practices which culminates in a disregard for democratic institutions. 
Liberalism and External Goods 
The first limitation to liberal thinking is the notion of the individual as no more or 
less than a competitor for finite material resources. While it is certainly true that 
competition is an ongoing theme of the human narrative, this formulation abandons 
internal goods as a defining cultural need, which signals the demise of humanity's quest 
for excellence in the public sphere. Even individuals come to be defined as "material 
beings™ whose "social and political time and space™ as well as "motivation, agency, and 
interaction are necessarily physical" ( Barber Strong 32): social laws come to "correspond 
to the laws of physical mechanics" (32). That is. as material objects "cannot occupy the 
same space at the same time" (33). human beings come to be seen as constantly 
aggressing toward or defending political, social, and psychological spaces (33). 
In similarly physical terms, the operations of the market are considered self-
regulating under some sort of natural law or "invisible hand." Based on the small-scale 
entrepreneurial economy of early capitalism, which optimizes "equilibrium between 
production and consumption" for "mutual advantage"! Bellamy 3). this model assumes 
that intimate and local relations between economic actors will make producers, their 
relatively small crews of workers, and the consumers they serve interdependent and 
accountable to one another. Thus the principle of laissez-faire has been thought sufficient 
for development of "a meritocratic society of self-reliant and responsible citizens'* (3). 
This model, in substance, asserts that economic "equilibrium" ought not only mean 
"stability of prices near actual costs" but "social stability—that is. harmony, felicity, 
public order™ ( Lowi 7). Meanwhile, optimism regarding progress, which ~posit(s) human 
wants and needs as expandable—indeed, nearly insatiable™ ( 12). has led to assumptions 
that production can grow indefinitely "to satisfy and continually fuel the restless cycle of 
the creation and satiation of needs" ( 13). Productivity takes on a moral force: individuals 
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become obligated "to work hard and reap their rewards" ( 13) as economic development 
comes to be equated with social improvement and the social order becomes increasingly 
meritocratic. And. since growth requires investment and investors demand profits, 
increased consumption is needed to fuel continued progress. Material consumption is 
transformed into civic responsibility, the consumer "glorified.** as life becomes 
increasingly "pervaded by market imagery" (Elshtain 13). Capitalism becomes more than 
"a bundle of economic and technological processes™ (Lowi 3); it becomes an ideology, "a 
source of principles and means of justifying behavior* (3).18 
While the realities of the last century cast doubt on the efficacy of laissez-faire. 
leading to its fluctuation as public policy, this doctrine continues to carry considerable 
weight as moral ideology. One consequence is that public education tends to be directed 
toward the market: the student is both consumer of the educational product ( Aronowitz 
58) and product of a market-oriented educational system.19 Upon completing the desired 
level of education, this marketable product becomes both an "enlightened** producer and 
consumer of other commodities. A second consequence is that relationships of power tend 
to be cast in materialist terms which are insufficient to articulate ethical matters. 
Education and the Rhetoric of Markets 
Judging from Chapter One. it may seem that counter-traditionalists are likely to 
reject the moral-traditionalist assumption that liberal education has been "dumbed down.™ 
But on this point many agree. Sociologist Stanley Aronowitz. for one. laments that 
"undergraduate education in the United States may achieve what a decent secondary 
school was expected to deliver fifty years ago™ (2). while Cary Nelson points out. as a 
given, that "the gradual collapse of the secondary school system... has left Americans 
without any common foundation of historical knowledge™ (139). Meanwhile. Benjamin 
Barber worries that "illiteracy and innumeracy meet at ground level to create a splendid 
Lowi calls capitalism a liberal ideology because it "had always participated in positive attitudes toward 
progress, individualism, rationality, and nationalism" (3). 
19 Lester Faigley. citing French postmodernist Baudrillard. asserts that U.S. consumer culture seduces 
students into defining themselves as products for consumption. He cites a paper in which a student author 
describes "packaging" her high school aged sister into the proper sorority girl for consumption by "fraternity 
brothers* and "jocks": and another in which a student associates "the value of agency" with the objects of 
consumption which construct his external (and Faigley infers, internal) identity (214-215). 
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egalitarianism of ignorance" (Aristocracy 201). In fact, a primary point of disagreement 
concerns what has caused this decline and what content has been lost. Moral-
traditionalists claim that the political agendas of self-proclaimed victims and advocates 
ensures unearned success tor marginal students, lower standards and poor instruction for 
"quality" students, poor research and scholarship, and a disregard for truth. Counter-
traditionalists are more likely to look at market factors and structures of domination and 
oppression. Claiming that liberal capitalism and cultural hegemony exclude, dominate, 
and exploit those who have little economic or cultural power, these critics fear that their 
students are denied self-governance under current institutional structures, will continue to 
be unable to remove or alter these structures, and will be inadequately educated to govern 
wisely should these structures be altered or removed by others* efforts.20 
Indeed, the evidence of market logic on education is all around us.21 At the 
elementary and secondary levels it can be seen as concern about tailing schools has 
elicited cries to privatize, to subject schools to market competition—on the assumption 
that laissez-faire will sort out the losers. Yet many commentators fear that privatization 
will push marginalized students further to the margins by abandoning them in increasingly 
underfunded and decaying schools. Giroux. for one. sees this as an "attempt to transform 
3 The literacy crisis which allegedly began in the early 1970 s comes under some doubt. Ira Shor questions 
the reliability of the most referenced source, the SAT. as a measure of literacy, noting that the test has no 
written component (Culture Wars 71). Moreover, while SAT documents an alarming decline in test scores, 
the National Assessment of Education Progress shows markedly different results, notably that "basic 
literacy, reading performance and writing mechanics, especially among blacks, showed either increases or 
slight [my emphasis} declines" (in Culture Wars 73). Educational researchers David C. Berliner and Bruce J. 
Biddle note that "none of the supposedly supportive "evidence" [of educational decline | actually appeared in 
A Saturn at Risk, nor did this work provide citations to tell Americans where that evidence* might be 
found" (3). Berliner and Biddle also point out that the slight decline in SAT scores from 1963-1975 as 
reported in .4 Nation at Risk "reflects the fact that more students from unimpressive educational 
backgrounds have chosen to take the SAT* which "proves that more students who would not have gone to 
college in the past are now planning to attend college" (Lind 162). When "disaggregated." that is. broken 
into smaller components, "verbal achievement has been holding steady — minorities — earning higher 
average scores." whites level ( Berliner and Biddle 20). The average SAT score among Native Americans 
actually showed an increase of 39 points: blacks showed an increase of 55 points; and whites held steady. 
Berliner and Biddle also note that the number of students expected to have IQs over 130 is seven times 
greater than "for the generation now retiring from leadership positions in the country and often complaining 
about the poor performance of today's youth" (44). 
:I Euben cites the Gardner Report (Reagan-appointed National Commission on Excellence in Education) as 
evidence of a new business orientation toward education (Commons 9). For supporters of this orientation 
see John E. Chubb and Terry VL Moe. Politics. Markets, and America s Schools. Washington. D. C.: 
Brookings Institution. 1990.: David Kearns and Denis Doyle. Winning the Brain Drain. San Francisco: 
Institute for Contemporary Studies. 1988. 
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public education from a public good, benefiting all students, to a private good designed to 
expand the profits of investors, educate students as consumers, and train young people for 
the low-paying jobs of the new global marketplace™ (Stealing 84). He is likewise 
concerned that privatization will privilege "the most motivated and gifted students™—the 
bulk of whom have not had to bear "the crushing burdens of poverty, racism, and other 
forms of oppression" (89)—and so "deepen [the] racist exclusions™ (89) that characterize 
the inequities between suburban and inner-city schools. 
Market influence at the elementary and secondary levels is displayed as cash-
starved schools contract with industry for equipment and materials, in return subjecting 
children to the onslaught of advertising during their classroom routines. The perils of 
advertising aimed at children have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere, but it bears 
repeating that among these is increased material dissatisfaction which "remove(s) the 
dynamics of student performance from broader social and political considerations" (89) 
and "feeds a value system in which compassion, solidarity, cooperation, social 
responsibility, and other attributes of education as a social good get displaced™ ( 89). 
Above all. a market orientation at the elementary and secondary levels threatens to 
diminish individual agency by under-preparing students for democratic participation as 
well as for the moral and political challenges of higher education. The consequence of the 
first is the alienation of the people from the political process. The consequence of the 
second is the necessity to adapt college curricula to the diminished liberal knowledge base 
and underdeveloped critical skills of incoming students. 
At the college level, the effects of increasing market logic can be seen in attacks 
on tenure, our traditional guarantor of academic freedom. To save money, colleges offer 
early retirement packages to expensive senior faculty, replacing them with temps. 
adjuncts, and graduate assistants. Unfortunately, at research institutions, faculty who 
devote themselves predominately to teaching are denied tenure with alarming frequency— 
teaching seen as a distraction from the "real" work of research."' But the market model is 
not limited to attacks on tenure. Administrators, now often "drawn from the ranks of 
— See Jonathon Kozol. "Whittle and the Privateers."* The Nation. 21 Sep. 1992. 
3 See Stanley Aronowitz The Knowledge Factory: Dismantling the Corporate University and Creating True 
Higher Learning. Boston: Beacon Press. 2000: 51-52. 
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corporate executives" and valued for "their managerial style." treat schools as "major 
companies." students as "customers." and learning as a "measurable outcome" (Giroux 
Stealing 84). Many other private sector business practices are also imposed as colleges 
and universities begin "mimicking the drive to "flexibility" or "lean" production" 
(Aronowitz 84). Working from this commercial model, they "downsize academic units 
and narrow the "mission* of the university on the grounds of "efficiency*" ( Hollinger 119). 
Unfortunately, the debates summarized in Chapter One "have made cutting university 
budgets a great deal easier" as a "delegitimated university is easier to de fund" and "easier 
for state governments to ignore when making basic policy decisions about higher 
education" (Nelson 108). Meanwhile, in the popular media, academics, particularly those 
in the Humanities, are considered irrelevant to public life—ivory-tower idealists with 
nothing to contribute to effective policy. 
In the meantime, to compensate for budget losses, professors are encouraged to 
"provide commercially useful knowledge" (Aronowitz 173) funded through contracts with 
industry. Such motives may skew research away from vital projects which do not yet 
promise great commercial reward (e.g.. organic farming) and may skew research with 
commercial potential toward marketable rather than socially responsible ends (e.g.. 
genetic engineering). Ultimately, a commercial emphasis threatens to privatize knowledge 
that best belongs in the public domain"4—the most ominous example being the Supreme 
Court's position that "corporations can own all of our collective genes" ( 173). Indeed, if 
there is any doubt regarding the influence market logic enjoys at the college level, one 
need only examine the rhetoric of values currently employed. 
Market logic echoes throughout the rhetoric of higher education in North America, 
as reflected in magazines such as McLean s (Canada) and U.S. .VVws and World Report 
which annually review and rank colleges in terms of "relative value-for-monev" 
( Readings 27). Such rhetoric raises concerns that education is evaluated by means of "an 
analogy between the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities and the 
production, distribution, and consumption of knowledge~ ( 146)—an analogy that reduces 
Aronowitz cites MIT biology professor Jonaihon King, who notes that "many who deliver papers 
concerning scientific research at scholarly meetings may omit information on patent grounds, thereby 
closing intellectual communication" (Factory 48). 
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knowledge to a product an individual can own rather than the foundation for human 
excellence. By means of a "cost-benefit analysis."* the university 's social responsibility is 
reduced to "solely a matter of services rendered for a fee"* (32). Public education is no 
longer defined by "its civic function: rather it is primarily a commercial venture in which 
the only form of citizenship available for young people is consumerism"* (85).~ Among 
those concerned. Readings and Giroux criticize such rhetoric for reducing students to 
"consumers.™ rather than people "who want to think** (Readings 27) while reducing 
teachers to the "ultimate salespeople** (Giroux Stealing 89).:t> Certainly educators do not 
see themselves as salespeople and are likely to resent being thought of as such. However. I 
will argue with Readings and Giroux that such rhetoric may serve to fuel the 
commodification of learning at the policy level and in the minds of the public. 
Evidence that such rhetoric influences students" perceptions of their roles and 
status can be observed in the classroom. As consumers, students may reject anything in 
the classroom they do not want to hear: "they can leave class without penalty"*: and they 
can demand "'alternative" assignments if the course material is too controversial* to 
them™ ( Hollinger 119). Seeing knowledge as "owned.™ rather than as something with 
which to actively engage, students are often tempted, and do. buy term papers on the 
Internet, depend on ClifFs Notes, and hire better students to write or sort out their messy 
term papers and theses. They sometimes demand higher grades, arguing that they have 
paid tuition tor good results. They seek credentials, an external good which leads to more 
external goods." rather than the internal goods of personal and human development. 
Recognizing temporaries and graduate assistants as replaceable commodities, they 
sometimes blame failure on "product" quality—"How can I learn when she's a man-
hating feminist?**: "I can't understand his accent": "He gives too much homework": "I got 
stuck with a TA.~: "If he's so good, why isn't he tenured?"28 Such arguments mistake 
- The notion of consumerism as patriotism took on new force following the September 1116 attack, as the 
administration called upon people to strengthen America by shopping. 
A. Bloom notes that in the marketplace "an education, other than purely professional or technical, can 
even seem to be an impediment"* (339). 
" A 2000 nation-wide survey of American first-year students conducted by the American Council on 
Education and UCLA shows that 73.4 percent claim their primary goal as "being very well off 
financially"—a consecutive, cumulative increase from 39.1 percent in 1970 (ACE 2). 
28 Meanwhile, at many colleges, students are the primary evaluators of instruction. 
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negative liberty and consumer agency, i.e. choice in purchasing, for socio-political 
agency, the capacity to "interpret influence, change, or redirect" (Ewald and Wallace 
343) public events which bear on their personal lives and on global conditions—the 
facilitation of which is. of course, the ostensible purpose of democratic education. 
Where is pursuit of excellence in all this? According to rhetoric commonly 
employed by higher education, it is of course, the mission of the university. Yet 
excellence, too. is conceived in commercial terms as a "purely internal unit of value that 
effectively brackets all questions of reference or function** (Readings 27). Among other 
effects, "the question of access to tertiary29 education is bracketed™ (27). "Purchasing" an 
education has become analogous to buying a car—as reflected in U.S. News and World 
Report which extols efficiency, examines the "best values.™ and compares "sticker prices" 
and tuition "discounts." i.e. scholarships and grants (28). The criteria used to determine 
these values are likewise cast in material terms: quantitative measurements, themselves 
arbitrarily determined.30 of such equally arbitrary factors as "graduation rates within 
standard time limits." "quantity of federal grants obtained." and "ratio of tenured faculty 
to part-timers or graduate teaching assistants™ (25). The first of these criteria neglects the 
influence of part-time students on these numbers, as well the number of students who may 
take lighter full-time course loads while supporting themselves and/or families. The 
second assumes that the best teachers get the most grants, while the third assumes that 
tenured faculty are automatically the best teachers. Above all. excellence—which as "an 
integrating principle ... has the singular advantage of being entirely meaningless, or to 
put it more precisely, non-referential" (22)jt—has became a code word for effectiveness 
conceived in terms of a cash-nexus. 
Of course, many universities attempt to define "excellence" within their mission 
statements. Iowa State University, for example, includes "the discernment, intellectual 
curiosity, knowledge and skills essential for [students'] individual development and their 
useful contribution to society.™ as well as "literacy in science and technology, an 
^ Post-secondary. 
"° Arrived at by -combining a ratio of 20 percent for students. 18 percent for class size. 20 percent for 
faculty. 10 percent for finances. 12 percent for libraries, and 20 percent for "reputation"" ( Readings 25). 
1 Aronowitz notes that -excellence" has become an "indeterminate concept" that signifies little more than 
... "comparative advantages*—a euphemism for competitive position ... closely related to "revenues" and 
other signals of profit and loss" (48 cf. Columbia University Provost Jonathan Cole). 
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understanding of humane and ethical values, and awareness of the intellectual, historical, 
and artistic foundations of our culture, and a sensitivity to other cultures and to 
international concerns" (ISU I). Yet many of the terms used to define "excellence"* are 
themselves "non-referential.**"2 Intellectual curiosity seems somewhat self-explanatory, 
but "discernment.** must be in regard to something in particular. While "knowledge"* and 
"skills" certainly encompass many details too numerous to mention in a mission 
statement, "personal development" and "useful contribution to society" remain wholly 
non-referential. Does personal development mean something more than success in the job 
market? What do the authors of this mission statement see as "useful" to society? 
As for "literacy in science and technology." students in liberal arts are required to 
take only eleven credit hours in natural sciences and mathematics"^ and are not required 
to take any technology course—although First-year Composition is usually taught in 
computer labs where the instructor, if able, assists students in learning word processing 
and other text-processing programs. For engineering majors the story is similar. To obtain 
the required "understanding awareness and sensitivity." these students are required 
only twelve credit hours in Social Science or Humanities—three of which must meet the 
"diversity" requirement, another three to meet the "international perspectives" 
requirement.34 Although effort is being made here, this low demand seems insufficient to 
develop the broad and deep "excellence" toward which the university purports to aim. 
Faigley notes that textbook criteria is also non-referential—"clear."* "concise." "effective."* "interesting." 
"projecting the "authentic voice" of the writer as are departmental guidelines—an "A" paper "'displays 
unusual competence*: hence, an A paper is an A* paper* (113). Terry Eagleton notes that the "values" 
students are expected to glean from literature are equally non-referential, involving not a particular set of 
values but something vaguely defined as universal, requiring students to be "sensitive, imaginative. 
responsive, sympathetic, creative, perceptive, reflective about nothing in particular' ("Subject" 98). 
' Three credits (one class) must be in higher level math, leaving eight hours (less than three classes) for 
sciences and technology—obtainable through courses such as Observational Astronomy which may provide 
an insufficient knowledge base for deliberation of political issues involving science or technology. 
a Generally four classes. Here. too. students may at least partially subvert the intent of these requirements 
by obtaining some credits through dance or music classes—which do not generally possess linguistic modes 
of expression necessary to understanding of cultural or political issues. While such classes have substantial 
value in their own right, they may be insufficient to the task of facilitating sensitivity to other cultures and 
perspectives or of providing a sufficient knowledge base for deliberation in a multicultural society. This is 
especially true considering that no requirement is placed upon instructors for teaching the greater cultural 
and political implications of these art forms and in light of moral-traditional objections to attempts to do so. 
Faculty and students in colleges other than Liberal Arts often argue that such courses are irrelevant to their 
disciplines: serve a "political agenda" which aims to discredit their interests: and take valuable time from 
disciplinary study. Likewise. Liberal Arts students and faculty sometimes claim that they don't need math 
and other sciences. 
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Although deeply concerned about the internal goods of education, moral-
traditionalists often seem ambivalent regarding market influence on education. D'Souza. 
for one. seems notably unconcerned, although in concert with counter-traditionalists, he 
calls for more intensive liberal education "for rulers" (250) which, in a democracy, he 
concedes, means everyone. Yet in light of the elitism of his general arguments, it is 
difficult not to feel that he has merely tossed a bone in the direction of philosophical 
democrats. Cheney likewise says little about market influences except to express concern 
that emphasis on research has devalued teaching. Although she concurs that U.S. .Vews 
and World Report inadequately assesses quality of teaching, she persists in defining 
parents and students as consumers, arguing that market pressures—the choice of private 
schools—will culminate in better public schools at the elementary and secondary levels. 
With all due respect. Bennett maintains that "acquiring "skills" should not come at the 
expense of acquiring knowledge™ (De-Valuing 50). Nevertheless, he too falls back on 
"tree-market"" arguments in calling for vouchers for private schools (52)."" Kimball, by 
contrast, baldly denounces concerns about market influence, as "sheer quackery" (39). 
labeling those so concerned "intellectual Marxists" (39)—diminishing the significant 
contributions Marx made to economic theory in favor of a Cold War sound bite. In like 
vein he wonders. "What is so compromising about being an employee of the state or a 
corporation, even a 'major corporation?*"* (39)—glossing over real concerns about what 
preparation for such employment may entail. It is telling that Kimball applies the same 
gloss to concerns about gentrification in SoHo and similar communities which have 
pushed out the less-advantaged as they have become trendy spots of "high"* culture.56 
5 For examples of the application of market logic to education, see John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe. 
Politics. Markets and America's Schools. Washington. D. C.: Brookings Institution. 1990: David K earns 
and Denis Doyle. Winning the Brain Drain. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies. 1988. 
"* Even cities as small as Des Moines. Iowa have experienced the oppressive effects of inner-city 
gentrification. In the 1960s. Des Mornes" vibrant minority commercial district. Center Street, was 
demolished for freeway construction—ending the livelihoods of many families and the cultural center of 
minority life. In the 1970s, artists, activists, and other representatives of the so-called "counter culture"* 
began living side-by-side with minorities and poor in some of Des Moines oldest neighborhoods where 
huge Victorian homes were divided into smalL inadequate, and often unsafe apartments. As they began 
improving neighborhoods, demanding services, and winning restoration and revitalizarion grants, 
purchasing a converted house as a "project" or "investment" became trendy and property values rose 
dramatically. As a result, lack of affordable housing for the poor has remained steady, even increased, 
despite public housing efforts. Meanwhile, commercial projects said to be in the interest of "devitalization 
continue to remove affordable housing. 
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Allan Bloom is particularly self-contradictory about market influences—in ways 
which well reflect the internal contradictions of liberalism. On the one hand, he berates 
the Left for "abstracting" rock music from the ~capitalist [my emphasis} element in which 
it flourishes" (77). while on the other, he disdains the music as promulgating ~a society 
where the greatest satisfactions are sexual" (79)—a society, he charges was promised by 
Marxists advocating "the overcoming [my emphasis] of capitalism and its false 
consciousness" (79). Bloom briefly bemoans that "the modern economic principle that 
private vice makes public virtue has penetrated all aspects of daily lite" ( 84). yet leans on 
the language of contracts to provide minimal rationale tor community obligation, relying 
primarily on the "glue" of private relationships, the family in particular, to hold 
community together. But in the public realm, does not a unified family represent 
something much like an individual who must then compete with other such composite 
individuals? At any rate, is the alleged collapse of the family the cause or effect of the 
breakdown of communal ties? 
Bloom is right to identify social atomism as contrary to civic obligation and he 
usefully criticizes value-relativism, but in the end. it is not value-relativism that troubles 
him. but commitment to values other than his own. He berates Continental philosophers 
for labeling the "new man of the democratic regime" as "bourgeois." that is. "diminished, 
egotistical, materialistic" ( 157). but in later chapters complains that "almost no one wants 
to face the possibility that "bourgeois vulgarity* might really be the nature of the people, 
always and everywhere" ( 249). And he is quite clear that by "people" he means those 
unlike himself, those who do not live up to "Aristotle's great-souled man. who loves 
beautiful and useless things" and "is not a democratic type" (250). Unequivocally, while 
acknowledging concern over "a fudging of the distinction between liberal and technical 
education" ( 59). Bloom contends that liberal education is "what the small band of 
prestigious institutions [my emphasis] are supposed to provide" (341). while the 
responsibility of "big state schools" is to "prepare specialists to meet the practical 
demands of a complex society" (341). i.e. train workers for the fragmented world of work. 
Above all. he echoes the most vehement arguments of his associates—that his territory, 
the territory of philosophers, must be protected from feminists, minorities, egalitarianists. 
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popular culture, and other threats to reason. To Bloom, as well as other moral-
traditionalists cited herein, it seems the agency of the masses is limited to meeting 
material wants and needs; socio-political agency is rightfully constrained to the elite. 
Yet. as I will later discuss, the response of counter-traditionalists to this elitist 
onslaught often has been both inadequate and unconsciously self-incriminating. It has 
likewise been overly dependent on material assumptions, often holding up "capital** as the 
one true villain and/or characterizing the Culture War as a battle over cultural "capital.™ 
Like moral-traditionalists, such commentators fail to recognize that market logic, what 
political theorist Iris Marion Young calls "the distributive paradigm" (8). provides an 
inadequate model of domination and oppression which assumes that all inequalities are 
analogous to the unequal distribution of material goods; that justice itself is no more than 
effective distribution and protection of material goods. 
The Distributive Paradigm 
Young defines "paradigm" as "a configuration of elements and practices which 
define an inquiry: metaphysical presuppositions, unquestioned terminology, characteristic 
questions, lines of reasoning, specific theories and their typical scope and mode of 
application" ( 16). Upon this, she argues that "contemporary theories of justice are 
dominated by a distributive paradigm, which tends to focus on the possession of material 
goods and social positions" (8)—"the morally proper distribution of benefits and burdens 
among society's members™ ( 15). Social justice and distribution are treated as "coextensive 
concepts" ( 16). a consequence which reifies non-material goods as "identifiable things or 
bundles" (8). treats individuals as discrete "points in the social field** ( 18). and "evaluates 
justice according to the end-state pattern of persons and goods that appear on the social 
field™ ( 18)/' Because this focus ignores relationships between individuals that go beyond 
"the amount of goods they possess** ( 18). social justice is commonly discussed in terms of 
taxation, allocation of public funds, or distribution of privileged social roles; terms which 
do not adequately account for "the social structure and institutional context that often help 
determine distributive patterns™ ( 15). Requiring a more process-oriented and relational 
French postmodernist Jean Francois Lyotard is likewise concerned with "the reduction of everything to 
"exchange value" in capitalism-—what he calls "the hegemony of the economic genre" (in Faigley 237). 
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conceptualization" (8). issues of domination and oppression"8 tend to be obscured while 
questions regarding the distribution of social positions and opportunities are usually 
subsumed under those regarding wealth, as the desirability of a social position is measured 
by income or access to resources (19). The distributive paradigm therefore fails to account 
tor "the justice of decisionmaking [sic[ power and procedures." "the creation and use of 
cultural imagery and symbols." and "the structure of the division of labor and a right to 
meaningful work" (20). Two main aspects of the distributive paradigm contribute to the 
above problems: I ) misrepresentation of 
non-material goods and resources: and 2) presupposition of "the institutional context that 
determines material distribution" (18). 
When non-material goods are treated as "a kind of stuff possessed by individual 
agents in greater or lesser amounts" (20). the "functions of rules and relations" (25) in 
social life are vastly misunderstood. Take rights, for instance. When an individual is given 
the right to ~a distributive share of material things, resources, or income." it is not the 
right, but the goods that are distributed (25). When rights are extended to include non-
material concepts like free speech or trial by jury, all individuals are granted these rights 
* Young defines oppression as ""structural": the "everyday practices of a well-intentioned liberal society 
unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutional rules, and the 
collective consequences of following those rules'* (41 ). Further, noting that group membership is "multiple, 
cross-cutting, fluid, and shifting" (48). she argues that group differences "cut across individual lives in a 
multiplicity of ways that can entail privilege and oppression for the same person in different respects" (42). 
Young therefore examines five non-distributive "faces™ of oppression. I ) Exploitation, "the transfer of the 
results of the labor of one social group to benefit another" (49). entailing a "structural relationship between 
social groups" ( 50) in which "the energies of the have-nots are continuously expended to maintain and 
augment the power, status, and wealth of the haves" (50). 2) Marginalisation. the exclusion of a category of 
people from the system of labor—which may result in material deprivation, but may also affect individuals 
even when material deprivation is relieved by welfare policies by depriving dependents of "rights and 
freedoms that others have- (54) through bureaucratic "patronizing, punitive, demeaning, and arbitrary 
treatment" (55). See also Jorgensen. Beth. What If Thev Have No Boots? Narrative and Ceremony in the 
Rhetoric of Welfare. Unpublished Masters thesis. Iowa State U. 1995. 3) Powerlessness. the condition of 
"those over whom power is exercised without their exercising if* ( 56) resulting from the many hierarchies of 
decision-making that inflect the day-to-day existences of most people. 4) Cultural imperialism, the way in 
which the dominant meanings of a society render the particular perspective of one's group invisible at the 
same time as they stereotype one's group and mark it out as the Other* (59). 5) Violence. which 
encompasses not only physical acts but harassment, intimidation, and ridicule: and which cannot be treated 
as isolated acts for they exist in a social context "which makes them possible and even acceptable- (61). 
Such violence is a systematic, social practice "directed at members of a social group simply because they are 
members of that group- (62)—consisting "not only in direct victimization, but in the daily knowledge 
shared by all members of oppressed groups that they are liable to violation, solely on account of their group 
identity"* (62). 
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in full: no one has to surrender her "portion" or "amount" because rights, as "social 
relationships which enable or constrain action" (25). are not something we have: they are. 
rather, something we exercise. Similarly, opportunity is not best thought of as a thing but 
as a "condition of enablement, which usually involves a configuration of social rules and 
social relations, as well as an individual's self-conception and skills" (26). Likewise. 
while "distributive arrangements" may "provide the background conditions for self-
respect" (27). self-respect is not an "entity or measurable aggregate.™ but "an attitude 
toward [one's) entire situation and life prospects" which issues in response to "many 
nonmaterial conditions that cannot be reduced to distributive arrangements" (27). These 
non-material conditions are fruitfully viewed as conditions of agency. 
Similarly, this paradigm describes power as "a pattern of the distribution of this 
stuff* (31). failing to recognize that power, too. "is a relation rather than a thing" (3D. So 
assuming a "static conception of society." (18) this model directs attention to "particular 
agents or roles that have power" (31 )—a "dyadic" model of "ruler and subject" which 
ignores the many additional agents and actions which mediate power "between two agents 
in a power relationship™ (31). Existing social stratification and hierarchy are assumed: 
"redistribution™ of power is cast as the movement of one individual into and another out of 
power while the structures themselves remain. Domination itself is not questioned: only 
the right of a given individual or group to dominate is questioned. In short, this paradigm 
misidentifies power as a material good rather than as a set of conscious as well as tacit 
practices which comprise our social institutions. According to this line, empowerment of 
disenfranchised groups or individuals must mean less power for those dominant: there is 
no vision of a public arena where all or most are empowered. 
At any rate, domination and oppression are prior to and independent of distributive 
issues. In the first place, wealth accumulates to those with power; power most often 
precedes gain. In the second place, fully equal distribution of material goods and resources 
will not necessarily signal the end of domination or oppression. Young explains the issue 
as one of "doing™ versus "having.™ Doing involves "learning and using satisfying and 
expansive skills in socially recognized settings: participating in forming and running 
institutions, and receiving recognition for such participation; playing and communicating 
with others, and expressing our experience, feelings, and perspective on social life in 
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contexts where others can listen™ (37). Economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
similarly see the issue as "becoming™ rather than "getting™ (22). Pointing out that the civil 
rights and women's movements "are not claims on resources™ but claims for "the creation 
and transformation of community and the establishment of individual and collective 
identities™ ( 10). Bowles and Gintis maintain that these movements deny "the separability 
of economic, moral, and cultural concerns" and assert "the primacy of moral and cultural 
ends and the general status of economic concerns as means™ ( 10)—though not the only 
means—to these ends/9 
The distributive paradigm inflects the rhetoric on both sides of the Culture War. In 
the first place, moral-traditionalists tend to treat respect for the canon as material stuff—as 
though respect for the work of Rigoberta Menchu means less respect available for 
Shakespeare. Yet counter-traditionalists, too. fall prey to the logic of distribution. In 
conceiving of every text as a product of self-interest, reducing literature to an emblem of 
either struggle or power on a competitive plane, counter-traditionalists often partake of a 
distributive logic in which social justice is measured in terms of who gains and who loses 
by publication and subsequent reading or placement in the canon. Ironically, it is the 
critics upon both sides who gain in this zero-sum grappling by keeping the controversy 
lively enough to fill journals and gain tenure. Unfortunately, their gain may be their 
students" loss if they lose sight of what their students need to know, not only as skilled 
employees but as socio-political agents. Moreover, the esoteric research in which many 
engage may do little or nothing to reduce the oppression of those for whom counter-
traditionalists claim to speak—distributively or otherwise—although it. too. leads to 
publication and tenure. At any rate, challenging the canon is not simply about giving more 
exposure to some works while giving less to others. It is about dismantling structures 
which limit not only exposure, but valuation. Forcing a white male to read Menchu will 
mean nothing unless the structures which encourage him to resent the reading are 
dismantled—one of which seems to be coercion. 
^ Bowles and Gintis also define domination, exploitation, and class in ways that go beyond distributive 
issues—the first as "a systematic relationship of unequal power* : the second as ~a particular economic form 
of domination-: the third as ~a form of exploitation based on the ownership of property" (23). 
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In the second place, moral-traditionalists tend to see opportunity in distributive 
terms. But more opportunity for one young person does not necessarily result in less for 
another. Take affirmative action—under the current paradigm, the Right argues that 
educating Rita at Harvard instead of Bill means that Bill will get less of that stuff we call 
opportunity. But given the underlying assumption that Bill is even more qualified than 
Rita, it is more than likely that Bill will be admitted to another fine institution. Concern 
that Bill's second choice may not be as prestigious as Harvard only reinforces counter-
traditionalists" arguments that the social, political, and economic structures of higher 
education are discriminatory. In the meantime, moral-traditionalists fail to acknowledge 
that these institutions engage in "affirmative action"* of their own through the practice of 
priority admission for legacies—the children, relatives, or friends of alumni. 
Yet while affirmative action was conceived as a challenge to discriminatory 
structures, it too reduces to distributive logic. Mere distribution of diverse individuals 
among academic ranks will not ensure the demise of discrimination and oppression if 
education serves only to acculturate them into the structures which perpetuate these ills. 
Alas, as currently conceived and discussed, affirmative action operates on these structures 
as "given background conditions whose justice is not brought into question™ ( Young 198). 
Evidence that this is so can be gleaned simply by looking at the Humanities departments 
that moral-traditionalists so malign. Here, the very scholars who disparage canonization 
and the structures which give rise to it enjoy tenure as a consequence of these very 
structures. Despite their rhetoric of inclusion, these departments are often sites of the 
struggle for dominance rather than for questioning and dismantling structures of 
dominance.40 Besides, diversity of skin color, gender, or other variables does not ensure 
diversity of thought, much less progressive thought—as the rise of intellectuals such as 
10 This can be seen in the struggle of TAs. temporary instructors, and adjuncts. It is also reflected in much of 
the disciplinary literature in English, often pejoratively labeled "politically correct." as these theorists 
describe struggles to find voice in the academy. Moral-traditionalists also cite examples of the university as 
a site of the struggle for dominance. D'Souza. for example, includes a number of anecdotes regarding 
censorship of research and intellectual curiosity. Indeed, moral-traditionalists often paint those who ally 
whh them as the victims of this struggle. 
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Clarence Thomas. Thomas So well, and Lynne Cheney attests.41 While I agree that 
affirmative action somewhat addresses the narrow distributive question of opportunity, it 
diverts attention from social patterns which leave many "Blacks. Latinos, or women [not 
to mention Native Americans, poor whites, and others} whose social environment and lack 
of resources make getting qualified nearly impossible for them" (Young 199). And 
qualified they must be. Affirmative action does not admit the unqualified. 
In other words, in the struggle for dominance, counter-traditionalists often confuse 
agency with power. Power is stuff that needs to be taken from some and given to others. 
At best they speak of balancing power—again it sounds like stuff—even as they call it 
empowerment. Reason—considered a construct of power—is thrown out on an all-or-
nothing wager. Authority, too—all authority seen as oppression. But some agreement on 
principles of reason is vital if the search for knowledge is to amount to more than mere 
assertion and counter assertion. Likewise, some authority must be granted to someone 
somewhere if we expect even tentative answers to our most pressing questions. To be 
sure, the "Students" Right to Their Own Language" is well and good z/students can 
choose their languages—but to choose they need another language option. For this they 
need the instruction of authority. The same is true of culture and values. 
Of course students also need to better understand issues of power and authority if 
they are to think critically. If the canon is treated as the authority, as the source of 
objective truth, what are students to make of the vast disagreement between canonized 
authorities? If Plato's truth is absolute, then Locke's cannot be. All too often students 
encounter conflicts between lines of thought and cannot sift through the contradictions. 
One risk is shallow analysis—a search for the right quotes to force highly divergent ideas 
to converge. Another is nihilism, the temptation to throw up one's hands and plunge into 
total relativism. Still another is dogmatism, acceptance of authorities who share one" s 
viewpoints, utter rejection of those who do not. Meanwhile, if students are to be prepared 
for democratic participation, they must come to understand, as Thucydides recognized. 
11 The cabinet selections of George W. Bush likewise illustrate that diversity of gender and skin color does 
not ensure diversity of thought. Although Bush appointed three women, two blacks, two Hispanics (one 
female), an Asian-American and an Arab-American, "most members hold moderate to very conservative 
views, and several faced opposition from labor unions and women's, environmental and civil rights 
organizations" (Superville "Cabinetl. 
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that use of power too often represents abandonment of the quest for excellence and that 
the use of power against the Other means that power can and will be used against them. 
Simply put. limiting their, or our own. understanding of power to the logic of distribution 
can do nothing but sustain an "us-them" dualism which is contrary to democratic 
cooperation, threatening to liberty, unfavorable to justice, and hostile to peace. 
Finally, we want our students to become "doers'* not simply "havers'* and we want 
them to keep on "becoming** throughout their lives. Both the Right and the Left err in 
thinking that higher education for minorities will end distribution problems or issues of 
oppression. First of all. a degree in mechanical engineering may not mean much in terms 
of distribution to a minority who cannot get hired or promoted because of racial 
discrimination. From another perspective, a degree in English these days may not mean 
much to anyone in terms of distribution. Second, higher education will not end the 
oppression of educated minorities until oppression is reconceptualized beyond the logic of 
distribution. In short, "having™ does not ensure "becoming™ or "doing.™ 
The distributive paradigm has consequences for our students* civic attitudes as 
well. Many come into our classrooms poised for battle, suspicious of those different from 
themselves, ready to do what it takes to get "theirs." Some arrive assuming that college is 
but a hoop through which they must jump before their prior connections will invite them 
into the world of commerce. Still others are deluded into thinking that the sole credential 
of a college degree is an automatic ticket to the middle class and beyond. While Allan 
Bloom claims that students come to us as relativists (25). my classroom experience 
suggests that students come to us along a broad continuum of moral commitment. 
Moreover, their commitments vary not only in intensity, but in kind. What few of them 
can escape is a conceptual paradigm which divides their world into "us™ and "them.™ in 
which they must look out for number one" to get "their share.™ As one young man told 
me. "There's just not enough to go around. We gotta protect our futures.™42 By such lights, 
some students have argued that fair wages don't apply in third world economies because 
"their standard of living is different™ and that those who immigrate in search of fair wages 
42 As most college students identify with or aspire to the professional middle class. Barbara Ehrenreich's 
description of the professional middle class as characterized by fear of social decline ( Falling) seems to 
apply. 
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(illegally, it is presumed) steal good jobs from Americans—jobs these students are in 
college to avoid. Often they contradict themselves, arguing that these job-stealing 
immigrants (in my classroom, nearly always perceived as Spanish-speaking and referred 
to en masse as "Mexicans") have too many children on welfare, refuse to learn English 
and. as all welfare recipients do. increase the crime rate and threaten our way of life. 
Moreover, they argue, tyranny on other soil is none of our business: U.S. economic and 
security interests trump human rights: sweatshops and child labor provide needed income: 
inhumane practices are inseparable from the workers* cultures and unsolvable by U.S. 
interference, whether governmental policing or consumer boycott. At any rate, they need 
the shoes for track. 
At bottom, distributive thinking encourages social atomism: when human 
relationships are reduced to competition, we become no more than "points in the social 
field inasmuch as there is no internal relation among persons in society relevant to 
considerations of justice"* (Young 18). Such limited thinking with regard to goods 
inevitably leads to inadequate thinking about practices and institutions. As practice is 
reduced to commercial and social competition, one is left searching for the coherence, 
cooperation, internal goods, and standards of excellence which Maclntyre claims define 
human practice. Without them, civic institutions crumble, only to be replaced by the chaos 
of the cannibalistic market. And. in fact, modem liberalism undermines democratic 
practice by offering no rationale for political obligation. 
Liberalism and Political Practice 
Political scientist Carole Pateman argues that liberalism is in part constituted by 
the idea that community obligation is self-assumed, voluntary, part of the social contract 
consensuallv entered into by free and equal individuals. On this view, voluntarism is 
necessary to a liberal system because the very notion of obligation, which requires that 
one at least temporarily be governed by another, is antithetical to freedom. By analogy to 
a promise freely made, voluntary obligation is seen an antidote to obedience which can 
result only from domination or coercion. But. Pateman stresses, this analogy fails because 
a promise is an individual act of agency, a conscious use of personal judgment while 
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political obligation is an assumption of the liberal democratic state which cannot explain 
"who has. and when, and how. actually and explicitly consented" (15). 
A common way out of this problem is to think of voluntarism as hypothetical, the 
result of voluntary actions of self-interest which give rise to obligation—one example 
being acceptance of the benefits of the state ( 16). Yet as people "do not connect walking 
down the road with consent™ ( 16) and so cannot be said to have consciously consented, 
hypothetical voluntarism fails as well. Similarly, it is often suggested that "the political 
counterpart of promising is voting" (17); that is. in the conscious act of voting the 
individual grants her consent, not hypothetically. but actually. Yet as voting represents 
people's alienation from political decision making and so from determining for 
themselves "the content of citizens* political obligation" ( 17). it is little more than "a 
promise to obey™ ( 19) the determinations of an elite few. By weakening "the sense of 
personal responsibility in community governance™ (Trend 10 "Crisis"), as well as the 
sense of personal effectiveness, this alienation from political deliberation undermines the 
impulse of citizens to participate in governance. On one hand, political involvement, even 
voting, comes to be seen as unnecessary, even irrelevant, as government appears to 
generally meet public need. On the other hand, political involvement comes to be seen as 
inconsequential, meaningless, as government ignores public need and the voice of the 
people. In any event, both perceptions diminish the socio-political agency of individuals. 
This alienation from self-governance is a direct consequence of the priority of the 
personal over the public which characterizes liberal democracy. As Barber points out. "the 
aim is not to share in power and to be part of a community but to contain power and 
community and to judge them by how they affect freedom and private interest" (Strong 7). 
Natural man is "free™; community is "artificial.™ a means of coercion. Ignored is "the 
possibility that community may support certain types of freedom or that nature may 
nourish forms of coercion and conflict more insidious than those known to democratic 
politics™ (10). Because the liberal ethos moves to minimize the individual's involvement 
in things public and the public's influence over the individual, the liberal citizenry is 
"unable to understand the formation of collective identities" and "cannot grasp that the 
collective aspect of social life is constitutive" (Mouffe 22). Separation from the 
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community becomes a primary right, ultimately leaving the "free" individual vulnerable to 
the deliberative power of others. 
Moreover, the normative image of the liberal individual as a white. Western, 
heterosexual male may particularly diminish minority and female participation. On this 
note. Armapal Dhaliwal contends that even "liberal discourses that presume to make 
everyone a self" (through inclusion) ignore that the liberal "self" always needs and is 
often manufactured in opposition to the *other(ed)* (the excluded)" (44). Indeed, because 
social obligation and inclusion are conceived in terms which "still oppress or fail to alter 
structures of domination™ (44). those whose "selves" do not embody the liberal ideal may 
not agree that they have consented to governmental policy. Case in point: the right to vote 
does little to alter structures of domination when the choice of candidates is limited to 
those who would uphold existing structures which culminate in an unequal playing field. 
Relatedly. inclusion often means nothing more than "happy family multicultural ism" 
(Nelson 35) which relegates significant differences to the private sphere, ignoring 
"conflicts, contestation, or contradiction" ( Dhaliwal 44)—which in a democracy are 
rightfully made public. In short, as "the United States constructs its "democratic" image 
through a series of selective constitutive erasures" (51). dominated populations are 
actively discouraged from participating in democratic practices. 
Even so. though also concerned with such "erasures." Chantai Mouffe defends the 
liberal element of democracy as the only hope "that the logic of popular sovereignty can 
avoid becoming tyrannical" (21). Mouffe s concern is that democracy unchecked by 
liberalism "speak(s) of the people as if it was one homogenous and unified entity with a 
single general will™ (21). ignoring that agreement is always "partial and provisional." a 
"product of a given hegemony" (24). Mouffe thus calls for a radical liberal democracy 
which embraces pluralism, "discarding the dangerous dream of a perfect consensus, of a 
harmonious collective will" (20) which can suppress minority opposition and which, like 
liberalism itself, finds articulation on both left and right in forms too numerous to examine 
here. In the end. like Dhaliwal. Mouffe rejects "happy family" pluralism which is "blind 
to relations of power™ (24). in favor of a pluralism which recognizes that the social agent 
occupies a "multiplicity of subject positions.™ involving a "multiplicity of relations of 
subordination.™ which clearly means that an individual "can be dominant in some groups 
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while subordinated in others" (25). According to this argument we can sustain 
democracy's link with liberalism without "endors(ing) either economic liberalism or 
individualism" (20). by extending "the democratic ideals of liberty and equality to more 
and more areas of social life" (20) and by using "the symbolic resources of the liberal 
democratic tradition to struggle against relations of subordination not only in the economy 
but also those linked to gender, race, or sexual orientation" (20). 
In concert with Mouffe. I have no intention of throwing the liberal baby out with 
the white Western male's bath water. Nevertheless, there is a "dark side" ( Hollinger) to 
liberalism that must be understood if we are to keep its excesses in check. Among these is 
alienation from the political process, which among other things has precipitated a decline 
in citizen involvement. Even within dominant populations, alienation is augmented by 
"the ethic of equal opportunity." and its "imaginary corollary, the American dream." 
which serve as "collective mvth(s)" to justify the State's "partial claim to authorize power 
over its citizens as a universal claim to social truth" ( Wallach 322). According to Josiah 
Wallach. these myths, "authorize ... a community of individual means rather than shared 
ends... displacing) radically individual fantasies onto the nation as a whole" (323). The 
state comes to be seen as no more than a collective of radically autonomous individuals 
suspicious of "any and all ties of reciprocal obligation and mutual interdependence" 
( Elshtain 12). As this fantasy is one of effectiveness in the midst of competition rather 
than excellence in a way of life, it does not concern virtue but rather rights. And rights are 
construed as attaining to anything that meets an individual's ever-expanding, often 
consumer-oriented "needs." Thus feminist legal scholar Jean Bethke Elshtain argues that. 
"designed primarily as immunities from overweening governmental power, not as 
entitlements." even rights are defined in consumerist terms as possessions of the 
autonomous "rights-bearing individual" ( 15). Unfortunately, as rights increasingly come 
to be construed as entitlements that free the individual from interference with or obligation 
to the community, the language of rights places the individual in opposition to 
community. 
Among other things, this opposition translates into the language of moral 
instruction in our public schools. James Davison Hunter, for one. contends that 
individualism has led to values curricula which promote the belief that "the foundation of 
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goodness, and especially altruism, is love of self* (Death 134). Moral instruction is "self-
referencing and oriented toward the end of personal well-being" ( 147) and moral 
reasoning is "framed by a cost-benefit calculation" (92) in which the costs and benefits 
accrue to the individual rather than the community. In the end. he asserts, the "moral 
imperative ... is not some antiquated notion of rectitude or even clear conscience but. 
rather, basic survival with one's emotional and mental health intact" (93): agency is 
reduced to survival while community is rendered irrelevant. Hunter gives, as one example, 
the drug prevention program known as DARE which depicts drug use as "unsafe" and 
"harmful" to the individual and des abstinence from drug use to "one's sense of well-
being" (94) rather than to community issues surrounding drug use. 
At any rate, notions of obligation and rights may be seen as liberal surrogates for 
Classical notions of virtue and meriL That is. where we once held standards of excellence 
to determine the best for the community, we now have obligation for personal benefits 
received: where we once attached merit to virtuous behavior, we now have rights to 
ensure that vicious behavior does not impede liberty. This substitution is nowhere more 
apparent than in the contemporary rarefaction of merit—which John Wallach attacks for 
lacking moral substance as well as perpetuating the notion that "relationships of power 
depend on virtually natural hierarchies of legitimate authority" (325). In the end. with 
virtue "privatized" under liberalism, we are left with only "a de-moralized conception of 
virtue" (325) embodied in the liberal notion of meriL Criteria for merit tend to be left 
unexamined, reducing democracy to "a set of institutional procedures designed to promote 
competition among elites for the approval of ordinary citizens" (326 cf. Schumpeter). 
Young similarly holds that the "myth of merit" legitimates a "hierarchical division 
of labor" (200). which is often unjust in that "normatively and culturally neutral measures 
of individual performance do not exist for most jobs" (202).4j Young's critique is equally 
apt regarding government and other social hierarchies beyond the workplace. With regard 
13 Young provides tour reasons why neutral measures do not exist: 1 ) "most jobs are too complex and 
multifeceted to allow for a precise identification of their tasks and thus measurement of levels of 
performance of those tasks": 2) "in complex industrial and office organizations, it is often not possible to 
identify the contribution that each individual makes, precisely because the workers cooperate in producing 
an outcome or product": 3) "a great many jobs require wide discretion in what the worker does and how 
best to do it" (202); 4) "the division of labor in most large organizations means that those evaluating a 
worker's performance often are not familiar with the actual work process" (203). 
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to education, for example, political scientist Amy Gutmann points out that, in its essence, 
meritocracy must neglect students with "relatively few natural abilities and little 
inclination to learn" (134) in favor of those more gifted and motivated—leaving us free to 
ignore the conditions which produced these inequalities as well as possibilities for 
remedying them. Should meritocracy triumph, children would be simply assumed to be 
autonomous individuals who can be held responsible for their abilities and motivation. In 
effect, the liberal model of merit ~assume[sj free competition between individual 
producers of approximately equal standing" (Bellamy 3). ignoring real differences in the 
places from which individuals begin. The individualism inherent to this model was 
nowhere better expressed than by Vice President Dick Cheney who. as a candidate, 
claimed that his financial success as an oil company executive was based on personal 
merit that "government had nothing to do with"—an utterance made with disregard to 
federal policies w hich largely benefited oil producers at the expense of consumers, 
laborers, and the environment as well as disregard to the connections he made to the oil 
industry while serving as Defense Secretary and in other governmental positions.44 As 
Wallach points out. "equality of opportunity says nothing about the conditions (apart from 
the rules) in which the race occurs" (326). 
At bottom, community interest gives way to self-interest: politics becomes nothing 
more than negotiation of power—seen as necessary to control those who would impede 
one's liberty. The idea is not to alter or transform "hedonistic self-interest" but to 
manipulate it ( Barber Strong 13). Certainly this manipulation is behind governmental 
"dog-biscuit laws, reward-and-punishment sanctions, and carrot-and-stick incentives" 
(13). Because such laws resort to private benefits rather than promote community benefits, 
they "do nothing to create a sense of genuine public interest" (13) but instead make 
"justice a matter of personal profit" (13). 
Prior to the September 11th attack, the consequent "me-first™ attitude was strongly 
present in my classroom. Students made it quite clear that they think of politics primarily 
in terms of personal benefits. During times of relative prosperity, the comparatively 
" Cheney seems ambivalent about the government's role in facilitating citizen virtue. On the one hand, he is 
a social conservative who opposes abortion rights and advocates censorship of the arts. On the other hand, 
he argues that energy conservation is a fine personal virtue but inappropriate as government policy. 
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affluent tended to express apathy as their needs were met. while students on the economic 
and/or social margins tended to express powerlessness and hostility as they went without 
in the midst of plenty. During times of economic distress, the affluent tended to blame the 
poor and environmental or ethical trade regulations for burdening society and so. briefly, 
activated to oppose policies related to these issues. Meanwhile, the poor tended to sink 
further into their despair, powerlessness. and resentment. But more often students 
complained that politics doesn't interest them, doesn't affect them, and is irrelevant to 
their education and their lives.43 In fact, after resorting to grade points to encourage my 
students merely to register to vote, only about three dozen of over three hundred students 
bothered to proffer a voter registration card.46 Needless to say. they, like most Americans, 
thought little about the horrors of terrorism and oppression until it bore a recognizably 
American face. Only time will tell whether their new awareness will endure. 
In the meantime, when students choose to participate, particularly when they 
choose community service or social activism, they often do so for altruistic motives which 
stem from faith-based, rather than secular, belief systems. Such a foundation for altruism 
may fuel arguments that the government should get out of the social welfare business and 
leave it to churches and other community groups but. in the end. dependence on private 
belief as a foundation for community action is insufficient, as some faith organizations 
may be punitive toward those in need, may abandon them when needs closer to home 
seem more pressing, and may have more concern with facilitating cultural homogeneity 
than with creating a democratic, even liberal democratic, culture. And as any individual is 
free to reject faith systems all together, much of the population may be left with no 
justification tor community obligation at all. What's more, as liberalism generally defines 
15 An annual survey conducted in 2000 by UCLA's Higher Education Research Institute shows that among 
responding first-year college students only 28.1 percent "are inclined to keep up to date with political 
affairs'* and only 16.4 percent ""say they discuss politics frequently." reflecting a continuing decline over 35 
years. 2000 findings are considered particularly significant because student interest usually increases during 
a presidential year (UCLA 2). Susan Miller argues that Composition Studies is complicit in orienting the 
student inward "rather than toward the full, highly political experience of an external world" (95). 
According to Miller, in failing to address (or even be aware of) the purposes for which students are likely to 
write, composition curricula and pedagogy do not value literacy "as an indication of capacities to transmit 
property, create rL or take political action" but instead "address the modem "individual* who has little at 
stake in the culture's organization, commerce, or politics" (95). 
16 The objection may be made thai 1 might have invited a non-partisan organization to register my students 
during class. I presented this idea to 10 of 12 classes, all of whom voted that to do so would be coercive. 
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needs in terms of material resources and rights as freedom from interference, the needs 
and rights of these students may be just as well met by benevolent despotism or rational 
aristocracy. Liberalism offers our citizenry no reason to prefer democracy over either. 
Alas, these forms of government do not possess democratic checks and balances to ensure 
that they remain benevolent or rational. We can implore students to participate to ensure 
freedom and democracy, but in the end. because liberalism eschews obedience, political 
obligation can be avoided simply because they "don't have to.™ no one can "make" them. 
But while liberalism offers no justification for political obligation, democracy 
necessitates obligation because democracy ceases to exist when the demos does not 
participate. Theoretically, one can be free in social isolation, but democracy is inherently 
political: it "presupposes a degree of faith in the possibility of politics—a belief that 
human need can be addressed within communities, as opposed to the anarchy of absolute 
privacy, liberty, and individualism™ (Trend "Crisis™ 9). Certainly if democracy is faith, 
liberalism is skepticism as to whether this faith is sufficient to social stability. 
Certainly liberalism in and of itself is not the problem. We rightfully cherish our 
rights, yet tear the tyrannical mob who may take them from us. But when the context of 
liberalism is accepted unproblematicallv. when liberalism is taught as an ideology, rather 
than as a fluid and self-regulating conversation, it may become as dangerous as extreme 
Islamism.4 declining to a condition wherein justice is no more than the will of the 
strong. Indeed, too long has the U. S. claimed our effective strength as evidence of moral 
excellence. Too long have we claimed economic liberty and material prosperity as our 
paradigm of excellence. Amidst claims o/democracy. upon claims of liberty, we have 
weakened our claim to democracy by limiting its reach both within and without our 
borders. At bottom, liberalism is neither a virtue nor in itself virtuous. It is instead an 
argument that virtue is a private matter. It is amoral. It does not prescribe norms. Hence, if 
we are to achieve excellence, we must rely on the principals of democracy, our agreement 
to be virtuous amidst freedom. In this sense, democracy, the recognition of each 
individual's right to self-governance, may be said to be the virtue by which we moderate 
liberalism. 
l
' l distinguish -Islamic- from "Islamist"—the former denoting a foith tradition, the latter the radical 
movement which aims to brine down the U.S. and establish Islamic dominance worldwide. 
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In sum. as Elshtain points out. "rights are always transitive, always involve us with 
others, cannot stand alone, and cannot come close to exhausting who and what we are" 
( 16). Accordingly, rights are not best understood as possessions but as functions of our 
relationships. Democracy provides a means to equilibrium in these relationships: it is "not 
a terminus for individually held rights and values: it is their starting place"* ( Barber Strong 
xv ). On this account, as liberalism offers no justification for political obligation, we must 
draw such from democracy. Any "notions of civic virtue, public spirit, and political 
community ... must be reformulated in a way that makes them compatible with pluralism 
and [my emphasis] the defense of individual liberty" ( Moufle 23). To do so will require 
that we reconsider the paradigm of Modern rationalism which undergirds liberalism, 
recasting it in a way which accounts for actual human practice. 
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Chapter Three 
Rational Autonomy and Thin Democracy 
Men stumble over truth from time to time, but most pick themselves up and hurry off as if 
nothing happened. 
—Winston Churchill 
Truth—an ingenious compound of desirability and appearance. 
—Ambrose Bierce 
The pure and simple truth is rarely pure and never simple. 
—Oscar Wilde 
What is laid down, ordered, factual is never enough to embrace the whole truth: life 
always spills over the rim of every cup. 
—Boris Pasternak 
The road to truth is long, and lined the entire way with annoying bastards. 
—Alexander Jablokov 
If taken at face value, philosophical liberalism appears to wholly ally practical 
rationality with effectiveness. Hence I have argued that the moral-traditionalist self-
proclaimed alliance with some sort of lost excellence is undercut by an operating 
allegiance to effectiveness and that counter-traditionalists are equally divided—though in 
different ways, toward different ends. But this is only part of the story. A further part of 
the story is that the modernist model of rationality which underwrites liberalism at once 
upholds and is incommensurate with many liberal premises—a circumstance which may 
account, in part, for the fragmentation of contemporary moral debate. In the words of 
political theorist Thomas Spragens. "liberal reason has turned out to be not very liberal, 
after all. and perhaps not very rational either* ( 14). 
I would like to begin by recalling from Chapter Two that Thucydides* allegedly 
"relativistic** view of human affairs arose in response to the political crises of fifth-centurv 
Athens < Maclntyre Justice 64-68). A generation later, responding with equal alarm to 
continuing crisis. Plato moved in the opposite direction, setting out to establish a theory of 
certain truth. Plato's concern was clear—flattery, manipulation, and other deceits of 
language are responsible for the ills which beset the polis. What was needed was a means 
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to distinguish between episteme and doxa. a method of reasoning by which humanity 
could arrive at infallible truth and conduct their lives accordingly. In the Classical world, 
this method was logic. 
The Context of Reason 
The first fluttering of Western logic is found in Parmenides as an effort to keep 
"what is ... uncontaminated from what is not" (Nye 12). A "perfected object of desire" 
(13). what is may be apprehended only by rejecting "the twisting and branching of 
ordinary existence ... for the straight way" (12). So establishing the "desire" of 
philosophy as perfect, unchanging truth and the practice of philosophy as a linear, logical 
progression unconcerned with "ordinary existence."1 Parmenides initiates a move away 
from sophistic modes of reasoning concerned with "the oral, the particular, the local, and 
the timely" (Toulmin Cosmopolis 30) toward "a purely theoretical view of philosophy" 
(x)2 which continues in Plato and comes to dominate Euro-western thought through the 
twentieth century. Yet the limitations of this linearity are apparent from the beginning. 
In Plato, philosophical reasoning, called dialectic, takes the form of a binary 
"logical division" (Nye 24)J which forces the interlocutor to choose between "two 
opposing alternatives" (26). each of which leads to a radically different conclusion. In one 
instance. Socrates asks Gorgias4 to choose between "learning" and "believing" as the 
outcome of rhetoric, associating rhetoric with flattery, cookery, and self-adornment ( Plato 
Gorgias 463b) as opposed to truth, health, and justice. Because Gorgias distinguishes 
between "justice" and "truth" and thereby associates rhetoric with justice, he has no 
option but to admit that rhetoric leads to belief rather than knowledge. Backed into a 
1 Contemporary rhetorician Michael Mendelson notes that "Parmenides regards all apparent manifestations 
of variety and transformation as illusion — truth itself can only be approached by logical deduction — 
any reliance on opinion or sense perception constitutes a descent into error™ (xx). 
: Parmenidean logic cannot express what "what is" is. One may say "my dog is a dog." but not "my dog is 
brown" because both "dog" and "brown" are what is. To admit one to the other is to contaminate what is 
with what is not. All truthful statements are thus tautologies. See Nye. 
' Platonic method allows such statements to contain a predicate. Nye explains: "A thing does not simply 
exist, it also is or is not a certain number of things: a man.* "not a dog,* "rational.* "not ruled by his 
appetites.* etc... "is not' is not always the simple contrary of "is* ...to say something is "not something 
else" is not to say thai it "is not* but that it is "different* from something else in some respect" (27). To more 
fully demonstrate. Nye diagrams the argument of the Eleatic stranger in Plato's Sophist (26). 
1 Sophist. 485? - ?385B.C.E_ represented by Plato as one of Socrates' interlocutors. 
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semantic corner. Gorgias is compelled to agree that "Rhetoric ... is not for instruction in 
the matter of right and wrong" (455al ) but a "device" for "*mak[ingj one appear to those 
who do not know to know better than those who know** (459c2)—so indicting Rhetoric, 
and himself with it for manipulation and deceit. 
Of course this line of reasoning elides the distinction between truth and justice 
and. in so doing, evades the very question at stake—whether Rhetoric can lead to justice. 
Clearly, opposing binaries do not represent the range of possible contrasts—"learning" 
may be also contrasted with "judging" or "deciding." Binary logical division does not. 
therefore, uncover knowledge new to all participants in the exchange, but leads to a telos 
prefigured by the dialectician. While often useful for uncovering flaws in the reasoning of 
Socrates* interlocutors, binary logical division also covers over flaws in Socrates* 
reasoning. That is. by limiting semantic options. Socrates simply shuttles to the realm of 
opinion anything that lacks the certainty he seeks—including any experiential or 
contextualized knowledge his interlocutor may bring with him. As products of social 
contexts, judging and deciding, posed in opposition to truth, are thus linked with belief5— 
a linkage which ignores practical distinctions between knowledge and decision-making 
which indeed contrast but do not inherently conflict. As Socrates* encounter with Gorgias 
illustrates, the persuasiveness of binary reasoning rests not upon linear exactitude but 
upon "powerful metaphors and analogies which underlie [the philosopher's! divisions" 
(Nye 30)—negative analogies to describe belief, positive to describe knowledge. Yet such 
analogies are themselves constructs of the rhetorical practice Plato, through Socrates, 
purports to disdain. Even so. plagued by the need for certainty in a time of crisis, the 
philosopher leads his audience away from the messy world of human affairs toward the 
perfected cosmic realm of Forms, abstract ideals which are only imperfectly realized in 
the physical, human world.6 
However, because Socrates cannot provide an arche, an indubitably true starting 
point from which accurate division can proceed, there are no "sufficient reasons for any 
" Rhetoricians Chaim Pereiman and L. OIbrechts-Tvteca call this "dissociation." a practice which "replaces 
customary usage with a more precise, "correct" usage, thus dividing a unified idea, such as knowledge. 
into a pair of ideas, here "truth'* and "belief." the former valued positively, the latter negatively (411-59). 
6 For Plato, only the Form is true; physical realizations of the Form are mere shadows of what is true. 
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sophisticated adherent of the opposing view to admit that a refutation has occurred** 
(Maclntyre Justice 75). Aristotle thus charges that Platonic logic "is still too removed 
from human affairs, still too encumbered with Parmenidean circularity" (Nye 41 ) to 
produce new knowledge.7 Meanwhile. Aristotle maintains that certainty, necessity, and 
generality are irrelevant to moral reasoning as "the nature of those issues" is determined 
by the conditions and circumstances of the moment and therefore "the kinds of arguments 
relevant to them "differ in degrees of formality or certainty: what is 'reasonable* in 
clinical medicine is judged in different terms from what is "logical* in geometrical theory" 
(Toulmin Cosmopolis 20). On these terms. Aristotle carves out a division between sophia 
and phronesis which commands that each be subject to different methods—a division 
which contributes to his theory of rhetoric. Meanwhile, to rectify the circularity of 
Platonic logic. Aristotle introduces the syllogism, a minimal three-part structure consisting 
of a string of true and accepted assertions which combine to create new assertions which 
he claims as new truth. As an example, he offers the primary assertion, "all mules are 
barren." followed by the secondary assertion, "this animal is a mule." which lead to the 
conclusion, "this animal is barren." 
Yet Aristotle's linear syllogism also proves insufficient to practical reasoning. As 
the above example illustrates, in syllogistic reasoning the first and second assertions are 
not demonstrated but taken as common sense or "general opinion" (Aristotle Topics 1.14 
in Nye 47). Moreover, "the direction of syllogistic reasoning" is not "from premises to 
whatever conclusion might follow, but from a conclusion to premises that will affirm or 
contradict the conclusion." from effect to cause rather than from cause to effect (Nye 51-
2). As the validity or invalidity of the conclusion or major claim is taken for granted by 
the dialectician, his aim is not to uncover truth but to persuade his audience to accept his 
primary assertion as true. The point is to make the premises appear "more basic, more 
intuitively certain than the conclusion" (52) and to arrange them in such a way that they 
appear to follow necessarily from one another. Questions of truth are thus "bracketed" in 
preference for "questions of logical form" (47). Hence, the syllogism, like Plato's binary 
Maclntyre claims that, recognizing this weakness. Plato offers only "a program for constructing such a 
theory" (Justice 82). Any theory satisfactory to Plato would have to grasp an arche. embodied in the forms, 
which can culminate in human telos. According to Maclntyre. as Plato sees apprehension of forms as still 
inaccessible, it is up to Aristotle to complete this project. 
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division, demonstrates only formal truth rather than revealing substantive truth. Certainly, 
even without this structure any farmer knows that his mule is barren, but then, this method 
is not intended for use by farmers but for use within "a specific Athenian institution of 
elaborate, often artificial debate in which farmers, laborers, or workers were not involved" 
(47). The purpose is not eternal truth but political advantage, "power, privilege, and 
wealth™ (44) for those identified as citizens. The point is "not whether the statements ... 
are true but whether they are believed and make a valid argument" (47). Indeed, the claim 
that such a method arrives at indubitable truth serves to reinforce belief. 
Meanwhile, modeling the rhetorical emhymeme8 upon the syllogism and 
privileging its abstract distance to the intimacy of the concrete, local example. Aristotle 
transports the formal exercise of dialectic to the chaotic, rhetorical world of problem 
solving, dismissing the emotional and ethical components of phronesis as mere 
persuasion. So. based on the assumption that objective truth is formally valid. Aristotle, 
like Plato before him. attempts to embody truth in linear purity, denying the messy, non­
linear world of immediacy and emotion. Emotion is relegated to the world of women and 
"others" who do not have access to the dispassionate reason that syllogistic logic brings 
about. According to contemporary philosopher Andrea Nye. one result is that 
[ajn ethics can be theorized based on the authority of reason over emotions 
which is the mark of a man; a politics can be developed that founds men's 
authority over women and slaves — other natural creatures can be divided 
into lower species in imitation of the superior species man: and finally 
divinity itself can be theorized as a nonmateriaL manly intelligence 
removed from the distortions of matter. (57) 
By this means. Aristotle reinforces the desire for linear certitude, undergirding a school of 
thought which comes to dominate inquiry for millennia. 
4 The emhymeme is a rhetorical chain of reasoning in which one premise is suppressed. For example. 
"Sociales is mortal" suppresses the premise "Socrates is a man"* which is present in the syllogism "Men are 
mortal, Socrates is a man. Therefore. Socrates is mortal.-
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Rationalism Reborn 
Fast forward to the seventeenth century, the approximate birth of Modernism.4 The 
common narrative, that taught in school and once presupposed in the study of Modernist 
ideas, tells us that Modernism began in a time of prosperity and material comfort, quite 
unlike that of Thucvdides and Plato, in which literacy had become "as widespread in the 
prosperous laity as it had earlier been among priests, monks, and other ecclesiastics™ 
(Toulmin Cosmopolis 14). Lay scholars, so schoolbooks say. insisted on reading and 
thinking for themselves and so reserved the right to reject church doctrine and free the 
human mind from the tyranny of superstition, tradition, and theology.10 Bolstered by a 
new spirit of intellectual tolerance, a new rationality emerged, a "method.™ which lay the 
ground for science and freed philosophy to pursue "pure™ inquiry unhindered by human 
concerns which cloud the mind and distort understanding. 
But. in tact, the seventeenth century was a time of great suffering and conflict 
throughout Europe. Near the turn of the century. Spain was defeated by England, ending 
her European dominance: religious disputes divided France and Germany: and England 
teetered on the brink of civil war. Economic depression and the Little Ice Age set in 
before the end of the century's second decade: the Thirty Years* War began: and. as the 
century passed, periodic recurrences of plague struck both England and France. Contrary 
to the standard narrative, scientists and "other intellectual innovators™ (19) experienced 
intensified theological pressure from both the Papacy and Protestant reformers. Unlike 
Copernicus a century before. Galileo was forced to abjure claims in conflict with Catholic 
doctrine and was placed under house arrest for heresy. Given such circumstances, can it 
perhaps be said that while liberalism arose from a Thucydidean response to seventeenth-
century conflicts, modem rationalism simultaneously arose from a Platonic response?11 If 
In am indebted throughout this section to philosopher Stephen Touimin's Cosmopolis. 
10 Toulmin argues that "Tradition and superstition were not clearly distinguished™ in the 17* century 
iCosmopolis 14). 
1 
' According to Susan Bordo. the dilemmas Descartes constructs, the solutions he embraces are more 
fruitfully read through the template of the cultural turmoil of the seventeenth century than as ever-
applicable. "enduring" philosophical experiences" (3). Similarly, political philosopher Sheldon Wolin argues 
that "most of the great statements of political philosophy have been put forward in a time of crisis" when 
"institutional breakdown" causes "political behavior and events to take on something of a random quality" 
and destroys "the customary meanings that had been part of the old political world" ( Politics 8). 
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so. the very contexts from which rationalist philosophies have sprung challenge 
rationalism's first premise—that truth and inquiry transcend human contexts.12 
This internal contradiction is just one of many which shake the foundations of 
liberal reason. Among other things, the self-concept of Enlightenmentu rationalism 
paradoxically both culminates in and denies the fundamental premises of liberal 
autonomy. For on one hand, if one is to doubt all received wisdom, inquiry must proceed 
in intellectual isolation: one must be free of outside influence to question anew. On the 
other, if knowledge gained by rational inquiry is certain, then freedom to entertain one's 
own beliefs is illusory: it is nothing less than madness to deny certain knowledge. Despite 
these contradictions, rationalism does indeed provide the foundation upon which 
liberalism is built. 
Rationalism and the Autonomous Self 
Any culture which possesses a singular notion of transcendent good likewise 
possesses an image of the ideal authority figure—that person thought wisest and best, 
possessing both knowledge and virtue. With this in mind, rhetorician Susan Jarratt 
maintains that the struggle between contingent and absolute truth represented in the 
Platonic dialogues marks a shift from the poet to the philosopher as teacher and exemplar 
of virtue, from mythos. the stories and theology of a culture, to logos. transcendent 
authoritative reason modeled on a perfect cosmological order.14 The seventeenth century 
witnessed a similar shift from the theologian and textual authorities to the rational 
empirical scientist and the authority of perfect reason, modeled once more on perfect 
cosmological order.'" At bottom, unwilling to abandon the notion of a human telos and 
12 Toulmin notes thai "the philosophical debate started by Descartes" has a "historical parallel" in Plato 
(Cosmopolis 31 ). while Spragens calls "modem rationalism a radicalization of the Platonic — line — 
separating] doxa from episteme. unreliable belief from genuine knowledge" (47). 
' " The Enlightenment, "discerned [in England] in the 17^ century with the writings of Francis Bacon and 
Hobbes. and in France... in the work, of Descartes." fully flourishes in the 18* century (Blackburn 120). 
u Maclntyre maintains that the shift "from the imaginative universal to the conceptual universal" is not 
complete until Aristotle. 
Like Plato. IT^century rationalists distrust poets—as aptly expressed by John LeClerc ( 1699) who calls 
the poet "a purveyor of lies, whose aim it is to feed us on chimeras, or on truths so twisted and distorted that 
we are hard put to it to disentangle fact from fiction" (in Spragens 34). 
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succumb to a world of conflict, both Classical and Enlightenment16 rationalists conclude 
that human emotion and its accompanying prejudices, traditions, and superstitions 
interfere with our rational capacity to apprehend the good. To draw on the language of 
Plato, to arrive at true knowledge, logos must dominate thymos (desire); or. in the words 
of the seventeenth century, reason must subordinate the emotions that the will may act 
wisely.17 But while the Platonic division of human nature into reason and passion 
represents a distinct departure from the mvthos tradition.18 the concept of the will is 
presupposed by the dominant Christian theology of seventeenth-century rationalists.1'' So 
we uncover a second contradiction in liberal rationalist thought—that reasoning must 
begin by doubting all one knows, by clearing the slate so that knowledge can be written 
anew. As point of fact, although they claim freedom from theological tyranny. 
Enlightenment rationalists incorporate Christian assumptions, particularly the concept of 
the will, throughout their vision of liberal reason. 
In fact, the founders of modernity were not "theologically lukewarm or even 
agnostic—let alone atheist™ (Toulmin Cosmopolis 20) but saw in their work a "pious 
purpose™ (21 ).:o The assertion that their methods were perfect and pure simply allowed 
them to speak in "the idiom of certainty" (70)—the idiom required for truth claims by the 
"theological dogmatists" (70). as well as necessary to the stability the rationalists desired. 
So. rather than abandon Christian theology concerning the will. Descartes and his fellow 
rationalists incorporate it into their model of reasoning. 
Toulmin notes that "ail the protagonists of modem philosophy promoted theory, devalued practice, and 
insisted equally on the need to find foundations for knowledge that were clear, distinct, and certain" 
(Cosmopolis 70). 
17 Descartes argues that anyone who "desires to investigate the truth of things should alone consider... 
how best to augment the natural light of reason ... in order that his understanding may guide his will in the 
choices he has to make on all the various issues by which he is faced throughout his life" ("Rules" 2). 
18 In Homer, thymos is contrasted with arete (virtue) rather than with logos. as in Plato. Thymos is "self as a 
kind of energy" that "carries [one| forward" (Maclntyre Justice 16). while arete is a cosmological necessity 
of one's role which guides one in overcoming thymos. As both are prior to reason, their relationship is 
means, ends, rather than reason giving ( 19). What to do is known "independently of their reasoning" ( 19). 
" Free will is a primary doctrine of Augustinian Catholicism which has carried over through many 
subsequent revisions of Christian doctrine, both Catholic and Protestant. 
3 These thinkers were optimistic that reason would "disclose- the certainty and stability of God s law in 
nature. Locke, for one. depicted the law of nature as the decree of the divine will discernible by the light of 
n a t u r e  a n d  i n d i c a t i n g  w h a t  i s  a n d  w h a t  i s  n o t  i n  c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  r a t i o n a l  n a t u r e "  ( E s s a v s  I I I ) .  
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Descartes follows the example of Augustine, who. confronted with the problem of 
evil, maintains that the voluntary nature of grace makes evil a necessary alternative to 
righteousness. Augustine wished to explain why. given that humanity is a perfect, divine 
creation, we sometimes fail to do what we know is best to do. Socrates. Plato, and 
Aristotle explain such failure as an "imperfection in that particular person's knowledge at 
that particular time or by some imperfection in the education and disciplining of the 
passions"* (Maclntyre Justice 156). But. given the perfection of divine creation. God could 
not have created humanity already bearing the mark of sin—not only is our reason perfect, 
so are our passions. The possibility of sin must therefore lie elsewhere. To meet this end. 
God gave us free will, the capacity to behave as moral agents'* ( Bordo 79). making "the 
will alone responsible for sin"* (79). Thus. Augustine holds that, by light of his perfect 
reason, an individual with no defect in his passions may know what is best, but may not 
act accordingly because his will misdirects him. 
As Augustine explains. Adam, directing his will, his "freedom to choose between 
good and evil." toward "love of self rather than of God — impaired his freedom to 
choose good" ( Maclntyre Justice 157). The will is thereby "systematically misdirected ... 
in such a way that it is not within its own power to redirect itself* (157). Thus the 
individual can attain grace, that is. the freedom to choose good, only by subordinating the 
will to divine law ( 157). But as free will is itself a divine gift to God's perfect creation, 
subordination must be voluntary—for to suggest that God can deny free will is to engage 
in a contradiction.21 Reason is not the source but the result of this choice—a gift from the 
mind of God in the form of divine law. So while Plato and Aristotle maintain that reason 
is "independently motivating." Augustine holds that reason must be "moved to activity by 
will" ( 156). Although under rationalism the locus of reason will shift from the authority of 
sacred texts to nature read by reason, this metaphysical freedom provides the foundations 
of political liberalism, the autonomous self.22 
Descartes parallels Augustine's argument to deal with errors in reasoning—our 
reason, modeled on the mind of God. is perfect: error belongs to the will. Error ceases to 
21 The voluntary nature of the will is exemplified in the Latin for wilL voluntas. 
~ The first principle of Cartesian rationalism, cogito ergo sum ( I think, therefore I am), clearly expresses 
this fundamental presupposition of intellectual autonomy. 
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be equated with a failure of passion or reason as the will comes into being as a faculty 
subject to either reason or passion—a crucial distinction being that emotion acts upon us 
while the will is ours to use—for good or evil, for truth or error. Intellectual error is thus a 
misuse of the will as applied to understanding ( Bordo 79) rather than a failure of reason 
itself.2^ In this way. judgment is distinguished as an act of will independent of reason (79): 
that is. while reason leads us to understanding, the will determines how we act upon our 
understanding. In place of the belief that the will must be brought under submission prior 
to reason comes to rest the belief that reason can master desire so that the will may resist 
temptation. The certainty and stability of reason become the virtues of the rational self by 
which the autonomous self may be directed to righteousness and truth. 
Yet despite theological underpinnings, seventeenth-century rationalists saw the 
church and political authorities, cultural mythos. as primary sources of intellectual error."4 
As they saw it. nature rather than ancient textual authority provides certain evidence of 
God's law: nature exemplifies God's logos. Unlike the truths of books which are written 
in obscure language, they maintained, the truths of nature are simple, self-evident, and 
easily accessible to the natural capacities of the mind—should one but use the right 
method. By these lights, made in the image of God. each individual possesses agency to 
become her own authority as the power of distinguishing the true and the false ... what 
is called good sense, or reason, is by nature equal in all" ( Descartes Discourse 5). Even 
peasants could become "better judges of the truth about the world than philosophers are 
now" ( Letters 6). In brief, the assumption of rational equality subverted the sovereignty of 
traditional authorities, paving the way for both epistemological and political Liberty. 
To be sure, in light of the religious wars of the era. these thinkers discerned that 
the church and the political establishment had a vested interest in thwarting 
unfettered rational inquiry" (Spragens 26). The church hierarchy, "devoted to the 
~ Contemporary philosopher Drew Hvland argues that, beginning with Descartes, the will comes to be 
"considered superior to and more fundamental than reason, and so human nature comes to be increasingly 
characterized as fundamentally irrational rather than rational" (8). While liberalism reflects Hv land's 
position, rationalism privileges reason. So while I agree that the will is privileged in the assumption that the 
many are less rational than the few. I hold that the optimistic view of reason—what Hvland calls the "stance 
of mastery" (3)—culminates in an ambivalent view of human nature. 
z* While many texts were still printed in Latin and Greek. Enlightenment rationalists were equally 
suspicious of texts in their native idioms, claiming that the imprecision of language distorts truth. 
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preservation of faith and their own social privileges" (26). was compelled to indict as 
impious all attempts to sever the ties between theology and rational inquiry. The political 
establishment, driven likewise to uphold the status quo and. with iL privilege and rank, 
was "threatened by the subversive possibilities of unfettered critical reason" (27). Under 
these conditions, autonomy, like equality, both a "political situation as well as an 
epistemological precondition" (81). served as a foundation for the notion of liberty. 
Freedom of mind and political freedom came to be synonymous: "man would never truly 
be free until the last king had been strangled with the entrails of the last priest"" (27). 
In sum. Enlightenment rationalists both adapted and rejected church doctrine and 
political authority in carrying out the project of liberal reason. They adapted the doctrine 
of free will to support political freedom. They embraced the theological necessity of 
certainty and stability but looked to nature rather than books for evidence of divine law.25 
thereby undermining traditional authority by declaring individuals equal. They 
nonetheless argued that true belief is certain and stable, in a word, rational. In short, while 
rationalists declare individuals free to determine their own good, their own telos. they 
insist upon a vision of the Good, a rational human telos to which all must supply their 
allegiance. Their point hinges upon their understanding of practice. Simply put. they 
believed that through correct practice, i.e. rational method applied to inquiry, free people 
must eventually come to agreement. In their minds, freedom of thought would lead to 
correct thought: disagreement and conflict would cease. As a consequence, their insistence 
on rational method undercuts the very liberty they hope to attain for all. 
Method and the Rational Self 
The idea that inquiry can proceed methodically and self-consciously was by no 
means new to Enlightenment thinkers: "the real difficulty was what those methods 
were" (Spragens 41). Having found the semantic trickery of the medieval Scholastics26 
- While Descartes, distrusting the senses, looks to the mind alone as the mirror of God's perfect order, the 
rational empiricists which follow him -rehabilitate'* the senses (Spragens 39). arguing that the senses 
convey -primary qualities" of material things which, being themselves "simple" and -clear."* correspond to 
simple and clear ideas (41). 
26 A mix of "religious doctrine, study of the Church fathers Aristotle and to some extent — Plato" 
(Blackburn 342). Scholasticism relied on "a highly specialized form of Latin" (Bizzell and Hirschberg 465) 
to attain a logical formality which led "in some cases... to the point of sterility (Spragens 41 ). 
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specious and Aristotelianism suited only to a "stable, finite Greek cosmos™ (41). 
Enlightenment rationalists sought a new source of first principles that would stand the test 
of infinite time. To arrive at these principles would require new "reliable procedural 
guides for inquiry** (41). As words deceive, a new "language™ was needed to represent 
thought directly. So. as nature exemplifies God's perfect plan, and as the "Book of Nature 
is written in mathematical symbols™ (Galileo in Toulmin Cosmopolis 74). mathematics 
and geometry come to be viewed as the perfect model of the precision, clarity, and 
certainty needed for knowledge and language.27 One need only divide subjects "into as 
many parts as possible™ in order to "commence with objects the simplest and easiest to 
know™ then move "step by step, to the knowledge of the more complex™ ( Descartes 
Discourse 18)—each new truth serving as "a rule available in the discovery of subsequent 
ones™ (19). 
So reducing the process of reasoning to a linear calculus, this model of rationality 
assumes that all individuals in all circumstances essentially think alike. The argument is 
simple: since humanity is part of the divine plan, mental operations are subject to natural 
law: thus they. too. are analogous to mathematics. All I need do to convince someone else 
of my conclusions is to take her through my chains of reasoning much as I would take her 
through a mathematical formula. In a nutshell, by explicitly testing my deductions against 
the natural mirror of another's mind. I may examine my knowledge for absolute certainty. 
Cognitive process and human motivation are thus seen as stable and permanent: 
knowledge as "a conceptual ordering of the thinking mind™ (Crowley 5)—"sequential — 
accurately inscribed in memory.™ and reproducible "upon demand** ( 12). Paradoxically, 
the rational self thus comes to be seen as a part of nature and above nature, possessed of 
the ability to intuit inalienable truths, to reduce complex problems to intuitive principles, 
and to methodically reason conclusions from them, thus gaining mastery over both nature 
and our material selves. 
Ultimately this paradox culminates in a distinction between Mind and Body, 
"between the rational freedom of moral or intellectual decision in the human world, and 
the causal necessity of mechanical processes in the natural world of physical 
17 Liebniz. among others, had faith that a language could be created to attain the exactitude of mathematics. 
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phenomena"—which was to become "'common sense" for the next 100. 150. or 200 
years" (Toulmin Cosmo polis 107). Along this line, "physical phenomena and natural 
processes [are] material — mechanical, repetitive, and predictable, effects of causes" 
( 108). contrasted to the ~mental or spontaneous outcomes" of human reason, which are 
"performed willingly and creatively" and "are active and productive" ( 108). While the 
body may be material and so. causally affected, the mind is non-material, possessed of a 
capacity to control both the body and material effects on the body. Extended beyond 
interpretation, influence, change, or redirection of human events, human agency ceases to 
be power to. becoming power over events both in nature and in society. 
According to philosopher Susan Bordo. this distinction between acting subject (the 
human mind) and passive object (material bodies, including our own), this "self-
consciousness" is analogous to childhood movement from an egocentric state in which 
"events occurring in the self" are not distinguished from "events occurring in the world" 
(46 ) to one in which the juxtaposition of self and world is "distinct, firm, and stable" 
(46)."* Reason becomes a function of the individual's internal world, detached from 
human contexts. So removed from material need and attendant emotions, the rational 
mind comes to be regarded as the solution to material causality. Knowledge, now a 
product of individual deliberative action rather than a response to and reckoning from 
causal experience, can effect only positive change upon the world—as calculation from 
known "facts" enables mastery and control of that which was previously causal and 
beyond human control. Such reasoning follows Aristotle's linear model: as to know is to 
apprehend the true order of things, to act upon what one knows is to do the right thing. As 
to do the right thing is in one's self-interest as well as that of others, should one know only 
enough to act in self-interest, one's actions will nonetheless serve humanity. Knowledge 
comes to be equated with progress—each "discovery" serving to expand our control of 
material forces.29 At bottom, if liberalism assures each individual freedom to serve self-
interest. the individual's inherent rationality coupled with the inherent rationality of that 
3 Bordo draws on developmental psychologist Jean PiageL 
3 Nuclear fission well illustrates the problem of this construct—producing a seemingly infinite energy 
supply along with problems of waste disposal, nuclear stalemate, possible nuclear annihilation or meltdown. 
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which is known, i.e. nature, assure that self-interest will be enlightened, unerringly 
precise, and practically efficient: so. in the interest of all (Spragens 88). 
From this view, knowledge is not regarded as the result of cultural interplay, but as 
awaiting discovery, within nature and within the individual human mind. This vision of 
rationality thus abandons the chaotic, public world in favor of a world of personal vision 
and concrete, testable scientific truths. Banished are relational modes of thinking which 
account for time, place, and the needs and claims of diverse individuals. What is left is a 
vision of reason which "conflates moral reflection with scientific knowledge"* (Young 4) 
and mistakes claims for "theorems to be demonstrated in a self-enclosed system** rather 
than pleas, claims upon some people by others'* (5). In sum. Enlightenment rationalists, 
like Plato before them. 
read questions about the soundness or validity of "arguments™ as referring 
not to public utterances before particular audiences, but to written chains of 
statements whose validity rested on their internal relations ... [They | 
thus set aside all questions about argumentation—among particular people 
in specific situations, dealing with concrete cases, where varied things were 
at stake—in favor of proofs that could be set down in writing, and judged 
as written. (Toulmin Cosmopolis 31) 
Looked at this way. the Enlightenment project, like the Platonic dialogues, not only 
represents a move from mythos to logos. but a narrowing of logos which makes it 
increasingly calculative. Logos having once meant words, stories, and arguments, comes 
to mean linear, calculative proofs, with the consequence that "Plato's libel against 
rhetoric"* is so successfully reinstated "that the colloquial use of the word rhetoric has 
been deprecatory ever since"* ("Recovery" 339). Rhetoric is once again equated with 
selfish, political machinations. Paradoxically, however, this abstract, linear, and 
individualistic rationality is grounded in deeply contextual political motives. 
Rationalism and Politics 
Above everything else. Enlightenment rationalists believed the new method of 
scientific inquiry to be applicable to all humanity is capable of knowing. Anything to 
which it cannot apply comes to be seen as outside the scope of human knowledge. 
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residing in the "kingdom of darkness" ( Spragens 45). The choice was clean "absolute 
certainty or epistemological chaos" (Bordo 17): either apply this method to the "moral 
sciences" or plunge humanity into absolute relativism. To the rationalists* way of 
thinking, just as method would allow humanity to understand nature, it would fortunately 
~unveil the good" (Spragens 69). Science, including the study of society, "would possess 
both the intuitive certitude of Aristotelian sophia and the practical force of Aristotelian 
phronesis~ (55)—and so it came about that practical rationality passed from the domain of 
rhetoric to the domain of systematicity. Henceforth, "the enlightened individual could be 
expected to discern his self-interest with careful reference to a felicific calculus and to 
behave accordingly" (6). Simply, reason would enlighten the wills of diverse autonomous 
individuals that they may choose the best course without sacrificing essential liberty. 
On this account, much of the Enlightenment project in philosophy, like the 
Classical, is an attempt to identify and articulate the ideal political order, a political telos. 
called by Steven Toulmin the cosmopolis, "a comprehensive account of the world" which 
can "bind things together in "politico-theological.* as much as in scientific or explanatory 
terms" (Cosmopolis 128). Prior to 1640. political philosophy examined the operations of 
actual cities or states—what has worked, what has not worked, what can be done 
differently. After 1640. under the influence of rationalism, political theory increasingly 
comes to be "handled in abstract general terms, with the individual citizen or subject taken 
as the unit of analysis the problem became to explain the political loyalty of the 
individual to the State" ( 77). In a stark move away from the Aristotelian tradition, the 
natural state of humanity comes to be identified as ~apart from civil society" (Spragens 
102). a condition prior to prejudices, superstitions, and traditions. Rationalists come to 
believe that by logically calculating from this imagined ideal state/0 human governance, 
while not attaining the status of a physis. could nonetheless rise above nomos by modeling 
the physis. the perfect plan of divine cosmology."1 In sum. "they hoped to illuminate 
Nature as it had been conceived in the classical tradition, with its teleological order, by 
0 Variations in the "state of nature- thesis show sharp distinctions. Locke envisions harmony and 
tranquility: Hobbes envisions a life which is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short* (76): Rousseau 
objects to both—to avoid ~rmport[ingl into [naturel ideas gathered in ... society" (214). he imagines 
humanity in the natural state as devoid of both reason and egoism (Spragens 103). 
While both Plato and Enlightenment rationalists rely on the notion of a perfect cosmos. in Plato, the 
cosmos is purely metaphysicaL while for Descartes and other rationalists, it is nature itself 
using the beacon light of new methods"* (71). Political stability could now be assured 
because loyalty was no longer a matter of fickle emotional bonds but of unfailing rational 
adherence to the themis represented, on the one hand, by nature: on the other, by a method 
which emulates the order of nature. In a significant way. modern rationalism thus 
represents a triumph of Platonic epistemologv. Henceforth, the tradition of practical 
reasoning initiated by the Sophists, accommodated by Aristotle, and continued by the 
Renaissance humanists is pushed to the margins of intellectual thought/2 
The upshot is that scientific discourse comes to be interpreted as dispassionate, 
value-neutral exposition—the inverse of the passionate, subjective persuasion of rhetoric. 
Ethics comes to be considered integral to the scientific process: written text is reduced to a 
mere site of empirical demonstration and logical proof, the truths of which are presumed 
clear to any rational person. Consequently, to obtain this appearance of neutrality, 
objectivity, and detachment from personal concerns and prejudices, the various studies of 
human society—sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, and particularly, 
economics—emulate the calculative methodologies and rhetorical style of the physical 
sciences. Rigorous method, preferably quantifiable, is applied to ensure detachment, 
clarity, and exactitude: people, as well as natural resources, become units of analysis 
dissociated from the particularities of daily existence. In sum. since the truthful results of 
method are thought to precede their delivery in text, the text is itself thought neutral and 
objective: ethical and contextual considerations are pushed aside as calculative results are 
thought to "speak for themselves."" 
But again, we are bound in a paradox. For while rationalism, like liberalism, is 
grounded in a calculative or "distributive" paradigm which treats all goods as though they 
are commodities in the marketplace, rationalism also claims to transcend mere 
Aristotle's accommodation is reflected in his distinction between sophia and phronesis—he "treated 
questions about the conditions on which, and the circumstances in which, arguments carry conviction as 
ones that philosophers can address with a clear conscience" (Toulmin Cosmopolis 31 ). noting that ethics is 
not "a universal or abstract science- nor "for theoretical analysis.- but for practical wisdom (76). Toulmin 
also sees "the oral, the particular, the local, and the timely- as "long-standing preoccupations- of 
Renaissance humanists (Cosmopolis 30). who saw rhetoric and logic as "complementary disciplines- (27). 
" Donaldo Macedo maintains that "blind belief in objectivity not only provides pseudoscientists with a safe 
haven from which they can attempt to prevent the emergence of counterdiscourses thai interrogate the 
hegemony of positivism and empiricism" but also generates a form of folk theory concerning objectivity 
believed only by nonscientists" ("Foreword- xxii cf. Brodkey "Designated" 8). 
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effectiveness by arriving at the correct and appropriate calculation, operating from first 
principles known by "insight" and "self-evidence." truths recognizable "by everyone of 
sound mind who understood the terms in which they were stated and — had not been 
subverted by false doctrine" (Maclntyre Justice 223). 
In the first instance, modern rationalism appears to ally with justice as 
effectiveness in the midst of competition—any notion of human telos appears abandoned 
to power and control. Distributive justice is governed by legal rather than moral 
constraints as the "effective" individuals who win the competition exercise their power to 
minimize regulation. And. as the "rational" methods of the market obscure the real 
contexts of people and resources, profit and/or economic growth serve as primary 
measures of effectiveness. Meanwhile, corrective justice is punitive rather than corrective, 
again a matter of only measurable social costs and benefits. Although such measures may 
tell part of the story, offenders are sentenced with little regard for circumstances, needs, 
sometimes even humanity, as retribution supplants prevention and/or rehabilitation. Moral 
considerations aside, the measurable costs in terms of recidivism which may stem from an 
excessively punitive approach, as well as the measurable benefits which may stem from a 
rehabilitative approach, are often overlooked.54 Such a view of rational justice "is simply 
too abstract to be useful in evaluating actual institutions and practices" ( Young 4). lacking 
"substantive premises about social life" (4). 
In the second instance, rationalism claims alliance with justice as excellence, 
paradoxically evoking the determinate self and so negating the autonomy which 
circumscribes both the liberal and rational self-concepts. Simply, if humanity is. on one 
hand, subject to material, mechanical nature but. on the other hand, above nature due to 
the causal ability of human reason, it seems to follow that, as in nature, the abilities of 
some creatures must be greater than those of others. Some individuals, "by attaining 
scientific truth." must be capable of freeing themselves "from the grasp of deterministic 
nature that swallows the unenlightened" (Spragens 106). Such men emerge to become our 
The effects of this punitive approach to justice is reflected in minimum sentencing laws which have led to 
overcrowded prisons where minor drug offenders make up large populations: in zero-tolerance policies 
which have led to school suspensions of elementary students for such minor infractions as kissing a 
classmate, threatening to "kill" someone on the playground, or creating a cartoon character with a marijuana 
leaf on his t-shirt: and in subjection of juveniles to the adult criminal justice system—m one case sentencing 
a fourteen-year-old boy to life in prison. 
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rational leaders, offering infallible solutions to human problems in clear language to the 
natural, though interior, reason of all individuals everywhere. Society comes to be divided 
in two—those whose scientific truths allow them to escape nature and those who do not 
possess these truths ( 107). The former, what Thomas Spragens calls "human subjects." 
rise above contingency and partiality: rather than "being radically determined beings 
they are radically self-determining" ( 108). The latter, "human objects." are "artifacts... 
characterized by their immanence, their passivity, their manipulability. their bondage. 
their "drivenness"—in a word, by their blind determination by outside forces" ( 107). The 
former possess not only agency, in the sense of volition, but mastery. The latter possess 
only minimal volition subject to forces beyond their control. 
By this means, social hierarchy comes to be read as part of the divine plan as 
demonstrated in nature, where "the actions of "lower" things depended on. and were 
subordinate to. oversight and command by "higher" creatures, and ultimately the Creator" 
(Toulmin Cosmopolis 128). Paradoxically, then, the very rationalism which underwrites 
political autonomy was once used to uphold the sovereignty of kings—the solar system 
serving as a model for government. With the monarch at the center of the political 
cosmology, each successive social stratum was understood to revolve around that next 
closest to the "sun"—"what God is to nature and the King is to the state, a Husband is to 
his Wife, and Father to his Family" ( 127). This "orbital" ( 133) relationship between 
classes and status—what Spragens calls "moral Newtonianism" (66)—"depended on all 
the parties in society "knowing their place" relative to the others, and knowing what 
reciprocal modes of behavior were appropriate and rational" (Toulmin Cosmopolis 133). 
As in the Aristotelian narrative, practical rationality and the virtues which attend it are no 
more than understanding what is required of one's role: hence, social inequality can be 
dismissed with the argument that social disturbances arise from the indiscretions of 
irrational subjects ( 128)—agency run amok. Under this construct, the depth and breadth of 
liberty and democracy hinge on a distinction between what Bowles and Gintis call 
"choosers" and "learners." Liberty "is held to apply to rational agents (choosers) but not to 
others ( learners), and the norms of democracy are held to apply to the actions of choosers 
in the public realm alone" ( 17). In tact, belief in a rational social order extends beyond the 
European nation-states to serve as justification for colonialism, slavery, and limited 
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suffrage, as well as gender and racial discrimination, giving "discriminatory practices a 
new respectability** ( 134). Once again at issue are power and control. 
So it appears that rational liberalism is something of a contradiction in terms. 
Being equal, we are free to determine our own telos. but should we prove rational, we will 
inevitably acknowledge the true, singular, and unitary telos recognized by all who rightly 
apply their reason. Should we tail to recognize this telos. we are simply not rational and 
are therefore incapable of sovereignty over ourselves. At any rate, the apparent 
contradiction in rational liberalism's dual allegiance to excellence and liberal 
effectiveness is no blunder of logic but is embodied in an assumption which underwrites 
both liberalism and rationalism—the state of nature. 
Rationalism and Market Assumptions 
As I have pointed out. liberalism assumes that in the hypothetical state of nature, 
humanity is in competition for scarce material resources. Of course under rationalist 
assumptions, nature is itself rational, hence the conditions of competition are rational. So. 
too. are humans, who both inhabit and are a part of nature. Again, due to our reason. 
human nature is essentially mental', capable of controlling material nature—of 
understanding natural operations and resources, of using (even exploiting) them, of 
manipulating the order of nature for our gain. It seems to follow that the most rational 
humans are those who obtain the greatest amount of material resources. By virtue of their 
rationality. they are. in fact, entitled to these resources: resources belong to them, they are 
property. In a nutshell, based on the hypothetical competitive state of nature, rational 
liberalism assumes property rights to be as fundamental as life and liberty/3 
This reliance on the state of nature thesis and its inherent assumption of property 
rights has had two notable consequences. One. "liberals came to assert not only that 
economics was the most useful form of knowledge for the individual in his pursuit of 
happiness, but that it also provided the necessary prescriptions for handling the common 
affairs of society" ( Wolin Politics 302). Two. even as the equality assumption challenged 
' Noting the linguistic connection between "propriety'* and -property." as well as the analogous connection 
between "property" and goods—in French, biens-, in German, gun in Spanish, bienes—Dietze points out that 
"property rights are generally considered the oldest of human rights" (48)—reflected in Roman law. 
common law. Locke's philosophy, the US. Constitution. Napoleonic Code, and Germany's Civil Code. 
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monarchy, the world continued to be divided in two—rational agents, "choosers." 
measured by good fortune: and semi-rational, even non-rational or irrational, agents, 
"learners." measured by lack of fortune. Simply, power comes to be viewed as rightly 
falling to men of property, as "those who have something to lose would act more 
rationally and responsibly than poor firebrands ... homo economicus thinks rationally" 
( Dietze 231 ). 
The first consequence, discussed in Chapter Two. is the foundation upon which 
liberalism has reduced politics to marketplace power. The logic is again linear rational 
conquest of nature leads to productivity, productivity reduces human misery, therefore, 
industriousness and productivity are the rational virtues of the liberal individual. As 
human nature is thus assumed to be grounded in economic activity, rational liberalism 
assumes that the surest of the human "sciences" must be economics. Here in particular it 
is not "the causal tangle of motives or feelings behind real human choices" which are of 
concern, but "the rational choices of "ideal* producers or consumers, investors or 
policymakers" ( Toulmin Cosmopolis 125). Economic patterns are taken as a part of the 
natural order, accorded a rationality of their own: all that is needed to maintain constant 
economic progress is greater understanding of the "natural" laws of artificial markets. As 
personal distribution is affected by the same rational system which profits public industry, 
"what's good for GM is good for America"—or so the argument goes. In the guise of 
science, politics becomes "prudence in the service of homo economicus—the solitary 
seeker of material happiness and bodily security" ( Barber Strong 20). 
It bears repeating that, according to this line of thought, to follow these economic 
laws should be to attain material success. Again, the reasoning is linear: rationality applied 
to human effort results in productivity: productivity culminates in property: therefore, a 
rational government exists to protect property. So operating on the premise of rational 
self-interest—if I respect the property of others, they will respect mine—virtue, which 
once directed humanity toward the public interest, is replaced by productivity and 
acquisitiveness. The public good is served only incidentally as my rational ability to 
anticipate threats to my priv ate interests reveals to me that only mutual cooperation and 
respect for the private interests of others can protect my own. As wealth thus comes to be 
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seen as material evidence of enlightened self-interest, it likewise is seen as material 
evidence of rational superiority. 
But if all humans are equal, should not our equal reason culminate in equal 
material prosperity? Not so. as we are also equal in passion. Following this line of 
thought, the ills that beset some individuals and. through them, society, must be due to 
emotions carrying them away: these folks must lack some quality, some virtue, which 
enables reason. In the interest of the community, therefore, the political, ethical realm 
must be ruled by a few objective "experts."" individuals whose superiority in "knowledge, 
will, and power"* (Spragens 108) affords them "omniscience." "detachment."* and the 
"god-like™ potential for creating social harmony ( 109). Such individuals are men of the 
public, while the majority are consigned to their own private realms so as not to unduly 
influence policy. Liberty is ensured by narrowing the public space, by excluding most 
activities of most individuals from public consideration. Democracy is (at least minimally) 
ensured by the right to choose from among these competing experts. In fact, to ensure that 
the property rights of these public "experts"* are not threatened by irrational, property less 
private citizens, the founders of United States democracy found it necessary to 
institutionalize democracy to check the excesses of liberalism, establish "rational"" 
procedures for government, and protect the rational, propertied elite from the irrationality 
of excess democracy that results from fully enfranchising the unpropertied. The means by 
which this process was initiated is the United States Constitution. 
Rationalism and Constitutional Democracy 
While under despotic governments, liberal or not. citizenship is little more than a 
description of one's legal inhabitance. democratic citizenship is "a set of practices that 
involve public action as much as private rights'* (Euben. et. al. 3): it is a "civic identity* 
(Elshtain 30) built upon "public actions'* (38): without the public sphere, "no politics can 
exist, by définition" (40). To ensure liberty, the public sphere must be narrow and clearly 
distinguished from individual's private lives: but to ensure democracy, the public sphere 
must be broad enough to address private social concerns. Hence, the defining problem of 
liberal democracy is to balance the tension between democracy and liberty, between the 
public, "those spheres of social life over which the twin norms of liberty and democracy 
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may be rightly held to apply": and the private, "those spheres over which only conditions 
of liberty may be rightly held to apply" ( Bowles and Gintis 66). The problem, simply, is 
that too much democracy can interfere with individual liberty—a majority may tyrannize 
a minority. Some artifice, some "mechanical contrivance.** is thus needed to "provide 
creative outlet for the moral, communal, and altruistic components of human nature while 
establishing procedural safeguards to prevent the selfish and domineering tendencies in 
man from producing tyranny or anarchy" (Spragens 90). 
The fundamental mechanism which establishes the necessary public, private 
distinction is the Constitution, designed to check the conflict that arises from moral and 
cultural pluralism by institutionalizing democratic practices. Having rejected both 
metaphysics and natural aristocracy as proper foundations for government, constitutional 
theorists evaded "questions of who should rule and how they should rule, by inventing the 
question of what should rule" ( Wolin "Norm" 46). They lay down the Constitution as a 
themis. an objective, universal form grounded upon rationally "self-evident" premises— 
the telos of which is to ensure optimal liberty in the private arena while alienating citizens 
from real public power which can only, so our founders feared, result in mob tyranny. 
Simply puL the Constitution was regarded as a means to deal with the "surplus 
democracy" (47) which ensues when the morally and culturally heterogeneous masses are 
enfranchised. According to political theorist Sheldon Wolin. its purpose is to specify "a 
set of integrated conditions for the production of power" (36) by which democracy, which 
is "informal, indifferent to /orma/ities wayward, inchoate, unable to rule yet unwilling 
to be ruled" and "inherently formless" (50). is forced to conform or be considered 
"misinformed" (49). This move allows democracy to be discussed as a "theoretical object" 
(49)—stuff, in Iris Young's terminology—which possesses "a distinctive character, 
structure, order, and boundaries, a mode of ruling" ( Wolin "Norm" 49) which constrain it 
to serve ""ends* distinctive to that form" (34). In this case, a primary end was to limit the 
capacity of the "irrational." "driven." unpropertied mob to interfere in the "rational** 
economic practices and institutions of the propertied few. 
Indeed, as propertied men. the framers of the Constitution found h imperative to 
limit the power of institutions which govern distributive practices. As "all political forms 
are prone to favor some group" (51). constitutional democracy thus favors "the social 
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groups and classes represented by the best men*** (35)—defined by their economic and. 
thereby, cultural influence. In this vein. Alexander Hamilton argued that the "habits of 
life** among the "mechanics and manufacturers'* ( Federalist 166), i.e. the unpropertied. 
"have not been such as to give them those acquired endowments'* (167) needed for 
deliberation in the assembly; hence representation of all classes is "visionary" ( 167).36 In 
accord. James Madison argued that "a well constructed Union"* is largely defined by its 
ability to "break and control the violence of faction" ( Federalist 42). something pure 
democracy cannot do because it has no rational form by which to check "this propensity of 
mankind to fall into mutual animosities" (44)—particularly those brought on by "various 
and unequal distribution of property" (44). In sum. because liberalism defines freedom in 
terms of socio-economic power rather than socio-political agency, and because 
rationalism assumes that the irrational, propertyless majority will abuse power, democracy 
serves as a narrow mechanism of public control rather than a way of life, pacification 
(even passivation) of the irrational mob through the right of suffrage. Liberal democracy 
is thus thin democracy. It is not "a synthesis of'liberal* and democratic* ideas and 
practices" but is in origin and today "essentially liberar ( Pateman 5). 
With this in mind. Ellen Meiksins Wood argues that because liberal democracy 
leaves only "formal" rather than "substantive" democracy, it does not stand for "the 
exercise of political power but its relinquishment, its transfer to others, its alienation" 
(62)/ ' Even Aristotle, she points out. saw "election as an oligarchic feature" (62) of 
"mixed" constitutions as it accedes power to an elite few/8 Thus. Wood claims, by 
evading "the one literal democratic feature of Athenian democracy, its extension of 
citizenship to laboring, "base." and "mechanic* classes." invoking instead the "liberal 
values of Classical Athens." the trainers of the Constitution redefined democracy to 
"* Jefferson, tor one. made the somewhat more democratic assumption that the vast land availability would 
enable most citizens to become property owners, thus enfranchised. However, claiming this land meant 
displacing Native Americans. Meanwhile, even free blacks were denied property rights. 
The former is elected representation while the latter ~refër[s] not only to political procedures and 
institutions but also to their social context, the distribution of class power within society" (61 ). 
* While the 15* and 19* amendments prohibit race and sex discrimination, the Constitution does not 
guarantee universal suffrage, leaving jurisdiction to the states. The Supreme Court ruling in Bush v. Gore 
and that which denied Washington. DC citizens national representation reaffirm that the people do not have 
a federal constitutional right to vote—violating the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
(Raskin 10). 
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coincide "not with popular power but with the values of liberalism" (66). Taking their lead 
from European feudalism, where democracy came not from elevating property less 
commoners but from liberating propertied lords from the claims of monarchy, these 
democrats "took it for granted that a propertied minority would stand for the population as 
a whole" (68). Liberal democracy "accepted class division, and built on... the 
assumptions of capitalist market society and the laws of classical political economy" 
( MacPherson 24) to liberalize, i.e. privatize, economic institutions under the guise of 
rational motives/'' 
So. as market capitalism is a liberal ideology grounded upon rationalist 
assumptions and fear of large government, corporations ultimately come to be "defined as 
persons separated from their owners." private entities entitled to "all the rights of 
citizenship under the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment" ( Lowi 5). 
Paradoxically, due to beliefs about "the sanctity of property and the binding morality of 
contract" (5). corporations also come to be defined as private property. In fact, operating 
on the assumption that our nation would be comprised of scores of agricultural property 
owners, this model further assumes that "property" represents an independent means of 
production. However, by its very nature capitalist industrialization shifts ownership of the 
means of production into a few hands. For the majority, property, and the power which 
attends it. have thus come to mean only that which you can purchase with wages. Within 
the workplace most individuals thus have little agency—save whether or not to abide by 
company policy—substantial agency reserved for those who own the means of 
production. Likewise, outside the confines of the "private" workplace, most individuals 
possess little socio-political agency, while corporate entities, being both private person 
and private property, are doubly protected from the reach of democracy. At bottom, "the 
most powerful form of collective organization in contemporary capitalism—the modem 
business corporation—is stripped of its communal status" (Bowles and Gintis 16). 
operating at the hands of. and to serve, a privileged few. That is. because the institutions 
in place to determine and uphold the rules of production and competition—i.e. the 
w Though the Constitution may have its flaws. I do not advocate fundamental changes in the institution 
itself or those mandated by it. 1 do. however, advocate a shift in our interpretive practices based upon a shift 
in our view of what is good—from a determinate. teleologicaL and thus, passive, paradigm to a negotiable, 
active paradigm. 
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Constitution and the interpretive bodies of the legislature and judiciary—severely limit 
governmental jurisdiction over the economic realm, little force governs the practices 
which most affect people's lives.40 No wonder that students argue that "politics" is 
irrelevant. 
But if both material goods and the goods of public esteem are external goods, then 
the power to rule, to make economic, military, social, and cultural decisions tor a nation is 
likewise an external good. With this in mind, distributive justice ought to apply not only 
to material resources but also to the distribution of executive. legislative, and judicial 
powers, privileges, and influence. But in fact, constitutional federalism is intended hy 
design to limit these goods to an elite few who then control material distribution as well. 
Reduced to an institution rather than a way of life, democracy is thus limited to effective 
administration of the narrow public sphere. Moreover, when the elements of collective life 
it is supposed to administer are rendered private ( labor practices or research, for example), 
the results may not be to the public good. In short, claims that our government embodies 
"self-evident" ideals which constitute humanity's greatest excellence rest upon an 
ideological document the purposes of which are to limit democracy, preserve a status quo 
which discriminates between the propertied and unpropertied. and forward the woridview 
of the elite. The emphasis of such rhetoric is not on equality but on the rights of equality. 
These rights include the "natural" right of the best to rule. Justice is indeed what the 
powerful say it is. 
In fact, the imposition of form to limit democracy in the service of economic 
interests goes well beyond government into the workplace, schools, and even social and 
family life. Evidence lies in the "hierarchical system of authority: centralization of 
decision making: division of labor and specialization and increasing reliance on expert 
knowledge" ( Wo lin "Norm" 36). which characterize labor, education, social, and family 
policies, in government as well as in the "private" economic sphere. These characteristics 
" One example which came to light following the September 11 attack is the poor training, low wages, and 
high turnover rale among airport security personnel. A 2000 General Accounting Office report notes that 
this ""last line of defense against a terrorist- bears an annual turnover rate of400 percent at some airports. 
Seven prior reports issued since 1987 concur. Maintaining high profits has been persistently cited to justify 
this practice—with government approval (Cocco. "Airport "Security-). 
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of modem administration severely constrain the agency of students to become meaning-
making subjects in academics, the workplace, and culture at large. 
But embedded within the rationale for economic privatization and deregulation is a 
fundamental error regarding institutions—"that power and control are properties of [only] 
the state" ( Lowi 16). In fact, given the "indispensable assumption of democratic theory" 
that a given social sphere is public "if its operation involves the socially consequential 
exercise of power" (66)/' the very existence in the private sphere of administrative 
mechanisms—which by definition provide rules and so "rule"—makes clear that power 
and control are not only properties of government but of private institutions as well ( Lowi 
31 ). Indeed. Bowles and Gintis identify "three types of socially consequential power" 
conferred upon capital: I ) command over production. 2) command over investment, and 
3) influence over state economic policy (67). According to their reading of liberal 
democratic theory, the assignment of economic concerns to the "private" is illegitimate: 
corporations "do" politics and are thus rightfully public. As currently drawn, the 
public/private split simply "makes power invisible in the economy" (66). Under such 
conditions, it is not the convergence of liberty and democracy (as t have argued, they 
conflict as much as converge) nor the actuality of democracy which ensure the loyalty of 
subjects to the state, but the ideas of liberty and democracy. And this is where the 
university steps in. 
The University and National Ethos 
Just as any ideologically-driven society possesses an image of ideal authority 
figure, every form of government requires an image of the ideal citizen—a citizen who 
acts and. presumably, thinks in ways which demonstrate the values of and loyalty to the 
state. A tyrannical government requires a tearful and submissive citizen. Monarchy. 
liberal or otherwise, requires a reverent and obedient citizen. Just what democracy 
requires depends on its depth and breadth. A direct, majoritarian democracy requires an 
informed, cooperative citizen, capable of making the kinds of decisions that constitute 
According to Bowles and Gintis. "an exercise of power causes others to act in ways they otherwise 
would not. yet goes beyond the mere protection of one s negative liberties" (66) and a "socially 
consequential action... substantively affects the lives of others, and the character of which reflects the will 
and interests of the actor" (66). 
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rule, while a representative democracy requires a citizen sufficiently loyal to state values 
and sufficiently informed to transfer rule to individuals thought better qualified to make 
such decisions within the parameters of these shared values. As I have discussed, the ideal 
citizen constructed by rational liberalism is both autonomous and unerringly caiculative of 
self-interest—tree to define excellence on her own terms and excellent in pursuing the 
satisfaction of material needs and desires—under rationalist assumptions, to the benefit of 
both self and community. But as rationalism assumes that such an ideal is attainable only 
by an elite few. some means must be devised by which to gain the loyal cooperation of the 
masses. Either an alternative image of the citizen must be constructed for emulation by the 
masses—a citizen willing to transfer power to an elite, who knows her place in the order 
of things—or the masses must be persuaded to embrace a national narrative in which the 
common citizen may rise among the elite. It is my contention that the American narrative 
accomplishes the former by means of the latter. 
This issue of citizenship ties the emergence of the modern university to the rise of 
the nation-state. In the first place, the rational, liberated individual will subject herself to 
governance only if governance proceeds from values she shares—as political revolution 
persistently demonstrates. As liberalism assumes a significant degree of pluralism (else 
liberalism would be superfluous), the values of the state cannot adapt to the individual. 
The individual must therefore be adapted to the state, must become "the bearer of a 
meaning that is only accessible as part of a collectivity." enunciated as a "subjective 'we.' 
as in the phrase *we. the people*" ( Readings 46). This adaptation has been, in part, the 
responsibility of public schooling. It has also been taken by some to be the central mission 
of humanities and literacy education through post-secondary schooling. 
In the second place, while freedom from government intrusion and protection from 
the whims of others serve as mechanisms to ensure loyal cooperation, these mechanisms 
ultimately prove insufficient given that they particularly ensure economic liberty and 
protection. That is. should persons of power and wealth employ their liberty and 
advantage to exploit the less fortunate for greater power and wealth (and I argue that they 
have), the resulting imbalance of power risks dissatisfaction among the masses, so 
threatening subject loyalty to the state. Hence, an additional mechanism is necessary to 
ensure loyalty, some sort of shared belief system which serves to rationalize such inequity 
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to the satisfaction of the narrowly enfranchised citizen. Certainly, given the underlying 
liberal assumption of equality. Americans are more than unlikely to embrace a ruling elite. 
Therefore, a narrative is required which places each citizen, potentially at least, among 
this elite. Toward these ends, ideology, that is national ideology, embodied in the notion 
of culture, comes to be viewed as a legitimate mission of the university. 
In a nutshell, what was needed was some means "to imbue the student's 
imagination with what it was to be... American" ( Aronowitz 5). Of course, given that 
Americans have no common history and that our philosophical tradition is drawn from 
international sources, our history, our story, must be the story of America, an idealized 
narrative of place "whose terms define [our| identity." even if it "tells a story of diversity" 
(Barber Aristocracy 40). Lacking the bond of religion as well as the bond of common 
ancestry, "for America the problem was one of finding a surrogate for religion—a secular 
bond... conceived of as a civil religion" (43). The premises of this religion are familiar 
to anyone educated in U.S. schools. Our story is "unparalleled in human history" due to 
"liberty's achievements progress and the victory of aspiration over history" (45). Even 
negative narratives, which emphasize the hegemony of the few over the many, tell a 
"unique story whose chief player is liberty and whose chief antagonist is the past, history 
itself* (45). The story is simple: America is the land of opportunity where everyone is free 
and equal to overcome the limitations of the[ir] past and pursue happiness (read 
"property"). In this vein, the history of Western civilization comes to be a story of human 
progress toward its culmination in United States democracy while the earmarks of liberal 
capitalism—industry, acquisition, consumption, and political dominance—take on a moral 
force which, it is claimed, underwrites democracy. 
Against this background. English and. ultimately. American literature come to be 
seen as a fitting means to teach the values embodied in this story. Based on a 
presupposition that the ideals of Greece and Rome were "inherently bound up with the 
grammar and etymology of the languages in which [Classical] works were written" (Graff 
29). literature in the English vernacular likewise comes to be considered "essentially 
national" (29). Hence, "many members of the founding generation" of English Studies 
saw literacy education as a means to foster "between the social classes, the cultivation of 
"larger sympathies.* the instillation of national pride and the transmission of "moral* 
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values" (12). Moreover, because it is embodied in a heritage which "throws off the 
shackles of tradition through revolution" (Readings 84), the American literary tradition 
makes the canon "appear to be the object of democratic choice rather than the sheer 
burden of heredity" (12). Yet "real" America certainly has not lived up to this narrative, 
either within or outside her borders. In the first place, the "everyone" to whom liberty and 
equality apply has not always included women, immigrants, even those who are legal, and 
minorities. In many ways, for many, it still doesn't—a plight which is arguably reflected 
in the canon debate. In the second place, in the name of political and economic interests, 
both the U.S. government and economic entities have sometimes turned a blind eye when 
liberty and equality are denied to those outside our borders—at times, advertently or 
inadvertently, even contributing to undemocratic regimes.42 
In tact, although the American narrative has always been contested and although 
the view of literature as a moral instrument has not been universal within or without 
English Studies.43 both the belief in a national literature and the belief that English Studies 
were founded for this mission, have come to take on the proportions of myth.44 It is upon 
this myth that moral-traditionalists establish their arguments for preservation of the canon 
as well as their arguments against counter-traditionalist theory and practice. Likewise 
upon this myth, counter-traditionalists denounce the canon as an artificial and 
discriminatory emblem of national ethos, rejecting the claim of a unifying American 
12 A recent example is the U S. gift of $43 million to the Taliban for banning opium in May 2001 (Scheer I ). 
Another example is the U.S. tax-supported School of the Americas in Fort Benning. Georgia. Founded in 
1946—originally in Panama—the School of the Americas was established '"to bring stability to Latin 
America™ ( Bourgeois and Panetta I ). by training Latin American soldiers. SOA graduates include dictators 
"such as Manuel Noriega of Panama and General Hugo Banzer of Bolivia, as well as death squad leaders 
Roberto D'Aubuisson from EI Salvador, and CoL Julio Alpirez of Guatemala" ( 1 ). The Defense department 
admitted in 1996 that "for years training manuals used at the School of the Americas had advocated 
executions, torture, blackmail, and the use of truth serum" ( I ). As a result, the SOA has produced some of 
the most notorious human rights abusers in our hemisphere." including those responsible for the rape and 
murder of 4 U.S. Church women: the assassination of Archbishop Romero: the execution of 6 Jesuit priests, 
a co-worker and her daughter and the massacre of more than 900 civilians at EI Mozote. El Salvador™ 
(Panetta and Seraglio 5). In addition, "human rights reports have detailed the role of the Pentagon, the SOA. 
and U.S. corporations in propping up an unjust socio-economic structure in Latin America" ( Bourgeois and 
Panetta 3). The School of the Americas continues to operate. 
Gerald Graff points out that arguments for establishing literature as a discipline with a moralistic and 
nationalistic focus were met with strong resistance, particularly from research scholars in philology "whose 
loyalties lay less with their national traditions than with their professional research fields" (72). 
" S. Miller credits F.R. Leavis and his followers with ~entrench[ing] social gains for English by giving 
•English" a past, the "great tradition' whose recognition allowed them to claim that native belles lettres has a 
history parallel to ancient counterparts" (21). 
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vision and calling for a new canon inclusive of the viewpoints of minorities and women. 
In a nutshell, on both right and left, the myth that English Studies came into existence to 
impart a national ethos has become institutionalized. The former see themselves as 
guardians of this institution, while the latter hope to deconstruct, if not reconstruct, this 
institution. In either case, the discipline of literature has become analogous to a museum— 
"a linear map of a particular account of a history of art. offering a unified account of linear 
development and a generalized system of classification" (Readings 73). The contemporary 
conflict surrounding and within English Studies is often no more than an argument over 
which roads will be drawn on this map. Rarely is it considered that the American, much 
less the human, narrative resists linear mapping. Typically, it is thus the proportions and 
details of this myth that are contested rather than the myth itself. 
The first consequence is that the practices embodied in the myth (those which 
uphold the desired ethos), rather than actual human practices in real contexts, become the 
focus of literacy education; practices themselves become institutions. Texts and the 
qualities of texts, come to be studied as passive objects that embody static universal truths, 
rather than the creations and idiosyncrasies of living subjects in response to specific 
cultural circumstances. Under the traditionalist model, literary criticism takes on the task 
of combining the Hebraic rigor of religious Tight* with the Hellenic grace of poetic 
sweetness, uniting knowledge and meaning in what Matthew Arnold calls a 'national 
glow*" ( Readings 78). Under the alternative or multicultural model, literary criticism often 
takes on the task of problematizing. deconstructing, or even rewriting the myth, often 
imparting a moral "glow" to alternative narratives and readings. In either case, criticism 
becomes "textual exegesis" of the "truths" embodied in the text rather than "ethical 
commentary" (Green 277) on the places and circumstances toward which the author 
addressed his work. In this way. a work of literature, what was mind—a human response 
to circumstance which can never be fully understood or explained—becomes body—a 
static and eternal institution, a canon or museum, which imparts so-called universal truth 
to those able to see-
Under the moral-traditionalist construct in particular, the canon, as material body, 
is thus accorded the unity and order of a singular entity with the result that difference and 
conflict within are elided. Aristotle tends to be taught as though his work simply 
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progresses from, or builds upon, the work of Plato, as Thoreau progresses from 
Jefferson—when in fact these authors conflict and contradict in myriad ways.45 By such 
assessments, the truth of Louise Cluck s "A woman's body is a grave: it will accept 
anything" is as universal as the truth of Walt Whitman's "This is the female form. A 
divine nimbus exhales from it from head to foot"—but do they not conflict? This 
assumption that the literary tradition is unified and cumulative, which is indeed 
traditional, accepted, and prevailing at least through secondary education, teaches that the 
history of knowledge is paradoxically both progressive and static—that expression of 
unchanging truths is movement toward a telos beneficial to all humanity. 
Indeed, to attain the alleged "lost organic unity" ( Readings 80) of the grand 
American narrative, an author's resistance must be eclipsed by readings which more 
favorably align him with the desired grand narrative. As an example, the struggle of Walt 
Whitman as a gay man in a hostile culture is not only pushed aside as irrelevant to 
understanding his work, it is just the sort of thing moral-traditionalists condemn as serving 
a "political agenda." Alternately, efforts to use his struggle and reflection to assist students 
in coming to grips with contemporary hostility towards gays and lesbians is condemned as 
"therapeutic" rather than "educational." To achieve this so-called "apolitical" and 
"educational" aim. homosexual references in Whitman's work have been avoided or 
reinterpreted. As an example, the furtive and lonely eroticism of what is now known as 
Whitman's "Live Oak. with Moss" series can be avoided by treating them out of 
sequence.46 so recontextualizing them in ways which diminish the homoerotic content.47 
" This notion of knowledge as cumulative progress is illustrated by Alisdair Maclntyres claim that 
Aristotle is a "completion" and "correction- of Plato as well as his claim that "the importance of other 
subsequent moral and political philosophy will then turn on whether they do or do not impugn, vindicate, or 
correct and supplement Aristotle's answers to Plato's questions'* (Justice 85). 
* Though the individual poems are well-known. "Live Oak. with Moss" was discovered to be a twelve 
poem sequence only 40 plus years ago. Fredson Bowers uncovered the sequence when working with the 
Valentine Collection of Walt Whitman manuscripts now owned by the University of Virginia. Following the 
roman numerals in Whitman's hand-written leaves. Bowers pieced together the sequence and published it in 
Studies in Bibliography in 1953. In 1955. Bowers again published the poems in his Whitman's Manuscripts: 
"Leaves of Grass* ( I860): A Parallel Text. However, because his purpose "was to allow readers to study 
previously unpublished manuscript poems against those first printed in ... 1860." Bowers printed them 
parallel to the way they appear the "Calamus'* sequence in "Leaves of Grass" rather than in the sequence in 
which Whitman originally envisioned them (Parker 3). The poems were not again published in original 
sequence until 1994 when Hershel Parker included them in the first volume of the 4* Edition of the Norton 
Anthology of American Literature (4). 
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In this way. the very identity of the "bard of Manhattan" may be left in the closet and 
Whitman declared among the most "American" voices. Ironically, as this sequence of 
poems reveals. Whitman "repudiates his ambitions as the poet who had struck up the 
songs of the New World*" (Parker 2 cf. "Long" 478). asking "bards of ages hence" (2 cf. 
"Recorders" 102)48 to remember him "not as one who "prophesied the States." but as a 
lover" (2). "who ever as he sauntered the streets, curved with his arm the manly shoulder 
of his friend—while the curving arm of his friend rested upon him also" (2). Yet just as in 
erstwhile readings of Plato, in an attempt to avoid political contenu eros becomes Platonic 
friendship—sexless arrangement the terminology for which is often applied to a 
relationship between a man and woman. However, understanding of homosexual 
relationships in Greece is critical to understanding how social mores influenced Classical 
thought: not the least of which is Plato's view of reason. Does not the same apply to 
Whitman? 
What then are we to make of this icon of American genius and virtue, when the 
story that emerges is that of a man whose life represents such a grave struggle against the 
"universal" values moral-traditionalists claim characterize our "national glow"? What do 
we make of the canonization of Whitman's work, when moral-traditionalists cite openly 
gay/lesbian scholars, as well as research into gay/lesbian experience and influence, as 
examples of academic unworthiness and poor scholarship? What message do we deliver to 
young people suffering their own struggles, when not even Whitman's can be voiced? 
What knowledge do we gain when a primary means by which Whitman knew the world is 
erased from his body of thought? 
At the same time, counter-traditionalists err when they reject the canon as just so 
much imperialist dogma. To do so is to forget that Shakespeare played to the people, that 
Homer traveled among the people, that great poets, thinkers, and leaders, indeed, some of 
them white, male, and privileged, have risen from the people. Such rejection is also 
paradoxical—for it can only be grounded in the moral-traditionalist assumption that the 
canon is unified. If anything, the Euro-western canon is certainly marked by controversy 
Whitman himself seems to have realized that the "sequence revealed too much" (Helms in Parker 3). for 
he never published the poems in sequence, instead revising them and "shuffling:" them into the "forty-five 
poem "Calamus' cluster" (Parker 3). 
48 Parker cites the original manuscript, unavailable to me. which reads "bards" rather than "recorders." 
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and debate, even hostility. Moreover, to attribute some sort of organic unity to the voices 
of the disenfranchised is simply to supplant one set of universal claims for another. 
Likewise, to attribute some form of guileless integrity to the disenfranchised is to negate 
the integrity of canonized authors just as it is to deny the guile of those on the margins. 
Meanwhile, language practices are also regarded as progressive yet static. Each 
newly canonized author "develops** the form, creates new usages in both vocabulary and 
structure, yet somehow upholds the formal standards of what we call literature. Followed 
to extremes, this theory suggests Ralph Waldo Emerson's "Bring me wine, but wine 
which never grew in the belly of a grape" somehow exemplifies the same formal beauty as 
e.e. cummings* 
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—else one does not belong in the canon. And while Homer. Plato, and Aristotle did not 
write in English, they too are part of the American story and Classic examples of eternal 
beauty. Likewise, translations of these authors are thought to uphold standards of both 
content and form, although translators convey the meanings, vocabularies, and structures 
of each in radically different ways—else there would be no call for further translation. 
So materially objectified, literature becomes an object of consumption, rather than 
creation. Literacy education becomes the study of. rather than creation of texts; authors 
become "others™ and the uses to which students envision putting their writing becomes 
merely instrumental. At best, this creates literary critics rather than authors: at worst, it 
creates non-writers, non-makers of meaning. Moreover, given that a traditional mission of 
literary study is cultivation of "taste"—somehow a moral, as well as aesthetic, quality, a 
distinction emerges between "high" and "low" language uses. Literary writing is "high." 
an unattainable model of perfection available for students to consume for spiritual 
nourishment and set apart from utilitarian purposes.^ Literary knowledge is positioned 
"as its own end. against the mechanical specter of technology" (Readings 75). which is 
seen to fragment knowledge by means of "mechanical specializations" (81 ) serving 
utilitarian ends. Meanwhile, despite obscure criteria for merit, not all fiction or poetry is 
"high." Popular fiction is "low." considered "trash" or "propaganda." little more than an 
"exercise in consciousness-raising, trashy sentimentality and elevated sentiment" (A. 
Bloom 64). The notion of canonizing cowboy poetry or cyberpunk is appalling— 
regardless of the substantive insight or creativity of form they demonstrate. By such 
standards, entire groups of "meaning makers" are excluded as illegitimate. 
Moreover, the kind of functional language students will employ in their future as 
workers is "low." subject to instrumental standards determined by the task toward which it 
is put. The language students bring with them to the classroom is similarly "low." In need 
of remediation, the language that colors their identities is thought to demonstrate, in the 
best light, intellectual and moral underdevelopment; in the worst light intellectual and 
moral incapacity. Moreover, as the language spoken in the university best resembles the 
language of the propertied elite, children of affluence and privilege arrive on campus 
" Thus, compositionists are characterized as the "sad woman in the basement" (S. Miller 121 )—the 
underpaid, overworked grammarian whose purpose is purely utilitarian. 
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advantaged while the insights of less-privileged majority are silenced by disapproval of 
and/or embarrassment about their mode of self-expression. Such distinctions and the 
discriminations which result from them are behind the NCTE's "The Student's Right to 
Her Own Language.™ 
The second consequence is that, when treated as material body, as non-living stuff, 
the canon becomes essentially dead, a corpus, a corpse. Attempts to write into the history 
of America previously overlooked perspectives of women, slaves. Native Americans, and 
other oppressed people are called "revisionist** and condemned. Literature which resists 
the accepted narrative and shatters formal standards is shunned by canon-makers 
(whoever they might be). As a matter of fact, to my knowledge. Louise Gluck is not yet 
universally canonized—likely in part because images such as the above, which shatter the 
romantic notion of woman's body as the well of life, violate some "moral™ perspective by 
"politicizing™ what it means to be a woman. The student who hates Moby Dick—long, 
often dull, archaic in vocabulary and structure, and told from a perspective difficult at 
least for many women—must be persuaded of the greatness of the book or accept her own 
aesthetic and spiritual inadequacy. Such a student may have merit if she sufficiently 
appreciates Jane Austen, but not if she prefers Barbara Cartland"0 or William Gibson. ' 
Literary study is thus reduced, at least in theory, to historical study, lessons from the past, 
hyper-extended metaphors which "visionary™ individuals created to illuminate today and 
all our tomorrows. Literature is no longer stories, intended to make you turn the page, to 
laugh or cry out loud, or invite you to adventures of your own. To present literature to 
students this way is analogous to telling the young trumpet player that when he becomes 
more sophisticated he will like Miles Davis (more likely. Handel) better than Aerosmith— 
in fact, he may be embarrassed that he ever liked Aerosmith.52 According to such 
thinking, music ought to become for him an object of thought and mimicry rather than an 
experience, a moment in which to dance, sing, or play. 
Contemporary romance novelist. 
M Contemporary science fiction author credited with founding the cyberpunk genre. 
" Conversely, the counter-traditionalist may be prone to argue that as sophistication develops the student 
will like Aerosmith better than Miles, or even Beethoven, and appreciate Menchu even more than 
"patriarchal and hegemonic" dead white men. 
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Meanwhile, under the moral-traditionalist construct. Composition Studies is 
reduced to attempts at emulation of "historic" and "standard** forms, content provided by 
canonized "experts" in their respective fields. Teaching formal standards in such a way is 
analogous to telling the young trumpeter that when he becomes more sophisticated, he 
will play just like Miles—style, structure, and message will belong to another. But if that 
is the goal, from where will come new voices which redefine our standards? 
At any rate, students won't accept this line. Seeing the vast diversity and variation 
in "canonized" texts, when told not to use dialect or slang, they are bound to ask. "Why 
can't I. when Mark Twain did?** Noting the fragmented sentences and dangling 
prepositions which contribute to force to many great works, they are bound to see 
grammatical rigor as an oppressive imposition rather than a flexible tool of 
communication and creation. Meanwhile, to reduce composition to the reporting of 
"expert" opinion is like telling the young musician that he can never "speak" like Miles: in 
fact, he can never speak at all. only parrot another's meaning. So what's the point of 
writing? Our reply—that they must compose well in future occupations, that to climb the 
ladder of success they must express themselves as "educated" persons. Following this line 
of thought, we do not invite them to use their language to question the terms of their 
occupation nor the measures of success and standards which define "educated." that is. to 
independently determine whether the practices of their industry or the institutions in 
which these practices are housed, are truly excellent. In the realm of industry, they must 
emulate "high" writing to prove their worth, but use it for the "low" purposes to which 
their occupations constrain them: they must emulate excellence for pragmatic 
effectiveness—typically defined as "the bottom line.™ Their public language becomes a 
mere instrument of their industry as they become instruments of the industry of others. 
Writing, and writers, become mere tools by which to exploit commercial opportunity. 
At the same time, keeping alive the myth of opportunity for ourselves as well, we 
paradoxically teach them that writing is a means self-expression, equated with self-
determination. We thus encourage students to see themselves as "choosers" ( Bowles and 
Gintis 17)—rational agents who possess socially consequential power or at least 
empowerment—rather than "learners" ( 17). But given the purposes to which their writing 
generally is put. this self-image of "chooser" is likely little more than illusion. In the first 
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place, by arguing that the messages delivered through our models of expressive writing 
are somehow universal, we imbue these authors with a "greatness of soul™ that makes 
students" insight and need for expression trivial and petty by contrast. Against such a 
background, students come to not expect their expressive writing to be public—at least 
until they "rise above themselves™ to attain that elusive virtue of universality. Hence, the 
student often ceases to envision herself as someone who knows something worthy of 
public expression. Expressive writing becomes private writing, at best directed to a slim 
audience of loved ones or teacher. 
In the second place, as self-expression is interpreted in terms of liberal values, 
students often fail to understand that "expression™ means "expression to" someone—with 
paradoxical results. What the author feels becomes more important than what the audience 
needs for understanding and empathy. Misunderstanding becomes an audience deficiency 
and guidance from peers and/or teachers becomes impossible. Yet emphasis on authorial 
expression rather than relationship with audience may also reinforce the notion that 
personal readings of the canon which vary from prevailing scholarship reflect their 
deficiency. The self-expressing student is thus at once master of her own texts—which 
may be neither excellent nor effective—and mastered by the texts of self-expressing 
others—often presented as excellent in ways yet beyond her comprehension. 
In these ways, we have made the practices of writing just that—practice. They 
practice and practice and practice, but they rarely really write. As students, they revise and 
re-edit over and over again toward the goal of pleasing the teacher and/or achieving higher 
grades, rather than to strengthen their arguments, to re-examine their assumptions, to 
negotiate with a living audience. The teacher-student relationship thus embodies an 
artificial audience of one—artificial because this audience does not read as a peer, but as 
an evaluator. a judge not only of the argument but also of its form. To please such an 
audience, students must approximate the privileged discourse of academics; they must 
know, that is. what English teachers know ( Bartholomae 140)—which of course they do 
not. In composition theorist David Bartholomae"s words, students are thus forced to 
"invent the university" in their own minds. A common consequence is stilted, unnatural 
prose, filled with almost comical errors and twists of phrase committed as "imitation and 
parody" ( 143) of what they believe to sound "high-minded.™ 
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Once they leave academics, most merely apply writing to instrumental practices, 
routine documentation and correspondence within administrative systems that render 
public writing private. That is. writing which may be publicly consequential, typically 
workplace or occupational writing, becomes a neutral techne. "a technique of information 
processing™ (T. Miller 59). rather than a praxis, a "doing." a social action upon something. 
Meanwhile, expressive writing is left to the private realm—personal correspondence or a 
private exercise of emotional purging—most individuals having abandoned the 
unreachable goal of getting it "right." Hence, "real" praxis is confined to superior 
others—the intellectual elite. Writing is not embraced in the sense of the jazz term "play." 
as in "Man. that cat can play. He's a real player." as a public act which reaches toward an 
audience in hope of carrying them to new places, nor is it embraced as a "socially 
consequential exercise of power" by which citizens may participate in and extend 
democracy . In short, when subjected to an education which makes such distinctions 
between high and low usages, students come to believe that writing may be literary and 
expressive and thus the public practice only of an elite, or it may be instrumental and 
routine, aimed only at institutional effectiveness: should the teacher propose to make 
writing social and political, she is stepping out of line. 
Unfortunately, by helping to transform our students into passively determinate 
selves who believe themselves self-determined due to narratives of opportunity and free 
expression. English Studies has come to serve the very commercial forces which threaten 
our alleged mission. Students have been reduced to consumers of the "American story." a 
story they are. on the one hand, expected to place themselves within, but on the other 
hand, not expected to create. Merging the concepts of liberty and equality , this story tells 
us that not only are individuals equal, but that the playing field is equal as well. All things 
being equal, then, we are utterly self-determined: all things out of our control stem from 
our deficiencies. While clearly flawed, this principle of individual agency commands 
loyalty for. without it. no individual could attain socially consequential power, or 
preferably, agency or empowerment. 
In fact, both denial and acceptance of the equality assumption (with its attendant 
myths of opportunity and merit) lead to a narrowing of the public sphere—denial by 
claiming the public realm for those few whose truths allegedly allow them to rise above 
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personal concerns: acceptance by perpetuating the notion that lack of personal agency 
stems from allowing private concerns to intrude on public judgment. In this scenario, 
equating power with economic gain, students often confuse "having"* and "choosing.™ 
Meanwhile, as moral-traditionalists and counter-traditionalists battle over the right to 
indoctrinate students, the university each desires is being dismantled from within by an 
increasingly corporate paradigm which feeds on public conflation of "having"* and 
"choosing.™ That is. bolstered by American narratives of opportunity and merit, corporate 
interests which threaten the intellectual independence of the university have taken 
advantage of internal disciplinary debates to discredit both traditional and critical views 
and locate their values in the rift we have created. In short, in the midst of disagreement, 
by establishing our grounds upon the same collective myth, we work together to construct 
passive and fragmented student subjects ideally suited to the administrative hierarchies of 
the transnational corporations which increasingly exploit them. As my mother says. 
"When you point the finger at someone, there are three fingers pointing back at you.™ 
The Fragmented Self 
There is nothing so stupid as an educated man. 
if you get off the thing that he was educated in. 
—Will Rogers 
Thus far I have distinguished two rival epistemologicai traditions in the Euro-
western world—the rationalist or philosophical and the Sophistic or rhetorical—tracing 
the rise to dominance of the rationalist tradition and connecting this tradition with liberal 
political theory. From this I have argued that rational liberalism has culminated in the 
intellectual conditions to which counter-traditionalists react and respond—conditions 
which are clearly more liberal than rational and which limit the primary benefits of 
democracy to an elite, allegedly more rational, few—ultimately resulting in a 
diminishment of individual agency and an aftpnrfanr alienation of the average citizen from 
self-governance. With regard to English Studies. I have argued that our discipline has 
been complicit in the success of this project by promoting a national mythology which 
facilitates in our students an erroneous identification with an economic, cultural, and 
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political elite which enjoys minimally checked liberty at the expense of common citizens, 
as well as by encouraging our students to assimilate unproblematically to rhetorical 
standards and practices which may suppress conflict and injustice. 
Indeed, the elite which benefits from this state of affairs, exemplified by 
transnational corporations (which often hold great sway over governmental policy), in 
literally abandoning the physical boundaries which comprise nations have likewise 
abandoned the ethical boundaries marked out by these nations. No longer loyal to national 
interests, the transnational corporation requires a different subject, a subject with shallow, 
manipulable loyalty to the state and. if not loyal to the company, at least self-interested 
enough to maintain the bottom line. This self-construct forcefully draws on liberal and 
rational assumptions to produce a subject which is. at bottom, largely determinate in 
significant ways. This fragmented self is defined not as a participating citizen but as a 
professional, client, and consumer ( Gorzelsky 307 cf. Habermas). 
As a professional, the fragmented self possesses a "disciplinarilv grounded 
authority" ( 308) which proves Janus-faced. From one view, her profession provides both 
economic security and a sense of personal authority which facilitates her identification 
with the elite. From the other view, her "authority to make judgments is confined to a 
narrowly defined vocational sphere™ (308) which limits her ability to question the 
determinations of others. Rather than possessing full authority for. as well as full 
knowledge of. the outcomes of her industry, she provides, and is aware of. but a fragment 
of the whole, discernment of which is limited to the few who possess ultimate power for 
judgment and decision-making. So mistaking economic security and disciplinarilv 
grounded authority for socially consequential power, the fragmented self is doubly 
pacified (even passivized) as she congratulates herself for being both economically and 
authoritatively higher in the pecking order than her less-educated subordinates. Yet 
confined to her narrow realm, she is nonetheless determined by the demands of her 
occupation and industry—demands which she is under-equipped to examine and which 
often result in fundamentally undemocratic consequences both within the workplace and 
within the greater society. In short, her self-image as a member of the professional elite 
serves not only to undermine her admission to the power elite, but also to reinforce her 
perception that elite power is justified. 
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Meanwhile, as a client of other professionals, the fragmented self is "subject to 
their direction™ (Gorzelsky 308) due to the perceived limitations of her expertise. 
Composition theorist Gwen Gorzelsky offers by way of example the top-down authority 
which characterizes medical encounters. In one particular example, Gorzelsky cites the 
top-down authority of a managed-care plan to deny recommended cancer treatment in the 
effort to save money (313 cf. Kolker). In both contrast and correspondence, she further 
cites the use of controversial, "expensive, toxic procedures" for cancer treatment by which 
"for-profit health care exploits a desperate patient market™ (313 cf. Linden). While the 
latter example may at first blush seem to justify the authority of the former, both instances 
illustrate the ways in which "authority as a top-down channel — not only offends clients' 
dignity but also infringes on their rights to participate in decisions that affect their lives™ 
(308)/J Likewise, top-down authority may prevent co-workers in disparate disciplines 
from participating in decisions which may affect not only their lives but the public good. 
In the meantime, the fragmented self is subject to the top-down authority of government 
agencies little accountable to the demos. As her interest in government is predominantly 
limited to personal benefits and advantages, the fragmented self can here be said to be a 
client, rather than citizen, of government. 
Finally, it bears repeating that the fragmented self as consumer is pacified by 
material comfort through its erroneous identification with social agency. Moreover, in the 
United States, this fragmented individual is a proud consumer of the very myths which 
associate liberalism, capitalism, and calculative rationalism with "American™ moral pride. 
Associating U.S. material dominance—from which she benefits and with which she 
complies—with the values of democracy and equality, the fragmented American 
feverishly defends the former as the latter. 
Thus, the fragmented self is economically liberal. She believes that a minimally 
regulated market produces global material benefits, that competition culminates in human 
progress. She equates material comfort with social agency, even consequential power, and 
she perceives global economic dominance as moral dominance. Possessing rational 
A conversational analysis by Ellen Barton further demonstrates that while "asymmetries [of power] 
between medical professionals and patients/families span all classes" (Gorzelsky 314). those without 
cultural capital seem to be systematically constructed into adversarial relationships'* (Barton 431). 
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agency only in limited spheres, she believes in opportunity and merit, equates her 
professionalism with (at least potential) membership in a rational power elite, and 
perceives her authority over subordinates, i.e. workplace inequality, as well as material 
and social inequality, justified in light of her rational self-determination. Thus by a 
cultural paradigm she herself accepts, the fragmented self is unwittingly transmogrified 
into a self determined by the demands of the market. 
Hers is a circular reasoning culminating in a self-enclosed system of ethics in 
which ethics is reduced to balancing what she thinks is good for her against what you 
think is good for you. Her dominance over you is merely evidence of the lightness other 
dominance. Even when motivated by seemingly non-individualistic ethics, this individual 
engages in a cost-benefit analysis in which the expense of her altruism is measured, not 
against the benefits conferred upon others but toward the goodwill or spiritual reward 
reflected back upon the giver. Even notions of a greater morality come to be reduced to a 
profession of faith guaranteeing a place in the afterlife. Taken to its extreme, so long as 
these individualistic circles of ethical reasoning (which begin and end at oneself) do not 
intersect, ethics are indeed irrelevant. The fragmented self thus harbors no concept of 
ethical responsibility to the non-human living world which sustains her. And. in fact, this 
non-ethic is often taken to just such an extreme—as our water, air. even our stratosphere, 
are perpetually poisoned to meet the needs of the individual or collective "me." 
Meanwhile, the individual's sense of duty is satisfied so long as she behaves as expected, 
so long as she believes herself to possess the virtues which manage the human foundation 
which supports this status quo. 
In the following chapter. I will employ the Platonic cardinal virtues as an analogy 
to present constructs of virtue which define the fragmented self. I will argue, by means of 
association with the virtue sophrosyne. that these virtues impose upon the masses the 
marks of the determinate self, a construct which is at odds with the myths of opportunity 
and merit which uphold our national ethos. I will then examine the ways in which 
sophrosyne works within the Culture War to undermine the efforts of counter-
traditionalists toward a more democratic society. From there. I will discuss an alternative 
way to envision rationality and sophrosyne. theorized from the fragments of Protagoras, 
which holds promise for reconnecting the individual to the collective needs of democratic 
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society, as well as for empowering the individual toward socially consequential action 
within and without the workplace. 
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Chapter Four 
Autonomy, Excellence, and Democratic Virtue 
Successful and fortunate crime is called virtue. 
—Seneca 
If ignorance and passion are the foes of popular morality, it must be confessed that moral 
indifference is the malady of the cultivated classes. The modern separation of 
enlightenment and virtue, of thought and conscience, of the intellectual aristocracy from 
the honest and common crowd is the greatest danger that can threaten liberty. 
—Henri Frederic Amiel 
Men of most renowned virtue have sometimes by transgressing 
most truly kept the law. 
—John Milton 
All government—indeed, every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and prudent 
act—is founded on compromise and barter. 
—Edmund Burke 
Good company and good discourse are the very sinews of virtue. 
—Izaak Walton 
Confirm thy soul with self-control. 
thy liberty in law! 
—Katherine Lee Bates 
"America the Beautiful" 
To this point I have engaged in a rather harsh critique of the dominant Euro-
western paradigm of knowledge which culminates in rational liberalism, pointing out 
disparities in both theory and application, including certain unsettling implications for 
rhetorical practice and incentive to civic virtue. Now at issue is whether aspects of this 
tradition can be recuperated, whether a theory can be developed which takes what is best 
from this history while also benefiting from the more neglected tradition which has long 
stood beside it. 
Let me point out, in keeping with my focus on democracy as the supreme practice 
of rhetoric, that my purpose is to explore rhetorical virtues—those which apply to 
communicative actions in the public arena, in short, the virtues of democratic deliberation. 
Let me also point out that1 unlike ancient Athenians., contemporary Westerners seem to 
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agree that virtue may be taught, in fact, that it must be taught. Despite this difference. 
Classical perspectives may shed light on present concerns, for Athenians, like ourselves, 
grappled with the need to balance autonomy, democracy, and political stability. With this 
in mind, I will draw an analogy between the Platonic cardinal virtues and the rhetoric of 
the Culture War to illustrate ways in which implicit cultural constructions of virtue 
presently hinder individual agency in ways which diminish democracy. From there I will 
offer a neo-Protagorean reconstruction of these virtues which holds promise for enabling 
individual agency to reinvigorate democracy. 
These virtues—justice, wisdom, sophrosyne. and courage—are notable because 
each may be defined as the virtue of a rhetor. Of interest concerning justice is its bearing 
on the right of deliberative participation; concerning wisdom is its formulation as a 
complex marriage of knowledge and deliberative skill. Of foremost interest is sophrosyne, 
self-knowledge/self-restraint, as each of the others may be said to embody this virtue. 
Hence, of interest with regard to courage is the tension between self-restraint and "the 
capacity to risk harm or danger to oneself* (Maclntyre Virtue 192). That is. a citizen must 
judge when to express bold, unpopular positions (courage), when to refrain (sophrosyne), 
or when to "hold her tongue" in face of pressure (courage as sophrosyne). 
Sophrosyne 
To begin, let me define sophrosyne personally. "Jorgensen" is a Norwegian name. 
In my "lowegian" culture.1 men are measured by the size of their garages, tools, and cars; 
women by the artistry of their "hot dishes." At gatherings, men discuss tools and cars in 
the garage or den. while in the kitchen women discuss children, recipes, and the taciturn 
stubbornness of men. lowegians neither emote, argue, discuss religion and politics, nor air 
their dirty laundry. Being contrary. I prefer to sit in the den. ardently arguing religion and 
politics in personal terms. To those at home. I lack sophrosyne. I stand in stark contrast to 
the paradigmatic Norwegian who "loved his wife so much he almost told her." 
1 
"* lowegian" is a regional term used to indicate lowans ofNorwegian descent. On the one hand, it declares 
our cultural difference from other Scandinavian groups in Iowa. On the other hand, it distinguishes us from 
Minnesotans. For some odd reason, tfife has traditionally seemed important. 
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Defined by classicist Helen North2 as "the harmonious product of intense passion 
under perfect control" (x), the concept of sophrosyne is somewhat slippery, having 
evolved to reflect the ethos of successive generations. Literally "soundness of mind," 
sophrosyne has been associated with "doing one's own work," that is, not meddling in the 
affairs of others (156), as well as a variety of more public behaviors. Among the earliest 
associations of sophrosyne is with aidos, shame or respect (5)J—a narrow view but which, 
in the Christian era, takes on the sense of humility. The first formal definition comes from 
Antiphon who gave greatest importance to its function as control of the passions (86), a 
"rule and conquest of self" (70) which reflects on one's reputation (88) and serves 
personal advantage (90)/ 
The first suggestion that sophrosyne bears rhetorical import is perhaps attributable 
to Gorgias. Defining sophrosyne as the ability to achieve fine things, Gorgias associates it 
with kairos. defining this as the opportune time to achieve what one desires. Simply, it is 
sophron to act when advantageous. Gorgias also points out that the heroes possessed 
sophrosyne, associating it with to prepon, due measure, right proportion, or fitness to the 
occasion (North 92-95). Turning from the individual toward the polis, Isocrates5 more 
directly adapts kairos and to prepon to rhetoric, again relating them to sophrosyne which 
he further associates with phronesis. Because phronesis is the wisdom to manage practical 
situations, the practitioner of phronesis must employ both to prepon and kairos. acting in 
the right season, the right time, or the critical moment. For Isocrates. stimulation of 
sophrosyne is the primary task of the educator ( 142-149). 
Plato connects sophrosyne with justice by naming both among the cardinal virtues 
required for rule and assimilation to God. He. too. associates kairos with sophrosyne. 
Kairos underlies Plato's definition of virtue as a mean (Kinneavy "Neglected" 82), 
rendering sophrosyne as moderate behavior and rational, orderly thought. Relatedly, 
Aristotle evokes sophrosyne in his discussion of to prepon, calling upon the orator to 
emote proportionately to the subject matter and to distinguish between "opportune or 
inopportune usage" (kairos) (Rhetoric 1408a30-l408bl). His preference for linear, logical 
11 am in debt throughout to North's Sophrosyne: Self-knowledge and Seif-restraint in Greek Literature. 
' See Homer Odvssev 4.158-60 (m North 5). 
* Sophist, fifth-century BCE, 
5 Orator and educator. 436-338 BCE, sometimes listed among the Sophists. 
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argument also embodies sophrosyne. discernible in his theory of taxis or "arrangement.™ 
But as Aristotle relates all moral virtues to pleasure and pain, the physical import of 
sophrosyne dominates the intellectual. Sophrosyne's "specific function is to find the Mean 
with respect to hedonae (pleasure)" (North 201), in particular food, drink, and sex. As 
Aristotle cannot attribute moral virtue to the always contemplative Divine, he maintains 
that assimilation comes not from moral virtue, but from exerting one's divine element of 
reason. Plotinus6 later reconciles sophrosyne with reason, suggesting that while God has 
no use for moral virtues, virtues purify mortals on the path to divine reason. Sophrosyne is 
consequently appropriated by Aristotelian Christianity (238). 
Two contrasting interpretative patterns ultimately emerge. The first posits 
sophrosyne as a kind of knowledge; the second, as a moral virtue: 
Sophrosyne as Virtue {Arete) 
hagneia - purity, chastity 
aidos - modesty 
enkraîeia - self-control 
sophronikos - disposed to temperance. 
moderate, under self-control 
eunomia - good order 
hasuchia — quietness 
katharotes - cleanness, purity 
kosmiotes - propriety, decorum 
Sophrosyne as Knowledge (Episteme) 
systasis -"compromise** 
symphonia - "agreement" 
taxis - "arrangement" 
sophronizein -"to bring to one's senses. 
to discipline" 
sophronisma -"discipline, prudent 
counsel" 
autarkeia — self-sufficiency, independence 
synsophronizein - "to join in being sane 
or moderate" (rare) 
® Egyptian-bom Roman philosopher, 2057-270 CE 
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Thus perhaps the richest interpretation can be traced to Plato, who joins these patterns to 
define sophrosyne as a union of arete and episteme: "knowledge of itself knowledge of 
other sciences and of itself, knowledge that one knows and does not know" (North 57). The 
first echoes the Delphic Oracle;7 the second, sophia; the third, phronesis. 
In rharmides. Plato defines sophrosyne as a techne—a distinctly Human practice of 
acquired skills (North 158)—the purpose of which is to rescue public decisions from private 
interests. Moral virtue bears on knowledge in that these "skills" are social behaviors. Hence, 
not only does Plato see sophrosyne as some kind of knowledge, he also defines it as a social 
knowledge—one of the intellectual virtues comprising to form phronesis. In Protagoras. 
Plato associates sophrosyne with the ordering of passions, both within the individual and 
within the greater society, which "leads to an analysis of the parts of the soul and permits 
sophrosyne to be defined as the harmony of these parts" (North 159). In Gorgias. Plato 
reaffirms this theory of a composite soul, subjecting the soul to his concept of nature as an 
ordered system. Sophrosyne becomes a virtue of orderliness and pleasant arrangement of the 
conflicting parts of the soul—a hierarchy by which the rational part of the soul "rules" the 
irrational. Finally, Plato posits that the individual who possesses an orderly soul has the 
wisdom necessary to order civil society, that is. phronesis. Sophrosyne is linked to statecraft 
because only he who understands and controls his passions can understand and control those 
of others. Simply, the sophron ruler can benefit the state if he "knew what he knew and what 
he did not know and could observe this condition in others, because every man would then 
do what he knew how to do and the State would be ruled well" (158 cf. Charmides 172a). 
Not only did the Greeks contrast their sophrosyne to the behaviors of rivals, they also 
discriminated the concept within their culture by rank, class, and gender. Examples that 
sophrosyne is an aristocratic quality abound in Greek literature. Certainly the root sophron 
carried conservative, aristocratic, or oligarchic connotations distasteful to democrats (North 
102). Aristophanes.8 for one. links sophrosyne with apragmosyne "the gentlemanly aloofness 
and detachment so highly prized by Greek conservatives" (98). 
While Aristotle does not confine sophrosyne to aristocracy, he defines it differently 
for rulers than for the ruled. As the soul, like the household and the state, has both "'a ruling 
~ A prophesying medium mythically located at the city of Delphi, the oracle's message is "know thyself." 
* Athenian dramatist. 448?-?380 BCE. 
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and a ruled element each has its different goodness — the ruler must possess moral 
virtue in its full and perfect form"; others need only "the extent required for discharge of his 
or her function" (Politics 1260a). Aristotle also classifies to prepon in accord with genus, 
"things like age or woman and man or Spartan and Thessalian" and moral state. "the 
principles by which someone is the kind of person he is in life" (Rhetoric I408a24-25). 
Modesty, silence (Politics 1277b17-24), and obedience to rulers, political and domestic, are 
thus more characteristic of female sophrosyne than of the self-restraint needed by a 
governing citizen. Likewise, the virtue of the non-citizen consists in "performing his 
function"; as his work is "ignoble and inimical to goodness" (1328b30)> he must remain 
silent in the public arena. As to age. Aristotle elaborates on Plato's notion of virtue as a 
mean, arguing that old men have lost their desires, appearing sophron when no self-restraint 
is needed, while youth have not yet acquired the habit (Rhetoric 1389a-1390a). Plato, too, 
claims that virtue varies "according to each activity and age" (Meno 72a), again associating 
this virtue with kairos and to prepon: sophrosyne is acquired in the right season; it is a virtue 
of one's prime. Thus the Athenian stranger describes "the dangers inherent in giving supreme 
power to the young as a neglect of due measure that leads to disorder, hubris, and injustice" 
(North 191 cf. Laws 691c). 
In sum, Classical moral philosophy is a "synthesis of moral quality and social 
position" (Wood and Wood 143)—not only does each social class possess virtues "peculiar 
and appropriate to it" (143), but the virtues necessary to rale are bound to a specific life-
situation. While Plato arguably envisions a meritocratic society, he nonetheless attributes the 
ruling virtues only to those who maintain "the proper position in the social division of labor" 
( 145). Those whose lives are conditioned by material need, who must work for their living, 
become "warped by a life of drudgery" (Wood and Wood 159);* their particular and sole 
virtue is temperance" which "'chiefly means obeying their governors" ( 161 cf. Republic 
389d-e). By contrast, the wealthy possess the leisure to pursue the liberal education necessary 
to development of the ruling virtues.10 Indeed, the liberal education Plato describes is 
9 The Greeks generally saw "banausic," Le. manual, occupations as undignified because they suggest that one is 
vulnerable due to lack of self-sufficiency. To sell one's labor or the fruits of one's non-agricultural labor 
implied that one did not possess sufficient property to independently sustain the oihos, an economic family-
based organization which predates the polis as the primary economic, social, and political unit, and which 
includes family members, slaves, and free servants. See Austin and Vîdal-NaqueL 
10 Schale, from which our word "school" is derived, can be translated as either "leisure" or "school." 
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"clearly an aristocratic one, unmistakably based on the traditional education received by the 
upper-class youths of Athens, before the new education' of the Sophists" (148). 
Not only does a privileged life-situation provide the necessary conditions for 
cultivation of virtue, the ruling virtues are themselves "the ethic of an urbane leisure class 
whose fundamental moral distinctions correspond to the contrast between aristocratic style 
and common vulgarity" (155). Indeed, Plato's "enumeration" of the Guardians' virtues is 
"little more than a catalogue of the qualities held in esteem by the aristocrats and anti-
democrats of his time" (157), particularly their ""form and style in living" (Ehrenberg 97 in 
Wood and Wood 159). Style and bearing take on the import of moral excellence as "grace 
and seemliness of form" (158 cf. The Republic 396c) come to be seen as outward evidence of 
virtue. Such an association of style with virtue is not limited to Plato but is found in 
numerous literary examples. In Birds, for example, Aristophanes notes Poseidon's horror 
toward the barbarian god who wore his coat in the wrong way (Wood and Wood 157 cf. 
Ehrenberg 102). Likewise. Aristotle criticizes the democratic leader, Cleon, for speaking 
with "his cloak girt up about him." in contrast to those who spoke in "proper dress and 
manner" (Wood and Wood 157 cf. Constitution of Athens 28). More significantly, Aristotle 
"attaches to style and bearing as essential moral qualities" (Wood and Wood 157) in the 
Nichomachean Ethics. For example, the "high-minded" individual, according to Aristotle, 
walks with a "slow gait." speaks with a "deep voice," and a "deliberate manner" ( 1124al4 in 
Wood and Wood 225). This "high-minded" individual "is justified in looking down upon 
others for he has the right opinion of them," while "the common run of people do so without 
rhyme or reason" ( 1124b5 in Wood and Wood 224). Similarly, the "magnificent" individual, 
that is. the individual who spends "suitably" on a "grand scale" in public spirit, "has the 
capacity to observe what is suitable and to spend large sums in good taste" ( 1122a35). Thus, 
"a poor man is unlikely to be magnificent for he does not have the means" to (I I22b26) 
"equip a chorus or a trireme or give a feast for the city in a brilliant fashion" ( I I22b24). 
What Aristotle fails to consider is that magnanimity does not seem like much of a virtue if 
the magnificent individual gained her wealth by benefiting from an oppressive and 
exploitative system. Nor does magnanimity appear virtuous if gifts are wrapped up in strings, 
meet a "need" determined by top-down authority, are insufficient to alleviate need, are 
oriented toward the giver's posterity rather than the recipient's, or in any other way increase 
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the giver's influence while diminishing the recipient's agency. Meanwhile. Aristotle fails to 
consider that the poor man may be magnificent relative to his means in ways which avoid the 
above pitfalls. 
Indeed, this association of virtue with social class pertains to the relationship between 
classes as well. Plato draws an analogy between harmony and the state. Envisioned as a 
mathematically hierarchical order, harmony comes to serve as "his basic principle of justice" 
(Wood and Wood 161). For the ruled, sophrosyne becomes respect for their inferior position 
in this order and the obedience to governors respect entails. Justice lies not in the individual, 
but in "the polis in which he lives" (161), a hierarchical life system avowedly modeled on 
divine cosmic rationality as exemplified in music. 
Justice as Sophrosyne 
The description of justice as excellence in Chapter Two may well be taken as a 
description of sophrosyne in the context of Platonic/Aristotelian teleology. Justice is knowing 
one's place (self-knowledge) and maintaining one's place (self-restraint). There is thus a 
complementary relationship between their functions: sophrosyne is to the soul what justice is 
to the State (North 189). In this sense they are "at the highest level identical" ( 189)—the 
sophrosyne of the individual embodies the justice of the State. 
Take the notion of ""doing one's own business." which Plato offers as a definition of 
both sophrosyne ( Charmides 161a) and justice (Republic 433a). Read in light of liberalism, 
this may simply mean we should keep our noses out of other people's matters. But in light of 
Plato's ascription to social hierarchy, it is more fruitfully read as "performing one's role"— 
which, of course, means staying out of the business of rulers. In short, just as sophrosyne 
allows the rational part of the soul to deter the irrational, it allows the State to be ruled by its 
rational part, namely, the leisure class who, unencumbered by material need, can bracket 
personal interests to benefit the many. Platonic justice is thus founded upon "a hierarchical 
social division of labor in which each man performs the function proper to his class, and only 
that function, and in which the ruling class is a non-producing, non-labouring class that 
commands the labour of others" (Wood and Wood 156). Of course for this ruling class, 
"doing one's own business" is an insufficient definition for justice, as the business entrusted 
to them is precisely "minding everyone else's business" (Hyland 72). 
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While Aristotle draws no direct equivalence between justice and sophrosyne, his 
approach to "deliberation" nonetheless evokes such a quality. In the Rhetoric. Aristotle 
associates deliberation with law-making, defining it as "advice" or "counsel" ( 1358b5). 
Elsewhere he tells us That we deliberate about "things that are in our power and can be 
realized in action" (Nichomachean Ethics 1112a31 ); that "the slave is entirely without the 
faculty of deliberation": and that "the female indeed possesses it. but without full authority" 
(Politics I260al6). On this note, woman's authority to deliberate and to act upon her 
deliberation is limited to the domestic sphere, while the slave possesses only enough 
deliberative rationality to understand his master s commands and thus "realize" them in 
action. But Aristotle's arguments for exclusion do not stop at women and slaves. 
Distinguishing between the "parts" of the state and the "conditions" of the state, he identifies 
the former as the "non-labouring propertied citizens who — share in the good life" (Wood 
and Wood 232). the latter as the "labouring non-propertied farmers, artisans, tradesmen, and 
household slaves, who provide and maintain the material basis for the good life" (232)— 
enjoyed, of course, by the "parts" of the state. The cooperation of these "conditions" in 
maintaining the "just" social order certainly requires a class-based definition of sophrosyne. 
as does the wisdom the "parts" require for rule. 
Wisdom as Sophrosyne 
Evidence that sophrosyne is an intellectual as well as moral virtue lies in its affinity 
with three designations of wisdom—sophia. phronesis. and krisis (decision or judgment). As 
Socrates argues for the unity of virtue.11 a strong connection between these virtues is found in 
Plato, who alternately names wisdom as sophia (Republic 504a 4-6) and phronesis (Laws 
63 Ib-c). In Protagoras. Socrates directly equates wisdom and sophrosyne. presenting 
sophrosyne's opposite, aphrosyne (folly), as sophia s opposite. Since "to act foolishly is the 
opposite of acting with self-control (332b9) self-control and wisdom are the same" 
( 333b50). He also names sophrosyne "good sense." which characterizes it as phronesis and 
connects it with "good counsel" in pursuit of justice (333d). Hence Socrates pronounces 
sophrosyne and justice "the greatest and fairest aspect" of phronesis because each "concerns 
11 Much of Protagoras is devoted to demonstration fhar the virtues are not only unified but that each is a form of 
wisdom. 
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the regulation of cities and habitations" (Symposium 209a9-10). In fact. Plato maintains that 
aristocracy "degenerates" into less just forms of government precisely because the rulers lack 
sophrosyne. Aristocracy degenerates into timocracy.12 as "guardians" ignore the "geometry" 
of procreation, allowing couples to bear children "unseasonably"—resulting in a lack of "fine 
nature" or "fine fortune" in the offspring. Such offspring, lacking sophrosyne, cannot 
harmonize with one another, nor with their elders, and so upon coming into power "beget 
taction." war. and hatred (Republic 546-547).13 From here Plato proceeds to describe further 
constitutional degeneration—all of which stem from a lack of sophrosyne,14 both in the state 
and in the individual. At bottom, he argues that "the democratic man lacks even the 
semblance of unity, and in his indulgence of the unnecessary desires his soul is prevented 
from attaining sophrosyne and phronesisT (North 176 cf. Republic 559b-c). 
As Aristotle reduces sophrosyne to control of bodily appetites, he does not fully 
equate this virtue with wisdom. Yet from Aristotle we gain the etymology "saving 
phronesis' OJirhnmachean Ethics 1140b 10). indicating that while not the same, sophrosyne 
is necessary to wisdom It is significant, then, that Aristotle most commonly names wisdom 
as phronesis. For Aristotle, phronesis is a process of deliberation which culminates in krisis. 
or judgment ( Rhetoric I377b21),15 "the starting point of action (proairesis)" (Nichomachean 
Fthics I I39a31).16 "deliberate choice — directed to an end" (1366al). Sophrosyne becomes 
"wisdom in choosing" :17 as 
choice is guided by an understanding of the relationship between conduct and 
desired outcomes virtuous action will be guided by reason and appetite 
functioning in harmony or balance precisely because choice is conceived of as 
"rational desire/(Johnstone 3) 
12 Government in which love of honor is the ruling principle. 
13 Plato fails to explain just how or why such rational gnardians may come to err in procreative calculation. 
14 Noting that "Socrates made no distinction between sophia and sophrosyne" (Memorabilia 9.4 in North 128), 
Xenophon excludes both sophia and phronesis from the cardinal virtues—piety, kalon ("the fair," moral and 
aesthetic), justice, sophrosyne. and courage. Naming "irrationality" as the opposite of sophrosyne, he thus 
allows sophrosyne to substitute for both phronesis and sophia (North 124). 
15 This may be read as "giving of decisions" (W. Rhys Roberts in Bizzell and Hirschberg 160). Krisis is not 
action but a point in time, a moment of decision which must yet be realized in action (Nichomachean Ethics 
1113aIQ-l I). See also Christopher Lyle Johnstone. "An Aristotelian Trilogy: Ethics, Rhetoric, Politics and the 
Search for Moral Truth."- Philosophy and Rhetoric. VoL 13. No. I. (Winter 1980): 1-24. 
16 Action is opposed to a wish, opinion, appetite, or passion—which may be held while not acted upon. 
1 
' The early Stoics, too. considered sophrosyne to be wisdom "in choosing" (North 216). 
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Proper choice consists in "observing the mean by reference to two vices excess and 
. . .  de f i c i ency"  (Ar i s to t l e  Niehnmachean Ethics 1106b36-l 107a2).18 Moreover, as the 
purpose of deliberative rhetoric is action in the name of justice, under this model, moral 
reasoning falls within the province of rhetoric. 
Indeed, by means of these definitions. Aristotle accommodates the tradition of 
practical reasoning initiated by the Sophists, a distinction between theoretical and moral truth 
not made by Plato. Thus he maintains that "mathematical works do not have moral character 
because they do not show deliberate choice" (Rhetoric 1417al9-20). He further asserts that 
choice, which is "very closely related to virtue." seems ~a more reliable criterion forjudging 
character than actions are" (Nichomachean Ethics 111 lb5-6). Here choice is a particular kind 
of action, not only voluntary but reasonable, as opposed to voluntary actions driven by 
"appetites" (111 lbl4-15). Choice belongs to the individual who displays enkrateia. or self-
control. a word which carries much of the meaning of sophrosyne. But despite his 
accommodation of practical reasoning, Aristotle, too. makes an undemocratic distinction 
with regard to wisdom, for he tells us that "the form of goodness peculiar to subjects cannot 
be [phronesis]" but only "right opinion" (Politics I277b27). Therefore, "mechanics." Le. 
manual laborers, should not be citizens for they cannot attain the excellence that is phronesis 
( I277b35-1278b4). 
Courage as Sophrosyne 
At first blush, courage and sophrosyne may seem to be contraries, as self-restraint 
may cause one to hold back needed action. Plato certainly contrasts them, equating 
sophrosyne with the contemplative life which he sees as superior to the active life where 
courage may be demanded (North 171).19 Aristotle also distinguishes courage and 
sophrosyne. noting that "a man is not called 'self-controlled* because he can endure pain" but 
18 See also. Andrea A. Lunsford and Lisa S. Ede. "On Distinctions between Classical and Modem Rhetoric." 
F<.«ays of Classical Rhetoric and Modem Discourse. Eds. Robert J. Connors, et. aL Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois UP (1984): 37-49. 
19 Aristotle also argues that "the highest good attainable by action" nslirhnmacfaean Ethics I095al6), consists in 
activity of "the best part of us" ( 1177aI3) that "conforms with virtue" (1095al0). Le. theoria; the life of 
contemplation rather than political life (1177al7). As such a life requires the self-sufficiency and leisure 
enjoyed only by aristocrats. Aristotle tells us that "a state with an ideal constitution — cannot have its citizens 
living the life of mechanics or shopkeepers nor engaged in fanning" for these occupations are "ignoble." 
"inimical to goodness." and lack leisure (Politics 1328b 4— 1329a I). 
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for "not feeling pain at the absence of or abstinence from his pleasure" (Nichomarhean 
Ethics 1118b 29-35). These virtues, then, stand in complex tension, reconciled in the 
judgment characterized by sophrosyne—"knowledge of what is... and — is not to be 
feared" (Plato Protagoras 360dX At minimum, both Plato and Aristotle tell us that 
sophrosyne must attend courage so the individual does not act rashly. 
In fact, the association of courage with sophrosyne has a rich history in Classical 
literature. Thucydides. for one. forges a strong link between sophrosyne and courage, noting 
that Spartan bravery "sprang from their "well-ordered" temper." a quality of self-control 
which is "the chief element in a sense of shame," in turn, "the chief element in courage" 
(Farrar 182 cf. 1.84.3).20 This "rigorous self-control" was essential to the "remarkable 
internal orderliness and discipline" ( 183) of Sparta as it imparted strong obedience to law. 
Contrasting Spartan disciplinarity with Athenian reliance on "inventiveness and self-
reliance" which "in the form of recklessness... were the cause of devastation" (Farrar 180). 
Thucydides lauds the former for serving to maintain the hierarchy necessary to political 
stability. On this order, sophrosyne marks "a way of life as much as a quality of character... 
associated with oligarchy" (184). That is. rigorous obedience to the law-making few 
forestalls change, particularly democratization. 
In the Laches. Plato variously characterizes courage as "resisting desires and 
pleasures." "endurance of the soul." and "wisdom"—"implicit characterizations of 
sophrosyne in the Charmides"—and as "knowledge of the past, present, and future" as well 
as "knowledge of good and evil"—"explicit characterizations of sophrosyne in the 
Charmides" (Hyland 69). For Plato, courage, here nearly equated with sophrosyne. is thus a 
form of knowledge. Moreover, he identifies wisdom and courage as "the characteristic 
virtues of the two highest classes significantly describing] courage as politike. being 
distinguished from the quality found in animals and slaves" (North 172 cf. Republic 
4300-
Aristotie also seems to consider courage as knowledge as he declares that the 
courageous "will fear what is fearful" fMîrhnmarhean F-thics 1115bl2). Knowing what is 
fearful, the courageous individual "will endure in the right way and as reason directs for the 
sake of acting nobly" (1115b 13); will fear "the right things, for the right motive, in the right 
20 Thucydides attribues this claim to the Spartan king Arcfaidamus. 
148 
manner, and at the right time" ( 1115bl9)—conditions which evoke kairos and to prepon. As 
with sophrosyne. Aristotle makes clear that courage is not the same for a woman as for a man 
(Politics 1260a 27),21 noting the uselessness of courage "in all life's ordinary affairs™ ( 1269a 
47). For a woman, then, courage pertains to "serving" (1260a 28); it is a sophron quality 
which renders her submissive. Indeed, though Aristotle counts courage among those virtues 
acquirable by all individuals.22 given his correlation between genus. moral state and virtue, it 
seems within bounds to suggest that courage as sophrosyne serves to facilitate obedience in 
the lower classes as well. In sum. whether defined as justice, wisdom, or courage, in the 
Classical rationalist tradition, sophrosyne is conceived so as to ground political theory on a 
professed necessity for a non-producing, non-laboring ruling class. 
Sophrosyne and Rational Liberalism 
As may be expected from a philosophy which forsakes the affinity between virtue and 
practical rationality, liberalism proper has little use for sophrosyne. Yet even in the Classical 
world this virtue could be interpreted in liberal terms. Recall Gorgias. for one. who associates 
sophrosyne with advantage and power, competence to "manage the affairs of his city 
benefit his friends and harm his enemies, and avoid suffering harm himself* (Plato Meno 
71e). More relevant to our purposes is the way in which sophrosyne operates in Modem 
liberalism where virtue is reduced to rule of law. Here sophrosyne becomes a condition of the 
state rather than a quality of individuals insofar as law. rather than personal virtue, serves as 
social constraint. At this level, individual sophrosyne thus consists merely in loyalty to the 
virtues said to be embodied in the state. 
Yet there is a sense in which liberalism does conceive of a virtue much like 
sophrosyne—the virtue of productivity. With economic activity privileged as the 
consummate human activity and material development conflated with human progress, self-
interest and self-discipline combine to produce a virtue embodied in hard work. Yet there is a 
certain irony in our privileging of production, as boundless consumption, easily seen as a 
violation of sophrosyne. is likewise seen as virtuous as it keeps the endless cycle of 
production and ostensible progress in motion. 
21 Aristotle attributes this observation to Socrates 
~ These are courage. seif-comroL gentleness, friendliness, truthfulness, wfttiness. and shame (Wood and Wood 
224 c£ Nichomachean Ethics Books HI and IV). 
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Moreover, the emotional bracketing which characterizes Modern rationalism clearly 
evokes sophrosyne. Such is apparent in Descartes* mind/body distinction which subordinates 
sense and emotion, the qualities of body, to reason, the quality of mind (Meditation Two). 
Through the ensuing self-knowledge of his incompleteness, fallibility, and dependence on the 
Divine. Descartes comes to see God as author of his veracious thoughts (Meditation Six). At 
bottom. Cartesian doubt is as apt a description of rationalist sophrosyne as may be found in 
modem philosophy. Indeed, it may be said that under the dominant Modernist paradigm, it is 
by means of this rational sophrosyne that liberalism proper becomes proper liberalism. That 
is. by means of rational self-knowledge and the self-restraint which accompanies it. the 
excesses of liberalism may be brought into check. 
Yet while notions of self-knowledge and self-restraint command certain respect, 
demands for such may serve to silence individuals who do not appear sufficiently rational 
and sophron to the dominant culture. Hence, though sophrosyne may be seen as a kind of 
dhanna. or spiritual humility, it may also be seen as a means to exclude the masses. It is not 
difficult to connect common arguments against democracy—mob rule, tyrannical majorities, 
an ignorant, prejudiced, and politically irrational public, the banality of mass culture, 
democracy's dangerous history, and the impossibility of democracy in a diverse, global 
economy—with an implicit sense of sophrosyne. Again, maintenance of this elitism hinges 
on the public/private split. Case in point: the need for quality daycare for working families 
was dismissed as a private interest until lines of rhetoric developed regarding consequences 
to the larger society. Even now. many family issues continue to be marginalized upon 
arguments that government must not interfere in private issues. Another example of the 
silencing effect of the public/private split is the United States Army's policy of "Don't ask. 
don't tell." Though gag orders are justified on the basis that one's private life is no one's 
business, opponents understand that this policy is not about private sexual acts but about 
public identity. Meanwhile, sophrosyne is often invoked by moral-traditionalists to discredit 
the research and pedagogy of counter-traditionalists. 
Sophrosyne and the Culture War 
Moral-traditionalist arguments bear strong echoes of sophrosyne as defined by all 
three self-concepts associated with rational liberalism. Indeed, by clearly distinguishing 
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between mass and elite, they clearly mark out the boundaries of the fragmented self. Allan 
Bloom, for example, distinguishes between the self-determined and the determinate self, 
clearly linking the former with wealth. According to Bloom, liberal education exists 
primarily for the few elite students of "comparatively high intelligence, materially [my 
emphasis] and spiritually free to do pretty much what they want" (22). As wealth allows such 
"gentlemen" leisure to appreciate the "beautiful and useless" (279). they are more "open" to 
great ideas and "will spend their lives in an effort to become autonomous" (21), so serving as 
the "civilizing" force our society requires (21). The remaining majority "will be content with 
what our present considers relevant" or will see their "spirit of enthusiasm" diminish as 
utilitarian concerns determine their lives (21). Bloom goes so far as to suggest that 
intellectually superior individuals must employ the "gentle art of deception" (279) as self-
protection from and guidance for this majority. Harold Bloom likewise envisions a high­
brow aesthetic education for "the few who have the capacity to become highly individual 
readers and writers." an "abandonment" of all others to the "politicized curriculum" he so 
deplores (17). While arguing that anyone may join the intellectual elite, he nonetheless 
asserts that the "alliance of sublimity and financial and political power has never ceased, and 
presumably never will" (31 ). After all. "very few working-class readers ever matter in 
determining the survival of texts" Q6).23 
This is not to suggest that all moral-traditionalists associate sophrosyne with wealth. 
Kimball. Cheney, and D'Souza decry theoretical or curricular emphasis on class just as they 
do an emphasis on race, gender, or ethnicity, arguing that the study of the canon levels the 
playing field, rendering such personal attributes irrelevant. Meanwhile, Bennett looks not for 
cultivation of aristocratic but of middle-class values,24 censuring the so-called liberal elite for 
questioning "the American Dream" (De-Valuing 12). Here arguments regarding Mcstyle 
supplant those regarding life situation. So Allan Bloom laments opening the university to "all 
sorts of lifestyles" (27), while D'Souza objects to the "new diversity of pigments and 
lifestyles" ( 13). Meanwhile, if culture may be considered analogous to lifestyle, these 
commentators clearly associate sophrosyne with the "unique" spirit of the European West, as 
2 My association of the current educational paradigm with Greek aristocracy is by no means new. Nearly a 
century ago. John Dewey likewise argued that the division between elite and mass education was a legacy 
inherited from the Greeks and contrary to the "realization of democratic ideals" (Democracy 192) 
Z4 While calling for cultivation of elite intellectual values. Kimball, too. sees counter-traditionalism as "a violent 
attack on middle-class culture and society" (98). 
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is apparent in the name* they give this quality—"introspection" (D'Souza 88), "self-scrutiny" 
(Kimball xvii). "self-examination and correction" (Bennett De-Valuing 172), and a unique 
"need for justification of its ways and values" (A. Bloom 39). 
But in castigating "leftist" faculty for criticizing Euro-western texts while lauding the 
West's self-critical tradition, moral-traditionalists contradict themselves. Moreover, they 
commit what Martha Nussbaum calls "descriptive chauvinism," an attempt to interpret the 
unfamiliar by "recreating the other in the image of oneself" ( 118).25 That is. claiming the 
canon embodies universal truths, moral traditionalists elide the diverse perspectives which 
constitute the Euro-western conversation in favor of their position.26 There is, in fact, 
something disingenuous in moral-traditionalist claims of political neutrality—as Bennett and 
Cheney have served in politically appointed positions and, as Cheney admits. Allan Bloom 
and D'Souza have been supported by "foundations with a conservative agenda" to play 
"high-profile roles in debates about American culture" (Truth 109).27 
Meanwhile, moral-traditionalists draw a strong "contrast between aristocratic style 
and common vulgarity" (Wood and Wood 155). As an example. D'Souza scorns the 
style of I Rigoberta. which he asserts merely "details the mundane" and is difficult to follow 
due to "lavish** use of Latino and Indian phrases (71)—going so far as to ridicule Menchu's 
"tribal garb" as a ploy to "elevate ... her place in history as a representative voice of 
~ Nussbaum cites translation of Aristotelian eudaimonta as "happiness." which reduces Aristotle's notion of "a 
complete and flourishing human life" to a mere "state of being pleased or satisfied" (118), so attributing to 
Aristotle an allegiance to utilitarian effectiveness inconsistent with his general philosophy. This error has also 
led to specious parallels between the economic structures of the 7th. 6th. and 5th centuries BCE and those of the 
14th. 15th. and 16th centuries CE (Austin and Vidal-Niquet 5). 
26 In this respect, it is ironic that moral-traditionalists uphold the Greeks as exemplars—for Modem liberal 
democracy abhors many of their beliefs and practices. We do not. for example, endorse slavery and eugenics or 
consider "foreigners" and women sub-human. Meanwhile, in denouncing Gay/Lesbian studies, moral-
traditionalists erase the notable influence Greek attitudes toward and practice of male homosexuality exerted 
over Plato's philosophy—reflected in his powerful analogy between philosophy and same-sex eras. 
27 D'Souza serves as an example of descriptive chauvinism, as he argues that "the open market [equated with 
Western morality] is emancipating millions... previously dependent on the government" (86), ignoring 
many governments, at times in collusion with the West, which have destroyed indigenous lifestyles that allowed 
self-sufficiency. Whfle accurate that millions need emancipation, he sees only Western practices as liberating. 
In fact. Western relief programs have often suffered from descriptive chauvinism—including application of 
Western agricultural practices to environments and cultures where unsustainable. Commodity row-cropping to 
produce animal feed, for one. does not serve the needs of many Third World populations for whom grams 
provide more sustainable and sufficient food value for humans than does meat. In the U_S_ the USDA Women. 
Infants, and Children progtain largely distributes dairy products to poor families, although many come from 
ethnic backgrounds where dairy is not a dietary staple, thus enzymes needed for dairy digestion may not be 
present or sufficient. 
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oppression" (73). Meanwhile, Cheney draws a corollary between truth, beauty, and 
excellence, employing selective examples of contemporary art to arouse moral sympathies 
and further the idea that the aesthetic realm has become pervaded by the ugly and immoral. 
Here descriptive chauvinism transforms into "normative chauvinism"—a move from 
inaccurate description to inaccurate evaluation.28 
But normative chauvinism may exist even in the presence of accurate description. For 
example, while D'Souza accurately describes Menchu as a product of oral culture, he 
proceeds to condemn her work because she did not write and translate it herself (17). 
D'Souza thus assumes that rhetorical artistry depends on the written literacy of an individual 
author, that written literacy is requisite to the conceptual development necessary to formulate 
complex thoughts regarding one's own experience. Under such analysis, neither Menchu's 
text nor the analysis it displays belong to her—a product of an "illiterate" culture, she is but a 
"mouthpiece" for "Marxists." Normative chauvinism is likewise apparent in Allan Bloom's 
apparent condemnation of most art, literature, and music of the last 50 years, as well as the 
general moral-traditionalist claim that the term "culture" ought to be reserved for what they 
have already identified as "high" culture. 
Meanwhile, style is used to substantiate assertions that counter-traditionalists lack 
rational sophrosyne. For example, Kimball castigates religion scholar Cornel West as 
"histrionic" for employing "the fervor of a political rally or revival meeting" (81), so 
neglecting due measure and fitness to the occasion. Likewise, D'Souza depicts counter-
traditionalists as imbued with "ideological fervor" (217), persistently employing the term 
"victim" to make their claims appear overwrought. In similar fashion, Bennett asserts that 
outrage over censorship "lacks any sense of propriety, proportion, or reality" (De-Valuing 
IT), while Kimball attributes the rise of counter-traditionalism to a "fear of being unstylish" 
(181), resulting in a taste for "hermetic jargon" (xiv). Indeed, a favorite sport of many of 
3 Nussbaum particularly cites as descriptive and normative chauvinism Allan Bloom's claim that the West is 
unique "for justification of its ways and values for discovery of nature... for philosophy and science" (39). 
She maintain* that Bloom "neglects rich critical traditions m many non-Western philosophical cultures and, of 
course, the everyday critical rationality of most human beings in all places and times" (132), thereby treating 
Western culture as normative, as "relating or conforming to, or prescribing norms" (Webster), and so ignoring 
the normative power, as well as the resistance, of other cultures. Lvnne Cheney also makes the claim that "the 
American system has uniquely nurtured justice and right" (Truth 30), while chastising Nussbaum for being 
suspicious of too much patriotism. 
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these authors is to discredit such scholarship by quoting provocative, irreverent titles of much 
counter-traditional scholarship without sufficiently representing their content. 
Allan Bloom devotes a considerable portion of his book to demonstrating that 
students lack sophrosyne—evidence that "histrionic" (325), radically democratic (326), and 
relativistic (327) educators neglect the responsibility of cultivating the "self-knowledge" (21) 
which would arm their students against the pervasive influence of popular culture (64) and 
"democratic relativism" (67). Condemning books and music popular among youth, he 
admonishes youth for a "contempt for the heroic a perversion of the democratic principle 
that denies greatness and wants everyone to feel comfortable in their own skin" (66). Bloom 
asserts that youth look only to rock stars for heroes, seduced by the "barbaric appeal to 
sexual desire" (73) embodied in their music. Certainly he here condemns the content of 
"propaganda." "trash." and rock lyrics, but his censure goes beyond substance to style as he 
denounces rock's "orgasmic rhythms" (75), as well as the stage behavior (79) and costumes 
(81) of rock musicians. Surely he has forgotten criticism of his beloved Mozart's personal 
taste and the critical abuse Beethoven suffered in response to the angry and erotic passion of 
the Sonata Pathétique. 
Yet it is not only the style but the rational substance of counter-traditionalist 
arguments which comes under attack. Kimball labels such scholarship "totalitarian... 
simple-minded and philistine" (xvi), "formulaic criticism that never engages its subject" 
(xviii), ~exhibit[s] a species of skepticism that is essentially nihilistic" (2), and is no more 
than "commentaries on commentaries" which rely on "primary texts only to furnish 
illustrations for their pet critical 'theory'" (11). D'Souza likewise condemns such 
scholarship, often citing extreme examples which counter-traditionalists may question as 
well.29 In general, moral-traditionalists depict counter-traditionalist thought as "asserted 
rather than argued" (Cheney Truth 18); a "suppression of reason" (A. Bloom 379) brought 
about by "disposition, sentiment, bias, and ideology" (Bennett De-Valuing 12). 
As moral-traditionalists generally contend that counter-traditionalists lack reason, it is 
unsurprising to find them arguing that their targets do not "know their place." As to feminist 
argument. Allan Bloom. for example, baldly bemoans a past when male and female roles 
were clearly distinguished, when "'the husband's will [was] the will of the whole" (126)— 
3 See Chapter Four "in Search of Black Pharaohs" m D'Souza's Illiberal Education. 
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even intimating that changing sex roles interfere with male virility (124). To Bloom, 
feminists have not only destroyed the family, they are "the latest enemy of the vitality of 
classic texts" (65). Cheney seems to agree that to criticize the canon is to step out of place, 
further arguing that affirmative action threatens to push minorities and [other] women out of 
their rightful place in the hierarchy of merit—a position universally shared by moral-
traditionalists. In D'Souza"s terms, affirmative action renders some individuals "more equal 
than others" (24), placing the "last" first by diluting academic standards to accommodate the 
intellectually inferior ( 157). 
Accordingly, counter-traditionalists not only overstep their social place, but in failing 
to "do their own work" they overstep their intellectual place as well. In Kimball words, they 
seek to transcend the traditional divisions between academic subjects so that 
professionals trained in English can pretend to be philosophers, philosophers 
can pretend to be literary critics, and everyone can absorb large doses of 
sociology in order to overcome the ingrained habit of regarding any academic 
subject as worthy of study in its own right. (60)JO 
Meanwhile, in questioning the canon and the aesthetic/moral standards it allegedly 
represents, literature professors are seen as violating their proper places as purveyors of the 
transcendent truths these texts reveal. Writing teachers are seen as violating their proper 
places as grammarians who correct "ugly mistakes" and "improper" usage. A primary 
consequence, according to the moral-traditionalist line, is that students no longer know their 
place in deference to authority. Above all. they implicitly argue, counter-traditionalists 
violate the place of the university by failing to treat it as a museum of the "best that has been 
known and thought" detached from mundane political concerns. Such arguments draw on the 
public/private split in contradictory ways—on one hand, the socio-political concerns of 
teachers are seen as private matters unstated to the public space of the university; on the 
other, the university is seen as a realm of private inquiry detached from the public arena. 
While the above arguments are underwritten by overlapping concepts of determinate 
and rational selves, additional arguments from moral-traditionalists draw on a liberal self-
concept as well. For one. Bennett's argument that the appropriate values include Rocky, light 
50 Kimball seems to contradict his clann that "everything in [counter-traditionalist] cultivation of specialization 
and ammrff* of profèssîonalîzation conspires against the preservation of great art" (55). 
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beer, and Disney World (De-Valuing 13) suggests that the good life consists of access to 
Western products. While others do not make such an implication, nearly all seem to clearly 
define the good life in terms of a consumer economy and worry that Marxism or its offshoots 
are perverting scholarship. Above all, an underlying assumption of these arguments is the 
paramount autonomy of the individual and the intrinsic value of meritocracy. Indeed, much 
of their allegiance to the determinate self-concept hinges on the notion that those so 
determined have demonstrated insufficient rationality to merit autonomy—in fact, that 
counter-traditionalists deny them autonomy by withholding or unfairly criticizing the source 
of rational agency, the Euro-western canon. Armed with such assertions, Cheney, Kimball. 
D'Souza. and Bloom thus accuse counter-traditionalists of being illiberal. By this, of course, 
they mean two things—one, that counter-traditionalists do not privilege the human individual 
as the chief ethical subject (a characterization many counter-traditionalists may accept); two. 
that counter-traditionalists are intolerant. As to the latter, they are unfortunately often correct-
Indeed. "political correctness" may suppress speech. Hyperskepticism does risk 
nihilism. Over-differentiation and hyperpluralism do risk widening the gulf between the 
many cultures which make up the United States. Reducing women and minorities to victims 
may reaffirm this status; painting them as weak and powerless while ignoring forms of 
oppression which may exist between members of the same socio-politically defined group. 
This reduction, as well as over-extended claims that humans are socially constructed, asserts 
a determinate self-concept which absolves individuals of liability for their circumstances. 
Meanwhile, to argue for alternative "ways of knowing" to the occlusion of Euro-western 
rationalism suggests that women and minorities are incapable of linear thought while denying 
them opportunity to develop it. so denying them multiple options for approaching problems. 
Moreover, to teach in the name of subverting students' beliefs, to push students to adopt their 
teacher's viewpoint, is to become equally hegemonic as those counter-traditionalists accuse. 
It is to deny students the very socio-political agency they advocate. In fact, counter-
traditionalists often stand on elitist, rationalistic arguments, painting their students and the 
public at large as ignorant and banal. Likewise, they often deride popular culture as banal and 
bourgeois. 
As a matter of fact, just as moral-traditionalists are prone to descriptive chauvinism, 
counter-traditionalists are prone to "descriptive romanticism"—a longing for the exotic that 
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causes one to view "another culture as excessively alien and virtually incomparable to one's 
own" (Nussbaum 124).31 For example, in critiquing Euro-western thought as excessively 
rationalise binary, and individualist, counter-traditionalists often pose it against spiritual, 
non-binary, relational traditions often attributed to non-European societies, so neglecting a 
variety of logical traditions, "complex debates about perception and knowledge," as well as 
diverse atheistic and materialist traditions of these societies (126). Such thinking likewise 
overlooks the Euro-western humanist tradition which has resisted narrow rationalism since 
the Sophists. While the humanist tradition, too. is subject to critique regarding imperialist 
truth claims, counter-traditionalists who ignore the tensions embodied in the traditional canon 
are equally guilty of reductionism as their opponents.32 But neither are moral-traditionalists 
immune to descriptive romanticism. "Happy family" multiculturalism, for example, tends to 
focus only on colorful, intriguing, surface differences, ignoring deeper differences these 
surfaces may represent in favor of emphasis on aesthetic commonalities. Here culture is often 
reduced to folk ways, exploration of social context or behavioral norms denounced as too 
"political." 
Meanwhile, descriptive romanticism underwrites a normative vice to which counter-
traditionalists are prone—"normative Arcadianism""3 which "consists in imagining the other 
as untouched by the vices of one's own culture" (Nussbaum 134). Such errors inhibit our 
critique of other cultures by blinding us to dishonorable practices within a culture we admire. 
1 Under descriptive romanticism, we may falsely assume that only the strange elements of a culture belong, that 
similarities between the European west and non-Europe are products of Westernization. Or we may not even 
notice or seek out the familiar, assuming we will not find it. so overlooking the real variety of a culture's 
traditions. We may also exaggerate differences, assuming that others cannot rather than may not understand our 
way of thinking or that familiar moral standards need not apply. As to the former. Nussbaum offers Indian 
feminist Veena Das' claim that Indian women are incapable of distinguishing their own well-being from that of 
the rest of their family, despite abundant research indicating that Indian women who go hungry while their 
families eat "Take note of this fact" and when forbidden to work outside the home "view this as a constraint on 
their ability to feed themselves and their children" (124). As to the latter. Nussbaum offers Marfan«» Butterfly. 
whose protagonist sees the submissiveness of a Japanese woman as indication that Western morals need not 
apply, that "she is a delicious plaything, to whom loyalty and promise-keeping are entirely unnecessary" ( 124). 
Meanwhile, descriptive romanticism distorts the European west by "selling short" Euro-western religions, 
music, poetry, and art ( 125). 
71 One of the most redeeming aspects of some moral-traditionalist critiques is the recognition of descriptive 
romanticism among counter-traditionalists. D'Souza. for example, points out the history of oppression within 
non-Western cultures—although in doing so he practices chauvinism by attributing moves toward emancipation 
as solely the product of Euro-western ideas (86). 
" Nussbaum derives her terminology by reference to the ancient Greek district Arcadia which is said to have 
embodied a way of life characterized by simplicity and contentment, "Arcadian" has come to mean rustic, 
simple, contented, evoking a spiritual innocence synonymous with "Edenic." 
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For example, counter-traditionalists practice normative Arcadianism when they equate 
slavery with Euro-xvestem racism, ignoring both historical and contemporary practices within 
cultures where slaves and owners are of the same race or ethnic group. Descriptive 
arguments which too starkly contrast the hierarchical, oppressive elements of Euro-western 
rationality to non-European, allegedly non-hierarchical, ways of knowing are often applied to 
social structure as well, rendering invisible oppressive social hierarchies in non-European 
societies. Likewise, contrasting Euro-western rationalism with non-European spiritualism 
often results in valuations which overlook oppressive tenets and practices in non-European 
religions. Similarly, merely opposing feminism to patriarchy overlooks historical and 
contemporary oppression of poor, powerless women by comparatively wealthy, powerful 
women, just as merely opposing multiculturalism to racism overlooks the oppression of the 
poor. weak, or powerless within racial and ethic groups. Moreover, when normatively 
Arcadian, counter-traditionalists, while certainly not foolish enough to mistake poverty or 
victim status as Arcadian contexts, nonetheless imbue "victims" with a romantic innocence 
that absolves them of any responsibility for their circumstances or for changing them. 
Meanwhile, moral-traditionalists are likewise subject to normative Arcadianism. 
characterizing our intellectual past as idyllic. 
Unfortunately, the struggle to strike a balance between normative Arcadianism and 
normative chauvinism often culminates in "normative skepticism." which simply "narrates 
the way things are. suspending all normative judgment about its goodness and badness" 
(Nussbaum 136). Allan Bloom points out such an error when he claims that students can only 
"point out all the opinions and cultures there are and have been" (26) rather than evaluate 
them. In fact, moral-traditionalists often ground their arguments on the premise that counter-
traditionalists are normative skeptics—radical relativists who forsake moral foundations. 
Doing so. they mistake tolerance and self-scrutiny for skepticism. As Nussbaum points out, 
"the tolerant person may have, and usually does have, definite views about what is proper 
and improper, right and wrong" (136). As to religious belief, for example. U.S. citizens 
treasure a long tradition of tolerating other views even as they teach their views to their 
children. As a matter of fact, our tradition dictates that we be intolerant of those who 
interfere with others' free exercise of religion through "bigoted or violent acts" (136). It 
follows that normative skepticism should not be mistaken for the respectful suspension of 
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judgment when one does not yet understand a culture and thus lacks grounds for judgment. 
Normative skepticism, rather, is marked by a dismissal of understanding grounded in the 
premise that "this form of life is so alien and bizarre that it cannot expect to be measured by 
the same set of standards" (138). 
In the end, it may well be that the remedy for these vices requires a quality such as 
sophrosyne. a spirit of self-scrutiny which entails knowledge of "what one knows and does 
not know" as well as the self-restraint to withhold judgment until one better understands. 
Indeed, within both moral- and counter-traditionalist camps are those who laud Socrates for 
just this characteristic. Allan Bloom, for one, notes Socrates' awareness of his own ignorance 
as the quality which makes possible the examined life. Nussbaum, too, calls for Socratic 
"self-examination," pointing out that Socrates the arguer must be distinguished from Plato 
the philosopher, who "was certainly an elitist about reason, and openly hostile to democracy" 
(2Ô).34 This commonality suggests that moral- and counter-traditionalists need not be so 
ultimately polarized, that perhaps the virtue sophrosyne can be reclaimed so as not to be 
marked out by such a narrow view of rationality as characterizes the liberal tradition. As I see 
it, the possibility of this reclamation resides in a tradition which has stood alongside the 
rationalist. This tradition, which Susan Jarratt labels "historicist" (11) and Stephen Toulmin 
calls "humanist" (24), is embodied in the few remaining fragments of the thought of 
Protagoras. 
Protagoras 
Protagoras of Abdera. the oldest and most influential of the early Sophists, speaks 
across the ages only in the pages of other authors' works.35 Most notably, he appears or is 
discussed among Socrates' interlocutors in a number of Platonic dialogues—Theaetetus. The 
Sophist, and. of course, the dialogue which bears his name. We know he was a stranger in 
54 Some readers may judge that I too hastily name Nussbaum a counter-traditionalist, citing her laudatory 
reading of Plato and her negative reading of Protagoras as promoting "the debilitating notion that *my-Iaw-is-
as-good-as-his "* (Mendelson 25). However, moral-traditionalist Lynne Cheney places herself in opposition to 
Nussbaum. who responds likewise. Meanwhile, Nussbaum's treatise on democratic education is a rigorous 
defense of multicultural education and critical scholarship. 
' The texts in which Protagoras appears or in which his doctrines are discussed include: Aristotle. Metaphysics 
1IL 1046b 29.997b 32, 1007b 18, 1062b 13, Rhetoric 1402a 23.1407b 6. Poetics 1456b 15: Diogenes Laertius 
9.50; Plato, Protagoras. Theaetetus. Meno 91d-e, Miopias Maior282d-e, Cratvlus 266d-267c. Euthvdemus 
286b-c. Phaedrus 266dfE. Sophist 23 d-e; Pyrrhonus 1.216; Sextos Emp incus. Adv. Math. 9.55-6.7389, 7.60 
(Diels-Kranz 3-28). 
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Athens, arriving around 460 BCE; that he served Athens at Pericles" behest by writing the 
laws of Thurii; That he taught the young men of Athens how to reason and speak well; that he 
was the first teacher to be paid for his efforts; and that he was well-versed in a wide variety 
of subjects including theology, wrestling, government, mathematics, and particularly, 
argumentation and debate. We also know that his view of moral knowledge as "subjective," 
that is. a matter of personal conviction in particular social contexts, has brought scorn upon 
him throughout Euro-western history. While we cannot know for certain how his moral 
philosophy was fleshed out, the few fragments of his doctrine brought to us by other ancient 
writers provide significant clues to the ways in which his philosophy stands in contrast to the 
rationalist tradition. Significantly, Protagoras stood at the point of a profound historic shift 
from oral to literate culture. If Homer is taken to be representative of the mythic-poetic 
tradition and Plato of the rationalistic tradition, Protagoras can be said to bridge these worlds. 
He is thus a liminal figure whose doctrines glean from mythic, conventional, and rationalistic 
insights. His perspective thus promises to be fruitful for redefining rationality in ways 
account for ethical and pathetical."16 Le., non-rationalistic, ways of knowing, so overcoming 
the limitations of the fragmented self and allowing us to redefine our notion of the virtuous 
- - 37 citizen. 
The Protagorean Self 
In discussing Protagorean philosophy, we should take note that the concept of 
rhetoric as a "discipline distinct from other verbal activities or arts" (Schiappa 40) does not 
frilly emerge until the fourth century BCE. where it comes to mean specifically the art of 
political speech. Fifth-century Sophists like Protagoras saw themselves as concerned with 
logos, a much broader concept inclusive of stories, conversation, speech-making, argument, 
reason, and thought. It was only upon the coinage of rhetorike that the narrower description 
of the Sophistic art as persuasion came to be cemented in contrast to logos, the professed 
search for invariable truth. This coinage, attributed to Plato, served to clearly distinguish 
* Appeals to emotion. 
" My intention is to enact what contemporary philosopher Richard Rorty calls a "rational reconstruction" of 
Protagoras' thought, described by Stephen Makin as an attempt to "treat a thinker — as within our awn 
philosophical framework  ^(in Schiappa 66). However, so as not to distort Protagoras" viewpoints, it is necessary 
to provide a brief "historical reconstruction" which ~give[s] an account of what [he) said, or would have said, to 
his [or her} contemporaries" (Makin in Schiappa 66). 
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philosophers from Sophists, thereby disparaging the latter as committed to a doctrine of 
political effectiveness."18 But as the early Sophists did not themselves make this distinction, 
their association of the Sophistic art with logos places them among the philosophers 
concerned with the nature of reason and truth. As such, they, like Plato, are instrumental in 
the shift from the Homeric view of the self, largely externally driven and determined, to a 
more rational and autonomous view of the self59—a "self-conscious sense of agency" which 
led Athenians "to think reflectively about themselves as autonomous agents in a political 
community" (Farrar 15). 
Although this newfound sense of autonomy invigorated focus on the needs and 
desires of discrete individuals, unlike Enlightenment rationalists, Athenians did not view 
human society merely as means to contain war and competition, but increasingly as 
cooperation in mutual self-interest. The need for democratic expression and decision-making 
thus resided, not in a negative notion of individual rights, but in a positive belief that "the 
wisdom of a large group was inherently greater than the wisdom of any of its parts" (Ober 
Mass 163). Such a view lies in direct contrast to that of Plato. Convinced as he is that 
common members of the group perceive only shadows of the truth. Plato rejects the notion 
that humans can arrive at truth collectively. He thus looks beyond human experience for 
political order. Protagoras, by contrast, sees political life, embodied in our capacity for 
justice and mutual respect, as definitive of humanity's ability to achieve order. His first 
premise is the controversial and often misunderstood fragment 
Humanity is the measure of all things, of things which are. that they are: of 
things which are not. that they are not. (From Sextos, see DK80 Bl) 
The Measuring Self—The Human-Measure Fragment 
In claiming that "humanity is measure," Protagoras rejects three basic claims of 
Parmenides and. by extension. Plato: that "being itself is one and consistent" (Mendelson 5): 
that a truly rational Human is independently "capable of deep and accurate insight into the 
nature of being" (Farrar 48); and thaï humanity in general "exhibitjs] seriously defective 
judgment about such matters™ (48). Protagoras does not "challenge the Parmenidean 
58 For a complete argument see Edward Schiappa, -The Invention of Rhetoric" m Protagoras and Loeos. 
59 Havelock's The Liberal Temper m Greek Politics provides an extensive discussion of Greek autonomy. 
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dichotomy between what is unified, stable, and unchanging and what men experience" (48), 
but contests the notion that human insight can be stable, unified, and invariable and, 
therefore, consistently applied to social and political matters. Nor does he offer an alternative 
cosmology. In fact, there is evidence that he is not all that interested in cosmology (48), for 
he tells us that "concerning the gods, I am unable to know, whether they exist or whether 
they do not exist or what they are like in form" (Schiappa 141 ).40 While this statement is 
inconclusive as to whether the gods are non-existent or inaccessible, Protagoras does away 
with transcendental authority and with it. "final guarantees and permanently fixed principles" 
(Mendelson 7). leaving only human perception as our guide. As any "theory of knowledge 
must at least begin from what we ourselves can know" (7). Protagorean measure thus 
reverses the Platonic/Aristotelian emphasis on the nature of the object known—for we cannot 
know the ontologically prior nature of the object—in favor of an emphasis on humanity, the 
knowing subject. The human-measure fragment thus casts off the constraints of the 
determinate self, granting humanity the agency to establish social norms, so making way for 
the equality assumption upon which democratic thinking is founded. 
But if humanity is measure, does this mean there is no "vantage point" from which 
we may assert that human-measure is "true for all" ( 13)7" Not at all. for this "peritrope™ or 
~tuming-of-the-tables" ( 13) reflects "the ironic status of Protagorean thought: from the outset 
it has been reformulated by those who would refute it" ( 14). That is. the argument that 
human-measure is a universalist and therefore self-refuting claim depends on the very 
metaphysical, epistemological. and alethic42 assumptions that Protagoras rejects. Grounded 
upon the assumption that human-measure concerns "the ontological status of the object of 
knowledge" ( 19), rather than human capacity for knowledge, this peritrope requires a 
"paradigmatic shift" which "supplants" "knowledge for A" with "knowledge of X" ( 19). 
Therefore, neither does human-measure promote a radical subjectivism which violates the 
law of non-contradiction, for this notion, too, assumes that truth corresponds to the 
40 This fragment is -quoted in whole or in part by Diogenes Laertius (9.51), Hesychius (DK 80 A3), Sextus 
Empiricus (A 12), Cicero (A23), and Eusebius (B4); it is mentioned or paraphrased by Phflostratus (A2), 
Philodemus (A23), Diogenes of Oenoando (A23), and Plato fTheaetenis I62d) (Schiappa 141). 
41 This premise is attributed to Protagoras by Sextus Empiricus, Democritus, and Plato and continues to hold 
sway as an argument against human-measure. 
42 Concerning truth. 
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"ontological status" of objects.43 At bottom, as no ontological status holds for Protagoras, 
truth is not bivalent, a simple matter of true and false excluding any middle ground, but 
multivalent—"an expression of the variations that distinguish the human community and our 
diverse ways of knowing" (5). 
But Protagorean multivaience should not be construed as relativism, at least not as 
commonly understood, as relationalism, the idea that "true" simply means "true in L(k) (for 
some particular language, perspective, habit of mind, social practice, convention or the like, 
selected from among a set of relevant alternatives)" (Margolis 8). As this position holds that 
"any belief on "any topic' or on *a certain topic' is as good as every other " (57), it is not 
difficult to see how it may be refuted, for it precludes criticism, partaking of normative 
skepticism. It is nihilistic, abandoning both ethics and knowledge. As noncognitivism. which 
holds that "ethical commitments — express attitudes of their possessors" (Blackburn 264), 
relationalism professes that horror toward September 11th events stems not from knowledge 
of good and evil, but from a mere attitude toward the killing of innocents—so depriving us of 
grounds for judgment. Meanwhile, as cultural relativity. relationalism demeans other persons 
and cultures by placing them beyond critique. Cultural relativity is irrelevant to ethics, 
addressing only factual questions rather than legitimative ones (Margolis 14)—whether a 
belief, perspective, etc. exists, not whether it is right. At bottom, under relationaiist 
constraints, neither moral- nor counter-traditionalists can supply tenable arguments for 
persuading others to accept their views. 
How then can we read the human-measure fragment? Certainly Protagoras cannot 
mean that reality is what it is only for a particular individual, for as we have seen, such a 
proposition is philosophically untenable. Nor could he mean that all appearances exist, for 
this position negates the possibility of coherent discourse and thus community. In some way, 
then. Protagoras must mean "~ society-at-large,* thereby positing cultural knowledge (nomos) 
as the "measure* of all things" (Mendelson 4). Nevertheless, he cannot only mean humanity 
as a whole, for such measuring must be inclusive of individual perception—humans certainly 
do disagree. So fairing into account both collective humanity and the individual, human-
measure suggests that knowledge of the world stems from both personal and collective 
The law of non-contradiction may be stated thus: "if I say the wind is cold, it is not possible for you to 
contradict me because the perception of any experience is always relative to the percipient" (Mendelson 13). 
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experience, our interaction with the world and with each other. In human interaction, the 
variables of individual perception are brought to bear on one another, they are made public, 
such that analysis and comparisons can be made and individual perceptions judged "in terms 
which explain what appears to every man and to all men" (Farrar 49). Such a process is 
always steeped in controversy; thus Plato sought truth free of context while Thucydides 
succumbed to despair in the face of power. Protagoras, by contrast, sees in this multiplicity 
and controversy the very source of human reason and the agency which attends it. That is. 
from a Protagorean perspective, human reason stems from our very capacity to perceive 
differently, to recognize differences in perception, to make sense of these differences, and to 
gain from them insight into human problems. Rather than cling to the imminently despairing 
distinction between metaphysical excellence and political effectiveness. Protagoras 
establishes a middle ground upon which excellence is constructed as a particular context for 
political effectiveness. As we shall see. this context is necessarily democracy. 
Meanwhile, the things we "measure™ are not limited to physical objects, nor is our 
measurement limited to whether or not they exist.44 "Things" may be "circumstances" or 
"affairs.** "what is the case" (Schiappa 128) in any particular context.45 Unlike dog-fàced 
baboons, pigs or tadpoles (Plato Theaetetus I61c-d). we do not simply react, we inquire and 
judge, we engage in "analysis and comparison of the experiences of individuals" (Farrar 50). 
Our "measuring" is not limited to sense perception: it stems not from "im-mediate exposure 
to things-as-they-are-in-themselves. but through the mediation of our perceptual horizons and 
histories" (Mendelson 6). Human perception therefore includes our cognitive capacities for 
"memory, intuition, emotion, imagination, reason, or any synthesis of these in an effort to 
achieve both invention and judgment" (8). Less certain than discovery of ontologically prior 
truth and more certain than individual reaction to phenomena, "Protagorean 'measurement* is 
thus best conceived of as a hermeneutical act. a process variously represented as 
interpretation, evaluation, and judgment" (8). Unlike Plato, Protagoras "did not distinguish 
" Protagoras offers an analogy to wind: wind is not merely cold or not cold, for these truth-claims must 
consider individual difference. Plato may have agreed with this depiction of sense perception. However, while 
Protagoras built upon this observation his analogy for human-measure, Plato took it as evidence that sense-
perception is an untrustworthy foundation for truth (Schiappa 127). Meanwhile, Socrates attempts to limit 
perception to sense-perception in an effort to debunk human-measure. 
5 Chrematon (things) "can be used to indicate "goods" or "property"' (concrete usage) and "matter" or "affair" 
(more abstract usage). That "chremaion is preceded by portion (alL every, manifold)" suggests that "Protagoras 
had in mind the widest possible range of objects" (Schiappa 118). 
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the various aspects of human understanding, namely perceptions and judgments, but tied 
them equally to experience," both individual and collective (Farrar 55). Taking this variety 
into account, bivaience cannot begin to account for the full range of human experience: it is 
"itself irrational: it not only ignores the contingent and approximate nature of human 
cognition, it also refuses to acknowledge the legitimate claims of knowledge constructed 
through discursive exchange" (Mendelson 23). Seen this way. any "effort to claim absolute 
authority for a single logos' is "as much a political act as it is an alethic claim" (20). 
Of course given this political context, the question arises as to just how we are to 
determine truth from diverse accounts of reality. No doubt this requires that our experiences 
be in some way coherent with those of others. It is not merely that we must share a common 
language, we must also share basic human qualities and needs (Farrar 46) which lead us to 
experience the world in similar ways. Upon these commonalities are grounded our customs 
and beliefs, that is. our norms. Indeed, to be considered capable of measure, the individual 
must exhibit intellectual and moral capacities within the range marked out by these norms. 
Plato attributes to Protagoras an analogy to bodily health: 
food appears and is bitter to the sick man... the opposite... to the man in 
health. Now neither... is to be made wiser than he is—that is not possible— 
nor should the claim be made that the sick man is ignorant... or the healthy 
man wise but a change must be made from the one condition to the other. 
for the other is better. (Theatetus 166e-167a) 
Two conditions are here implicated on the part of the patient. First, he must have some 
criterion forjudging "sweetness" or "bitterness." some prior experience with the particular 
food at hand, which must likewise be shared by the doctor that he may establish his norm in 
relation to general norms. Second, unless he is to be treated without his knowledge or 
consent, he must be rationally capable of taking the doctors advice: "he is expected to have 
consistent beliefs and to be responsive to rational argument" (Farrar 74). So while the 
exchange between doctor and patient may entail substituting one truth claim (this medicine 
tastes bad) for another (it will make you well), the doctors purpose is not to make his patient 
wiser, but to restore him to a normal condition "derived from human experience and 
answerable to if* (73). The task of the Sophist or educator, accordingly, is to make the 
stronger claim appear to be the case, to "restore — men to the condition of proper measures 
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... capable of exercising their own capacity to gauge and interpret experience, guided by the 
informed experience of others" (72). 
With these things in mind, the sophrosyne of the measuring self can be thought of as 
ongoing critical examination of one's personal beliefs, one's judgment of personal 
experiences, the norms of one's community, and the expressions of others. Sophrosyne is a 
form of wisdom which places focus on knowing subjects, real human beings in real 
circumstances—their wants, needs, beliefs, values, and the contacts out of which these arise. 
It is the wisdom to recognize that knowledge is not a static body, a product to be deposited in 
a willing mind, but a process toward excellence in concrete, contextualized action. Wisdom 
is both a process and an achievement of intellectual negotiation, with oneself as well as 
others. Protagorean sophrosyne is the wisdom to hold one's judgments tentatively, to avoid 
dogma, to fully examine, without prejudice, the arguments of others. In short, the sophrosyne 
of the measuring self is wisdom conceived of as phronesis rather than sophia. an inquisitive 
and critical spirit which refuses to leave the status quo unexamined. The autonomy which 
makes possible this critical spirit serves human measuring to check elite manipulation of the 
mob. mob psychology, and tyrannical majorities. Such autonomy depends on critical 
education, for the rhetorical artifices which contribute to socially destructive ends depend on 
mass ignorance and naivete. 
Consider this: students must leam to recognize common tropes, figures of speech 
which suppress trite assumptions, that they may analyze them to identify ways in which they 
reinforce troublesome beliefs, negate analysis, and silence unpopular perspectives. Just as 
"victim" has become a trope for D'Souza. "racism" and other -isms have become tropes for 
counter-traditionalists. In fact, moral- and counter-traditionalist tropes not only run parallel to 
one another, but often intersect. As to the former, moral-traditionalists employ as tropes: 
Marxism, the 60 s. equality, and feminism: while counter-traditionalists employ as tropes: 
capitalism, the establishment (in the form of the canon, traditional scholarship, hierarchies of 
merit, etc.). inequality, and white male dominance. This is not to suggest that argument 
grounded upon such premises is invalid, but to suggest that such premises are themselves 
often asserted rather than argued, employed without sufficient analysis, or invoked simply to 
silence opposing viewpoints. 
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For example, moral-traditionalists employ the trope of the 1960 s as a time of 
lawlessness and relativism to discredit counter-traditionalist arguments without analysis of 
either the intellectual gains made in the 1960 s or of arguments which build upon these gains. 
They likewise employ the trope of equality, covering over the problematics of merit and the 
conditions of the playing field. Feminism, too. becomes a trope, effectively conflating the 
many feminisms which make up scholarship and practice and which often bear conflicting 
interests. Conversely, counter-traditionalists employ the trope of the establishment, thus 
failing to recognize themselves as benefiting from this establishment. In like manner, the 
trope of inequality too often covers over forms of oppression within non-dominant groups. 
Meanwhile, the trope of white male tradition too often serves as a means to avoid 
engagement with this tradition. At any rate, as Iris Marion Young points out. invoking 
economic metaphors (whether Marxist or capitalist) as tropes simply limits debate to a 
distributive paradigm which is insufficient to either theorize or diminish oppression. In fact, 
moral- and counter-traditionalist tropes often intersect in undemocratic ways—in particular 
those relying on assumptions about the banality of pop culture or the ignorance of a 
particular group.46 
No doubt the literacy education necessary to enable students to analyze such tropes, 
to engage in informed and reasoned discourse, and thus to contribute to collective decision 
and action, requires that they engage diverse perspectives, including texts from multiple 
viewpoints and multiple readings of a given text. Nevertheless. Lvnne Cheney and. following 
upon her lead. Cal Thomas have seized upon the current terrorist crisis as opportunity to 
further their arguments against counter-traditionalist scholarship and pedagogy.47 Thomas, in 
particular, employs the tropes of "patriotism™ and "external threat" to suggest that 
multiculturalism. cultural criticism, and so forth diminish American commonality, incite 
46 The group so identified often consists of those in the middle—often seen as shallow and bourgeois. 
XT While agreeing rhar students should study other cultures. Cheney chides NYC Deputy Chancellor for 
Instruction Judith Rizzo for saying, "we have to do more to teach the habits of tolerance, knowledge and 
awareness of other cultures." Cheney argues that to say it is more important now implies that the events of 
September 11* were our rtmr it was our failure to understand Islam that led to so marry deaths and so 
much destruction that somehow intolerance on our part was the cause." She goes on to argue that our real 
"•failure... is taHr of commitment to this nation's history" ("Veep's Wife"). Here Cheney dismisses a 
substantial body of scholarship which indicates that, while not responsible. U.S. failure to understand Islamic 
cultures and their socio-po lineal contexts has made us vulnerable. Meanwhile her comments suggest that 
counter-traditionalists ignore LLS. history, when, in fact, much of their scholarship deeply engages American 
history, often bringing to discussion events and perspectives traditionally overlooked. 
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moral relativism, and so threaten our way of life.48 But if, as Cheney suggests, more focus is 
placed on American history—either uncritically toward the purpose of instilling patriotism or 
to the diminishment of multicultural education—how shall students, not to mention the 
general citizenry, understand Islam and its perversion by terrorist collectives? How shall they 
understand the hostility much of the world, including non-Islamic groups, bears toward the 
U.S? How can we collectively strive toward excellence, avoiding the use of force to the 
greatest extent we are capable?49 With these concerns in mind, perhaps we can see criticism 
of America's foreign policy as a correspondence of humanitarianism and patriotism, for the 
answers are not merely moral or political, but strategic.50 
** Thomas calls upon educators to "make Americans out of American children, not multiculturalists who accept 
the fiction that all systems and all beliefs are equally good" ("Defend"). Rather than engage muiticulturalist 
arguments, he diminishes them as relativist. Meanwhile, he binds himself in a paradox by pointing out that 
those "who seek our destruction are... brainwashing their kids about the supposed superiority of their beliefs" 
("Defend"). While Thomas' plea is itself a call to teach "kids about the... superiority of [ourl beliefs," he fails 
to acknowledge thai a fundamental American belief is freedom of inquiry, thought, and expression—which 
necessitates that one scrutinize one's own values and contextualize their application. 
" Should one operate from a normatively chauvinistic position. Pashtunwaii may be interpreted as a more 
primitive form of ethics from our own. so fueling moral-traditionalist arguments that valuing their system 
promotes a form of relativism. However, the moral code claimed for the U.S. is also grounded in notions of 
honor, vengeance, and hospitality. As to honor. U.S. leaders approach the September 11* attacks as an attack on 
our values, our "way of life." Similarly, military action is viewed as a means of avenging the innocent victims at 
the WTC and Pentagon. Meanwhile, the U.S. frequently conducts hospitable relations with economic "hosts." 
military allies, and producer "guests"—often even in light of oppression and terrorism within these regimes. 
50 The need for multicultural education in values, as well as the rhetorical import of these values, is nowhere 
better illustrated than the difficulties the present administration faced in dealing with the Taliban, the majority 
of whom are Pashtun. an ethnic group whose ethics are grounded in an "austere code of conduct known as 
Pashtunwaii" (Jafri and Dolmsky 1). Central to Pashtunwaii is the belief that death is preferable to life without 
nang, or honor. According to Hasan Jafri and Lewis Dolmsky. both journalists with extensive experience 
covering the Mideast, to issue ultimatums while employing force is to "despoil" nang ( I). As I interpret, 
ultimatums suggest that the threatened party is inferior; use of force suggests that they are so inferior that any 
concession to discourse is mere charity on our part. As Jafri and Dolmsky describe it, ultimatums coupled with 
bombs add "insult to injury" ( 1 ). The proper Pashtunwaii response is to redeem honor through badal, or 
revenge. Thus, to combine ultimatums with military action only furthers perceptions that we are infidel. 
inflaming desire for revenge and so reinforcing Taliban influence. Meanwhile, bin Laden has exploited 
Pushtanwalr s third tenet, melmastiya. or hospitality—a "complex etiquette [which] surrounds the treatment and 
status of guests" (I), requiring that one provide "refuge to anyone within the confines of one's home or country 
a host gains honor by serving and protecting his guest — [and] must sacrifice his life in the course of 
extending protection or refuge to a guest" (I). Yet melmastiya obligates the guest "to obey the national law and 
not to do something that endangers his host" (I). Meanwhile, Osama bin Laden has exploited the Pashtun 
Afghans by broadcasting his hateful messages in Arabic, rather than Pashto or Dan, the languages of 
Afghanistan. As most Afghans receive their news from Pashto radio broadcasts of the Voice of American and 
BBC. Jafri and Dolmsky argue that US. and coalition leaders "must tailor those broadcasts so that they are 
understandable within the Pashtun's code of honor and hospitality — [must] convey that bin Laden is 
abusing melmastiya" (2). 
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At bottom, collective judgment depends on individual judgments—autonomous 
critical thinking is necessary to the collective. Because of this interdependence, the 
measuring self, unlike the liberal autonomous or rational selves, is an inherently social 
creature, quite unlike the solitary philosopher: a creature who "notices his neighbor and who 
moves through life and interacts with others as a human being, with all that implies about 
basic needs, responses, and capacities" (Farrar 76). 
The Social Self-—The "Concerning the Gods " Fragment 
While the intellectual autonomy of the Protagorean self serves to check manufactured 
consent and tyrannical majorities, this self-concept nonetheless holds that individuals are 
constantly "shaped and tempered by — social interaction even as they control... it" (Farrar 
78). This interaction produces a collective wisdom which draws on all humanity's cognitive 
resources: stories and myth, conventions and law. reasoning and argument. Unlike the liberal 
rationalist self. then, the Protagorean self does not achieve truth in isolation by the lights of 
her own mind, but brings her ideas to the light of the minds and experiences of others. The 
very process of social interaction ~lead[s] to social order—and perhaps even prudence and 
justice"* (78). Political order is thus a collective human achievement, the effort toward which 
is itself ennobling. 
The Protagorean self is therefore unlike the liberal autonomous self as well, for she is 
defined by her membership in the collective rather than by her competition with other 
autonomous individuals. She is. in fact, integral to the order: the polis is impossible without 
her. But she is equally impossible without the polis. for only collective life holds promise for 
self-realization. It is not that she lacks self-determination nor that she has no self-interest, but 
That self-determination and self-interest both require social context and are modified by this 
context. From this angle, our perspectives are not developed in isolation but are "formulated 
in and shaped by the complex network of relations (historical, familial, cultural, political, 
economic, etc.) that make up our social environment" (Mendelson 30). Social life is thus 
both -transformative" (Farrar 90). facilitating those very qualities {aidos. respect and dike, 
justice) on which social life depends; and "constitutive of a fully human life," providing not 
only security, but "development genuine autonomy and freedom" (95). Outside the 
collective. life is no more than survival; from interdependence springs those very things 
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which make life human. Seen thus, as autonomy is not philosophically prior to community 
human-measure refers not to "man qua man" but to "man qua citizen" (98). Ethics 
not to the individual, as in individual rights, but to the polis which makes autonomy possible. 
Necessarily then, the virtue of the Protagorean self is grounded in an "epistemo logical 
pragmatism."31 a "distrust [of] intellectual pursuits too tar removed from concrete experience 
and practical utility" ( 149)—as reflected not only in human-measure but in the fragment 
often taken as evidence of Protagoras* atheism: 
Concerning the gods. I am unable to know, whether they exist or whether they 
do not exist or what they are like in form.52 
Were we to read to read this statement as an assertion about the object known, i.e. the gods. 
Protagoras certainly does appear to assert atheism or. at least, agnosticism. However, as 
human-measure reverses epistemologicai emphasis from known object to knowing subject, 
"concerning the gods** appears rather to be an explication of religion "as a social practice 
that furthers the goals of civilized people" (Schiappa 148).53 Seen this way. although religion 
cannot claim the status of knowledge, it serves knowledge by reinforcing those skills and 
virtues which most benefit humans—those which make up "the art of living in the polis" 
( 148). Simply put. for Protagoras the purpose of human knowledge (as well as belief) is 
human utility and human utility is bound to social complexity and contingency. Religion, 
regardless of any metaphysical truth it may bear, serves the utilitarian social end of fostering 
order. So challenging the traditional authority of mythos. Protagoras ~prepar[esj the way for 
what now would be called an anthropological approach to theology." which calls for 
~arguing rather than merely telling" (Schiappa 56). From this perspective, the only means of 
even tentative certainty relies on discourse—comparison and contrast of the multiple 
M This -epistemologicai pragmatism" is reinforced in repotted accounts of Protagoras' distaste for theoretical 
geometry and mathematics. Schiappa cites Aristotle's (Metaphysics 997b55 — 998a4 ) reference to Protagoras 
when drawing his distinction between geometry and surveying—the former theoretical, the latter practical—as 
evidence that Protagoras saw theoretical geometry as defying utilitarian common sense. As further evidence. 
Schiappa cites Phïlodemus" assertion that Protagoras considered mathematics "unknowable and the terminology 
repugnant1* (80 B7a) and Plato's portrayal of Protagoras "as scorning the advanced study of geometry and 
calculation (Protagoras 3I8e)~ ( 149). 
52 According to Schiappa. the fragment is "quoted in whole or in part by Diogenes Laertius (9.51), Hesychius 
( DK. 80 A4). Sexnis Empmcus (A 12). Cicero (A23), and Eusebnis (B4); it is mentioned or paraphrased by 
Philostratus ( A2). Diogenes of Oenoando (A23\ and Plato (Theaetetus 162d)" ( 141). 
53 Indeed, the view of religion as an absolute, as well as accessible, truth has been at the root of war and 
oppression throughout history. Thus, our country's founders likewise took an "anthropological view" of 
religion, establishing religious tolerance as a fundamental tenet of our government. 
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experiences of diverse individuals in search of intellectual and moral resonance (48-53). To 
make possible this discourse, civil society requires "certain social, civic qualities" (Farrar 78) 
such as sophrosyne, the self-restraint represented by willingness to judge collectively, which 
itself entails awareness that survival depends on our mutual dependence, that "society not 
only require[s] social harmony, but also foster[s] it" (78). 
Moreover, if we accept Diogenes Laertius* version of this fragment—which calls 
attention to the "many hindrances to knowledge, the obscurity of the subject and the brevity 
of human life" (9.51)—sophrosyne can be said to be self-restraint in light of one s personal 
intellectual limitations. On one hand, this self-restraint entails awareness of the need for 
judgment in the face of contingency and uncertainty. Although we can never be sure, often 
we must nevertheless acL On the other hand, it entails awareness of one s interdependence on 
the knowledge and judgments of others. Because we can never be sure, we must share the 
burden of decision. Hierarchy gives way to network—an exchange of perspectives, 
experiences, and expertise which bear on and modify one another. Meanwhile, as self-
restraint. Protagorean sophrosyne also can be said to be awareness of the limits of human 
knowledge in general. Unlike the rational self. then, the Protagorean self holds her optimistic 
faith in rational progress in check, distinguishing between scientific knowledge and its 
appropriate realms of application and moral knowledge and its realms, as well as conceding 
human limitation in either. While the possibility may continue to be held that operations of 
nature or the cosmos are indeed unified, stable, unchanging, and therefore, predictable, these 
operations cease to be viewed as rational in themselves for rationality is itself conceived as a 
contingent human process which entails persistent and continual reinterpretation of all that 
we perceive. 
Hence, together with the human-measure fragment, the "concerning the gods" 
fragment suggests that the Protagorean self is rational and social, autonomous and integral to 
community, consistent and open to new interpretation, self-interested and concerned for 
others. As Peter Euben points out. "philosophers reason in a world they inhabit alone or that 
is full of their own speculations; citizens thfnlc in a world of opinion peopled by many 
speeches and speakers" (Corrupting 39-40). For the Protagorean self, logos is thus 
intrinsically tied to the polis. rather than to a physis somehow removed from human's 
ordinary existence. The Protagorean self, in short, is not rationalistic and calculating, but 
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open-minded and capable of judgment in the interest of the collective. As her wisdom and the 
collective wisdom are interactive, ethical appeals, that is appeals to conventions and mores, 
i.e. nomos. are equally as valid as logos. Logos. as argument rather than some form of 
metaphysical truth, "is the means to excellence, consensually constructed law (nomos) being 
one manifestation" (Schiappa 185). 
Moreover, while it has been thought that Protagoras represents a decisive move from 
the mythic-poetic world to the rationalistic, Protagoras does not entirely do away with myth, 
for it. too. is part of the collective wisdom. What Protagoras does is to alter the function of 
myth, from instructional on its face to usefully interprétable (Untersteiner 59). No longer 
affecting "hypnotic mystification" (Jarratt 51). myth becomes subject to the activity of 
reason, an "externalized form of thought" (51 cf. Untersteiner 58). In his Great Speech in the 
Platonic dialogue which bears his name. Protagoras indeed employs mythos to illustrate a 
logos, i.e. rational argument. Arguing that Zeus, by way of Hermes, gave to humanity the 
gifts of dike, justice, and aidos. respect, Protagoras builds an argument that favors his 
anthropological approach to knowledge. In this "transition from story to its application." 
Protagoras thus "blurs the line between mythos and logos" (51). Myth ceases to be "repeated 
maxims and lessons of customary behavior." becoming a instrument by which to develop 
~new solutions to the problems of social organization posed by democracy" (51). At bottom, 
pathetical appeals, stories both traditional and contemporary, are likewise seen as valid 
components of the reasoning process. Indeed, if one uses the word logos in the broadest 
sense. Protagoras defines an epistemology of probability which draws its reasoning from the 
traditions and stories ( mythos) as well as customs and laws (nomos) of particularized, yet 
collective, human experience. Thus. Jarratt suggests that rhetoric "occupies a sort of 
boundary status between the two worlds" of mythos and logos, for which she suggests nomos 
as the middle term (39). 
Originally identified with land distribution, nomos. meaning law or convention 
determined by community agreement, was indeed the subject matter claimed by the Sophists. 
While the structure implicit in nomos contrasts with the subjective mythos of the fading poet 
culture, more starkly, the democratic undertones of this formulation contrast with the 
aristocratic, objectively rational truth of the Platonic and Aristotelian logos which, finding 
reinforcement in the Enlightenment, came to dominate the European West. These things in 
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mind, perhaps it can be said that counter-traditionalists are resisting the calculative logos 
which limits democracy and contributes to oppression, by reintroducing mythos, in the form 
of stories about individuals and cultures which expose negative consequences which have 
followed upon certain assumptions of rational liberalism; as well as nomos. in the form of 
community agreement that such consequences are intolerable. Jarratt's recasting of nomos 
works well to embody the spirit of these efforts, for as a "coalescence of the public and the 
private** (53), nomos accounts for individual perception while **demand[ing] a social context 
in which to take effect" (53). Certainly such a process entails "both collective self-expression 
and collective self-restraint" (Farrar 77), for to "come to grips with what is "true for N* 
requires ... that we restrain a natural attachment to our own logos and seek... to understand 
"where the other guy is coming from*" (Mendelson 50-51). Thus to achieve coalescence, 
logos. now conceived as human reasoning, must give public airing to the many private voices 
that make up a community. In short, the search for truth must consist in dialogue: the 
consideration of multiple points of view toward a judgment satisfactory to all or most. 
The Dialogic Self-—The " Two Logoi" Fragment 
Indeed, as lived reality is inevitably "measured" in diverse ways and as transcendent 
authority is either non-existent or inaccessible. Protagoras was the first to postulate that 
on every issue there are two arguments (logoi) opposed to each other on 
everything. (DEC 80 AI)54 
With this move. Protagoras establishes disagreement as "the substratum of human reasoning, 
the material with which thinking must grapple and out of which knowledge is constructed" 
(Mendelson 44). But of course disagreement is the very reason Plato and Aristotle, along 
with the Athenian citizenry, held a wary eye toward rhetoric. For while democracy is 
grounded in discourse, and while exposure to theatre, poetry, and the verbal activities of 
democracy rendered the average Athenian "competent to judge both the merits of an 
argument and the style" (Ober 159), he was not fully literate. As an educated elite came to 
dominate the courts and Assembly, Athenians, concerned that among two or more arguments 
54 Logos may mean "a) reasoning, thin Icing or accounting for; b) speech, discourse, or even specific statements: 
and c) the organizing principles formulae, or laws of the world itself (Mendelson 47). Here it can be read as 
"reasoned speech" or "argument" (47). See Schmppa and Mendelson for a fid! discussion on translation of this 
fragment. 
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presented, only one could be right, came thus to fear that jurors and Assemblymen may be 
persuaded by eloquence rather than truth. 
To a certain extent, their concern takes root in their view of arete. i.e. virtue. 
Descendants of the Homeric tradition, Athenians, at least in part, viewed virtue in heroic 
terms, as excellence in a competitive arena. Although by the 5th century. Athenians also had 
begun to view arete as cooperative virtue, their distrust of rhetoric is at least partially 
grounded on the view of argument as eristic, a contest of wits in which the goal is victory. In 
fact, eristic matches served as a form of public entertainment to which Athenians "flocked 
... as eagerly as we might to see a boxing match" (De Romilly 81).35 In such a context, as 
victory supercedes any commitment to truth, no tactic is off-limits (Mendelson 59). Moral 
excellence gives way to verbal effectiveness; antithesis seen as an obstacle to overcome 
rather than an opportunity to critically review possible options. The potential for rhetorical 
abuse is endemic. So while Athenians delighted in seeing their favorites verbally obliterate 
their opponents, they feared that use of unscrupulous tactics would spread to the Assembly 
and other democratic institutions. Indeed, their distrust was bolstered by a focus on rhetoric 
as persuasion—a contest between elites to "win" the minds of an audience. 
Such is the view of argument fleshed out as Aristotle defines the purpose of rhetoric 
as "defense" and "attack" (Rhetoric 1354a2), its function "to see the available means of 
persuasion in each case" ( I3355b2). Here argument is one-sided, directed from rhetor to 
silent audience. An argument appears as a pre-existing object, "a discursive artifact designed 
to assert a justified belief" (Mendelson 49). As artifact rather than social process, an 
argument is therefore capable of destroying contrasting objects, "marketable" to a consuming 
audience, and vulnerable to those who would dismantle it. Antithesis appears as a threat, for 
to accept the validity of antithetical claims is to destroy the artifact. Indeed, as artifact, or 
object, the "shape" of an argument is clear; it "exist[s] as a complete, two-dimensional visual 
construct" (Jarratt 27), the components of which. Le. premises and conclusions, are known 
from the outset. For Aristotle, argument thus takes the form of hypotaxis, a prepositional 
structure in which subordinate premises build in hierarchical fashion toward an overriding 
thesis, a conclusion "prefigured from the beginning" (27). 
55 We might note here the contemporaiy fascination with shows which feature hosts such as Rush Limbaugh or 
Maury Povich. 
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By contrast. Protagoras is portrayed by Plato as employing parataxis, "the loose 
association of clauses without hierarchical connectives or embedding" (51), the options 
presented loosely coordinated, placed side by side, toward the purpose of examining the 
familiar from a variety of perspectives. Approached thus, antithesis, rather than threatening 
an opposing truth-claim, "creates an openness to the multiplicity of possible causal relations" 
(21). So while Aristotle's "formal" approach to argument "tends to isolate ideas from the 
intricacies of their situation for the purpose of generalization and clarity." the Protagorean 
view of argument as antilogic is "immersed in the distinct and fully historical world out of 
which the discourse develops and in the psychological nature of the living human beings 
involved" (Mendelson 50); it has a "social rather than an epistemologicai purpose, strictly 
defined" (Jarratt 27). At bottom, the Protagorean self may be a measure unto herself, but her 
measurement must be placed alongside those of others that the merits of each may be 
weighed. Argument thus entails dialogue rather than monologue as "dialogical exchange 
among people with varied conceptions of the world" comes to be viewed in itself as "a 
victory because the circumference of what is known is potentially enlarged by the addition of 
each argument to the pool of resources" (Mendelson 60). From this standpoint. 
argumentation is analytical and cooperative rather than prepositional and oppositional. 
Again, an analogy to music may be helpful. In classical music, phrases, movements, 
themes, even each chord and note, are laid out in a linear fashion rigorously followed to 
achieve the effect determined by the composer—they are hypo tactic. Solos are likewise 
carefully structured and embedded within the hierarchical form as a means to feature a 
particular instrument rather than to feature a new interpretation of the structure. 
Consequently, a classical composition may be memorized as is. either aurally or visually, by 
performers and audience alike. The music is abstracted from its present context, its 
excellence residing in the faithful rendition of the composers intent. Jazz music, on the other 
hand, disrupts the hierarchical structure of the form, allowing new voicings of a particular 
chord, of a melodic line, even the metric flow of the composition—it is paratactic. Solos 
emerge as more than accentuation of a particular instrument, featuring instead the particular 
"argument" of the soloist. In the practice known as "trading fours." two or more musicians 
improvise upon a four-bar phrase, alternately reinterpreting the phrase to provide new 
perspective. Their "arguments" are placed side by side in such a way that both performers 
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and audience are illuminated by new meanings. Unless recorded, no given jazz performance 
can therefore be memorized. The music is created by its context, its excellence residing in 
individual ^interpretations which resonate with other players and the audience. In fact, too 
frequent repetition of the same interpretation marks the jazz musician as lacking innovation, 
as having nothing new to say. Likewise, in analogical exchange, participants are expected to 
contribute fresh perspective rather than dogmatically hold ground. 
Of course it may be argued that dialectic bears a dialogic quality, as it. too. reasons 
toward truth from opinion in a "give and take of converse and redefinition." placing thought 
"in terms of its opposite" (Mendelson 62). However, unlike analogic, dialectic pursues 
knowledge in the abstract, "removed from its context in the world" (63) and is 
"predominantly concerned with appeals to reason rather than to persons" (63). It seeks and 
employs the voice of authority and "tends to make formal entities out of fluid, operative 
relations and to atomize information into discrete and separable units, all for the purpose of 
generalization and precision" (63). This is well illustrated by Socrates" use of the elenchus. 
"cross-examination... by rapid-fire questions which solicit abbreviated responses" (63 cf. 
Grote: see Protagoras 332a-333e). Though Socrates* self-proclaimed purpose is to "disabuse" 
his dialectical partners of falsehood (64 cf. Apology 29e), "the cooperative impulse of the 
elenchus is clearly subordinate to the drive toward conceptual correctness and conformity to 
procedure as dictated by the questioner" (64). The contradictory arguments inherent in 
complex issues are thus abstracted "from the pluralistic, contentious, chaotic exchange that 
conditions public discourse and... subjected] to formal analysis" (65). 
By contrast, employing both antithesis and parataxis, analogic aims not to discover 
the unknown, but to "rearrange" the known so as to explore possible interpretations. The 
"pretense to objectivity" which characterizes the formal methods of Plato and Aristotle gives 
way to "an open acknowledgement of a value orientation: any realignment is made for a 
purpose" (Jarratt 28). Certainly the negative potential of this value orientation is precisely 
what concerned Plato and Aristotle. If antilogic is seen only as "a rhetorical tool for turning 
the tables and converting alternatives into justification for one's own stand, antilogic will 
indeed decline into eristic" (Mendelson 59). However, in light of Protagoras* commitment to 
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the collective, a neo-Protagorean theory of argumentation may be formulated that avoids the 
traps of eristic.36 
Indeed, if it can be accepted that Protagorean sophrosyne in its guise as wisdom is 
phronesis. antilogical argument, that is, argument from many sides, can be said to be the 
form this wisdom takes in practice. As Aristotle tells us. sophrosyne "saves" phronesis. This 
is especially true for the neo-Protagorean. for whom the end of discourse is not certainty but 
beneficial action toward the interest of the collective in whatever "reality" they find 
themselves. As I have argued, this substratum of disagreement requires both a critical spirit 
and the self-restraint to apply this spirit to one's personal standpoint as well as those 
opposed. To approach argument as dialogue therefore, again requires sophrosyne—in this 
instance conceived as courage or risk. 
Given that antilogic concerns topics "in which certainty is indeterminate and 
controversy hence immanent" (Mendelson 48), the potential for intimidation of the weak by 
the powerful is clear. Unless the weak are to kowtow to decisions made by the strong, 
antilogic necessarily requires the courage to dissent against the dominant view. Clearly this 
opportunity for dissent is the very purpose of the First Amendment. But First Amendment 
rights notwithstanding, a given social climate may indeed require great courage. For 
example, in the aftermath of September 11th. dissent has been met in both our legislative 
houses and the media with charges that those so dissenting are unpatriotic, even treasonous. 
In particular, those who suggest that U.S. foreign policy may have contributed to these tragic 
events have been labeled "subversive" (Feeney 2), "communist" (Feeney 3), "anticapitalisL" 
and "anti-American" (Kurtz I). Some have even been fired from their positions. Certainly to 
face the loss of one's livelihood takes courage. And. in light of the fact that certain 
accusations, if demonstrated in a court of law. can lead to imprisonment, willingness to 
dissent in such a climate requires further courage still. Moreover, as antilogic blurs the lines 
between the public and the private, requiring that personal perspective be weighed and 
measured collectively, it requires the courage to publicly expose the details of one's private 
experience and the perspective which emerges from it. We must tell our stories even at the 
risk of our privacy and credibility. The personal is political. 
56 See Michael Mendelson. -Protagorean Practice and the Nature of Analogic." Many Sides: A Protagorean 
Approach to the Theory. Practice, and Pffaff^py "f Argument. Amsterdam: Kluner (2000). 
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But the courage to speak our convictions is not the only variety of courage required 
by analogical exchange, for true dialogue also requires that we engage with views that 
dissent from our own, "to admit, or even solicit, an alternative, an attack, an antilogos to our 
own perspective" (Mendelson 11). Indeed, antilogic is "not merely a mechanical process of 
constructing countless arguments" but holds "critical potential for engaging and shaping 
political thought and action" (Jarratt 104-5). Viewed this way. the confrontation of thesis and 
antithesis which seems "gratuitous and artificial" in the context of eristic may be employed 
as a "rigorous means of assessment" (De Romillv 86) of the multiple needs and perspectives 
of the individuals who make up our community. To so engage, we must "emancipate" 
ourselves "from dogmatic preconceptions" to proceed in "negotiation of mutually acceptable 
benefits" (Mendelson 60). Analogical exchange requires therefore the courage to examine 
conflicting beliefs to arrive at the "true facts of a complex situation" (De Romilly 88). for 
"the means of discursive participation by many is connected to the intended end of good 
judgment" (Schiappa 184). In this way. critics of the government (as well as critics of the 
canon) may be seen as patriots who refuse to let our desire for justice lead us down the 
garden path. 
Of course as alternatives emerge from dissent, we must also possess the courage to 
admit when we are wrong—even to anticipate that we may be wrong. As such courage 
requires self-examination, we must think analogically, privately "contemplate the relative 
merits of opposing views on any contentious topic" (Mendelson 49) that we may come to 
respect "the socially generated categories in the context of which the "other side* makes 
sense" (50-51 ). Granted, our options for dealing with contrasting points of view are many; 
"we may revise, accept, or accommodate the arguments of the other side; but we cannot 
remain unmoved, for analogical exchange in itself serves to extend the circumference of 
understanding" (57). We must hence possess the courage to change our minds, to 
acknowledge that from analogical exchange may emerge "a truth more elaborate than either 
thesis" (De Romilly 89). In fact, we must possess the courage to both critique and dissent 
from those we may count among our allies. Finally, to solve problems by means of analogic 
requires the courage to act in the face of less than ideal certainty, in the face of continuing 
disagreement. While analogic "seeks coherence among opposing beliefs sufficient to justify 
provisional conclusions and sanction consensual action" (Mendelson 64), it is "not a dyadic 
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preliminary to some kind of synthesis, nor is it intent on the end of the dialogue" (50), for 
consensus denies the possibility of other logos. 
Unfortunately, the debate which characterizes the Culture War too often fails to 
proceed analogically; dogma too often rules the day. Clearly, moral-traditionalists utterly 
reject antilogic, declaring themselves to be the protectors of absolute truth. But counter-
traditionalists are not immune to dogma. Indeed, one of the strengths of moral-traditional 
arguments is that they often point out the dogmatic, even knee-jerk, responses of counter-
traditionalists. Lynne Cheney and Dinesh D'Souza offer as one example the attacks against 
Rosalind Rosenberg, associate professor of history at Barnard College (whom D'Souza 
identifies as a feminist scholar [203]), who testified for the defense against charges that 
"Sears discriminated against women in hiring for commission sales jobs" (in Cheney Truth 
116). Rosenberg's argument that women hold different "interests and aspirations regarding 
work" which lead them to jobs "more compatible with family life" ( 116) was quickly 
assailed by the American Historical Association Women's Coordinating Committee for using 
feminist scholarship "against the interests of women struggling for equity in our society" 
( 116)—though much of this scholarship itself emphasizes male-female differences. Rather 
than acknowledge the potential conflicts or controversy in any field of study, such a position 
simply covers them over, dogmatically insisting that feminist research must be used only for 
the "emancipation** of women—conceived quite narrowly as a career outside the home. 
Though moral-traditionalists often use such examples to promote their own dogma, their 
indictment of some counter-traditionalist reactions reveals much. 
At any rate, honest dialogue requires sophrosyne as courage in all its many forms. A 
courageous scholar does not disregard or discard the canon but engages with it. nor does a 
courageous scholar condemn those works that fall outside the canon, but engages with them. 
A courageous scholar does not dismiss opposing points of view, nor label those who hold 
them traitors—whether to contemporary scholarship or traditional. A courageous scholar is 
not afraid to buck the party line, to confront the possibility that women may have different 
needs and desires than men. that a minority individual may not only be disadvantaged by 
discrimination past and present, but by skill level, even attitude toward education. Indeed, 
among my own students I have had numerous women express that home and family take 
priority over career, that emancipation for them does not mean reaching the top of the 
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corporate ladder, but being skilled enough to support their families in the absence of paternal 
support. Meanwhile, many minority students and first-generation majority students have 
expressed ambivalence toward higher education as it sometimes changes their relationships 
to their communities. Thus they sometimes resist scholarship which contradicts home 
beliefs—canonized or otherwise—as well as language that marks them as "educated." It 
takes courage to express such views as well as to hold them in check when necessary. Such 
resistance likewise requires courage in the educator, for she must be silent long enough to 
hear her student and bold enough to disrupt his position. 
At any rate. I do not intend here to concede to moral-traditionalist arguments that the 
playing field is equal or that the words of dead white men are greater than those valued by 
counter-traditionalists, for the playing field is not equal and that inequality is often best 
expressed by voices outside the canon. The bottom line is. dialogue requires a democratic, 
not dogmatic, approach to issues. It thus requires a sufficient sense of justice to make way for 
voices seldom heard. Protagorean justice, therefore, can likewise be conceived as 
sophrosyne. 
The Democratic Self-—The **Stronger/Weaker" Fragment 
In rejecting human capacity for insight into the nature of being as well as its 
complement that most individuals are defective in such insight. Protagoras likewise rejects 
the trope which follows from these assumptions—namely that only a few gifted individuals 
are capable of sufficient reason for rule. His argument is laid out upon four premises 
illustrated in the myth contained in his Great Speech—I ) humanity requires cities to fend off 
the savagery of the wilderness: 2) cities are impossible without the art of government; 3) 
government is a process of discourse among citizens; 4) discourse is impossible without the 
divine gifts of dike, justice, and aidos. respect. Upon these premises. Protagoras concludes 
rHar cities cannot exist if only a few have these gifts, for without them, the many would turn 
on each other and on the few (Protagoras 320c-322e). 
As a matter of fact, since it is membership in the social collective that makes us 
human, "what is at stake is not merely the greatest possible exercise of freedom compatible 
with order" (Farrar 96) but "the highest form of self-realization" (96). As even tyranny can 
provide liberty and self-realization for a powerful few. Protagorean justice is necessarily 
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democratic. Justice stems from intersubjective wisdom or phronesis, "the ability to interpret 
experience, generalize from it. appreciate its implications—and to communicate this 
understanding to others" (95). Democracy, the rhetorical process of shared deliberation, is 
itself the source of virtue, "a commonly shared expertise" (Wailach 335) which involves 
"capacities for civic participation, cooperation, and sound political judgment about the 
welfare of [the] community" (333) which, in turn, involves "knowing what counts as a 
virtuous practice in public life" (334). Such a concept of virtue holds not that we should 
follow laws in order that others' vice not be wreaked upon us, but that we be virtuous 
because our social order depends on it. because we are bound to other human beings through 
both necessity and affinity. The divine gifts of justice, dike. and respect, endos, "become 
qualities of human behavior"—dikaiosvne. "a capacity for justice,** and sophrosyne. "the 
capacity tor [self] control" (Schiappa 148). Justice and sophrosyne become flip sides of the 
same coin, for justice stems from respect and. like respect, numbers among the bonds of 
friendship (Protagoras 322c) which make community and liberty within the community 
possible. Moreover, because majorities may tyrannize minorities. Protagorean sophrosyne as 
justice requires not only that we recognize the existence of opposing arguments, but that we 
seriously consider arguments that are not presently dominant—in the words attributed to 
Protagoras, that we "make the weaker argument the stronger.™ 
Of course this is just the practice for which Plato and Aristotle condemned the 
Sophists. For in their eyes, it is to "make the worse case seem the better."57 The implication 
here, of course, is that falsehood would be made attractive, that citizens would be lured by 
deceit. However, such a reading removes this fragment from the full context of Protagorean 
thought. Given the limitations of human-measure, as a "companion to the two-logoi 
fragment" (Schiappa 107). the weaker/stronger fragment is better read as an argument for 
"the substitution of a preferred (but weaker) logos for a less preferable (but temporarily 
dominant) logos of the same experience*" (109). Indeed, as Protagorean virtue is 
cooperative, defined as ""excellences deemed most likely to ensure the success, prosperity, 
and stability of the group"™ (182), Protagorean sophrosyne as justice can be seen as 
recognition that powerful individuals may manipulate the majority or silence the minority; 
57 Fora full discussion of the positive reading of this fragment, see Schiappa 103-114. 
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that the majority may be wrong; and that minority viewpoints may offer insight that reveals 
the true complexities of a circumstance. 
Thus, the stronger/weaker fragment suggests that antilogic is more than a method of 
argument; it is a method of inquiry mounted upon the assumption that dominant paradigms 
may cover over legitimate answers to problems. Antilogic requires "that all positions be 
examined in relation to their opposite numbers, that the authenticity of the other side be 
understood and respected, and that the construction of one's own position involves some 
response to the collision of alternatives" (Mendelson 57). Antilogic requires that the 
individual recognize the ways in which counter-arguments require adjustments to one's 
initial position: "an intermingling of alternatives where each position is the subject of 
critique and each critique, in turn, receives critical response" (57). In other words, it requires 
that we verbally "trade fours" to illuminate new answers to mutual problems. The matter is 
again one of utility. In keeping with the human-measure fragment. Protagoras "maintains that 
we can make distinctions between knowledge claims... with regard to the advantage — 
they hold for those who accept them" (Mendelson 20 cf. Theaetetus 172b). Antilogic thus 
asks us to step into the shoes of the other, to "strengthen both sides of a question" so as "to 
make clear what [is] at stake in a controversy" (Farrar 63-64). ~mak[ing] it possible to 
rli^nngnish the true tacts of a complex situation in a perfectly objective fashion, and thereby 
render them intelligible** (De Romilly 88). Upon this view, social harmony and stability are 
strengthened by our very consideration for others. 
Indeed, this requirement to strengthen the weaker argument stems from Protagoras' 
view of justice as "service and help to others" (208). Even as Protagoras tells us that 
"whatever seems right and honourable to a state is really right and honourable." he calls upon 
the wise individual to cause the good, instead of that which is evil to them in each instance, 
to be and seem right and honourable" (Plato Theaetetus 167c). Certainly here Protagoras 
points to the possibility that the state, or the dominant view, may erroneously maintain a 
harmful view. Hence. Protagorean justice requires the wise individual to persuade her fellow 
citizens to take the better course even when arguments which support this course 
momentarily seem the weaker. In sum. justice conceived analogically is other-oriented; "it 
insists on the need to counterpoint dominant logoi with those voices that have not been heard. 
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that one cannot imagine on one's own. the constituencies not yet at the table, the quiet 
student in the back row" (Mendelson 52). 
Indeed, unlike the liberal, autonomous self the Protagorean self does not view her 
primary activity as economic, that is. in her own self interest but political, in the interest of 
all. As the interest of the community is at heart the interest of the individual, justice is not 
merely an effort toward effective control in the midst of competition, but a collective quest 
for excellence defined in dialogic, democratic, and therefore perpetually modified ways. 
Certainly, when man qua man measures, rhetoric may be manipulative, as the individual 
seeks personal advantage, but when man qua citizen measures, rhetoric holds the possibility 
of operating in the interest of all. Indeed, it is not merely that minority voices must be heard 
to prevent their unjust treatment, but that minority opinion may provide fresh insight that 
may hinder us from mistakenly subjecting the many to an unforeseen injustice. In other 
words, democratic justice requires that we consider the possibility that minority perspectives 
may be in the interest of the many—if only we take time to explore their full implications. 
Indeed, history is replete with examples of minority viewpoints which, if heeded, would 
likely have staved off catastrophe. While it may be granted that justice for the many may 
nonetheless result in injustice for a few: "antilogic creates an opportunity for conventionally 
"weaker* positions to be heard... for the dominant order to be challenged and even 
overturned if the alternative case can be made to the satisfaction of those involved" 
(Mendelson 56). 
Of course such democratic deliberation does not preclude the possibility that some 
individuals may be wiser than others. In fact. Protagoras allows for a distinction between 
"two levels of ability which characterize all forms of human action: between those 
qualities essential to the existence of the polis and those which are not" (Farrar 83). Toward 
those essential qualities, all citizens must be educated: "those who are themselves competent 
teach the basics the talented few teach those who are already competent but wish to be 
proficient" (83) Even so. as wisdom is drawn from experience, some individuals may have 
different or broader experience which can be brought to bear on a given matter. Likewise, 
some individuals may have greater capacity to understand the experience of others. Such men 
"teach everyone, by interaction in the assembly and on the council" (84), so facilitating 
competence among the many. As excellence and competence exist in symbiotic relationship, 
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the democratic process is itself an education, as "universal competence is both 
complemented and made possible by the excellence of a few" (Farrar 86). 
Of course to achieve such a democratically collaborative polis, each citizen must 
receive an education which demonstrates and facilitates these virtues. Such an education 
must not mistake truth for judgment, must not fragment the citizens' knowledge into narrow 
disciplinary realms, must not privilege top-down authority over collaborative construction, 
must not privilege the individual over the community, and must not present discourse as a 
battlefield. It must examine truth-assumptions to reveal dogma. It must negotiate among 
disciplinary knowledges as well as between disciplinary knowledge and experiential 
knowledge. It must unpack privilege and oppression. It must have as its aim humanitarian 
good. It must be dialogic and democratic. In short, it must embrace the contradictions of the 
fragmented self, re-seeing them, reviewing them, and revising them as relations of power 
which may be collectively mediated. 
In the following chapter. I will examine just such an approach to education embodied 
in the theory and practice of Brazilian educator. Paolo Freire. 1 will contrast the assumptions 
of Freirean pedagogy—alternately called "critical" or "radical pedagogy'—to presently 
dominant pedagogical assumptions to argue for a "liberatory pedagogy" which holds promise 
for mediating the fragmented self, so enabling the agency of diverse humans to engage in 
socially consequential action. Meanwhile. I will recontextualize this liberatory pedagogy 
from the streets and rural passages of Brazil to the American university and examine its 
results in my classroom in the aftermath of September 11. 
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Chapter Five 
Teaching and Learning Democracy in the 
Wake of September 11th 
He who lets the world, or his own portion of it. choose his plan of life for him, has no 
need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for 
himself! employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment 
to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he 
has decided, firmness and self-control to hold his deliberate decision. 
—John Stuart Mill and 
Harriet Taylor Mill 
"On Liberty" (1859) 
It is the province of knowledge to speak. And it is the privilege of wisdom to listen. 
—Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Understanding is a two-way street. 
—Eleanor Roosevelt 
The shepherd, qua shepherd, acts for the good of the sheep. 
to protect them from discomfiture and harm. But he may be identified* with a project that 
is raising the sheep for market 
—Kenneth Burke 
Education is the sleeping pill that makes dreams happen. 
—Peggy Hill 
TV sitmom 
In The Virtue of Philosophy, classicist Drew Hyland signifies Socrates as history 's 
paragon of the sophrosyne needed for scholarship and teaching—again calling attention to 
the distinction between the subversive Socrates and the rationalist Plato. So doing, he 
provides useful language for distinguishing Socrates" approach to inquiry from both 
extreme rationalism and extreme relativism. Hyland argues that, beginning with 
Descartes, the rationalist project increasingly took on a "stance of mastery" (3). This he 
contrasts with the dangers of nihilistic relativism—the "stance of submission" (3). 
Drawing on the Oiarmfrfes. he attributes a third stance to Socrates, the "stance of 
interrogation" or "stance of wonder"1 (13), which he closely associates with sophrosyne. 
' "iicrixt yap $iâogo4>ov touto to somioo, to Oaupa^Eiv  ^("For this feeling of wonder shows that you 
are a philosopher* [Plato Theaetetus I55d2]). 
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While Hyland* s language resonates with my arguments, I maintain that Socrates 
the teacher, at least as depicted by Plato, does not go far enough. While he does, indeed, 
challenge his interlocutors to interrogate their own assumptions, he does so that he might 
lead them to his desired end. From a Protagorean viewpoint, the teacher cannot possibly 
have knowledge of the "true end." for the truest end consists in the juxtaposition of 
multiple viewpoints in a given context. It is neither true, if true is to mean absolute, nor is 
it an end. if end is to mean finished, discussion over. 
Meanwhile. Protagoras* description of the traditional teaching of his age brings to 
mind starkly the moral-traditionalism of our own: 
when they have learnt their letters and are getting to understand the written 
word — [they] are furnished with works of good poets to read here 
they meet with many admonitions, many descriptions and praises and 
eulogies of good men in times past, that the boy in envy may imitate them 
and veam to become even as they. (Plato Protagoras 325e-326a) 
As discussed. Protagoras challenged this vision of education just as do counter-
traditionalists today. Treating logos as both thought and language, his view of rhetoric, 
"did indeed include the art of reasoning, discussing and reaching a conclusion" (De 
Romilly 73). So while his methods "often involved the critical evaluation of literary 
models" (Mendelson 55). he was not bent on "contemplating the wisdom of'divinely 
inspired poetry'" (55 cf. Schiappa 162) or "dissecting the "barren subtleties' of abstract 
philosophy" (55 cf. Isocrates Antidosis 262-69), but on the development of "sound 
judgment [eubolia] through direct engagement with concrete rhetorical situations" (55 cf. 
Isocrates Antidosis 262-69). From this approach, the study of literature serves as an 
"exercise in practical reasoning "transferred to the realm of poetry"" (55 cf. Protagoras 
339: Quintilian 2.20.5). 
Students of Protagoras also composed opposing speeches on a variety of topics 
(Mendelson 55 cf. DBC 80A), presented alternative arguments in formal debate, and 
examined these alternatives through "verbal exchange" in "small informal discussion 
group[s]~ (Kerferd 34 in Mendelson 55). As "such activities immerse students in local 
detail. _. requiring them to identify appropriate rhetorical strategies in response" 
(Mendelson 55). the end of analogical teaching is "not a skill divorced from a 
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consideration of human needs and ends, but rather a way of analyzing and promoting 
them" (Farrar 87). Analogical pedagogy is thus grounded in praxis, literally "a doing, 
acting, or action" (Liddell and Scott), which in turn "offers a theory of how groups work 
— suffused with assumptions about authority, identity, responsibility, and value" 
(Mendelson 55). From this angle, pedagogy cannot be "conflated with teaching" or "used 
to signify the theory preceding and informing practice." but must be understood to 
"encompass both theories and practice at once" ( S ten berg and Lee 328). 
The critical or "radical" pedagogy advocated by many counter-traditionalists is 
likewise "concerned with how knowledge is produced through specific practices and 
processes, as well as the values and assumptions that inform those interactions" (328). 
Language use. as well as language education, are viewed as "social practices used to 
critically study all social practices including the social practices of language use and 
education" (Shor "Critical Literacy" 10)—which in turn "involves questioning received 
knowledge and immediate experience with the goals of challenging inequality and 
developing an activist citizenry" (Il cf. Dewey Moral). Such a view of literacy goes 
beyond functional or utilitarian writing skills, encompassing "social action through 
language use that develops us inside a larger culture" ( 1 ). To "measure." so defined, is to 
become "conscious of one's experience as historically constructed within specific power 
relations" (Anderson and Irvine 82 in Shor 11). This sort of literacy, with which the 
individual may engage her world and act upon it. is necessary to agency, to transforming 
the student from passive object to meaning-making subject to reintegrating the 
fragmented self, to completing her humanity (Freire Oppressed 47). 
Indeed, in the absence of such critical reflection, current standards and practices in 
composition education run the risk of reinforcing the contradictions of the fragmented 
self. As observed by Lynn Bloom, a major role of writing instruction is to assimilate 
students into the "middle-class values that are thought to be essential to the proper 
functioning of students in the academy" ("Middle-Class" 656). The correspondence 
between many of these virtues and the liberal rational conception of sophrosyne is clear in 
translation—"self-reliance/responsibility™ (autarkeia); "decorum/propriety" (kosmiotes, to 
prepon); "moderation/temperance" (sophrosyne, enkratia); "order" (taxis); 
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"respectability" (hagneia); "cleanliness" (katharotes).2 Self-reliance, for example, invokes 
the autonomous self, privileging independence over interdependence. In turn, to gain 
rhetorical autonomy, that is, to be seen as an "author," the student must demonstrate her 
"rationality" in coherent, "orderly," and "^well-integrated" prose which possesses a "single 
guiding purpose" toward which she ™march[es] step by step" (Marius 55-56 in Bloom 
"Middle-Class" 664). While such guidelines have come to seem as common sense, as 
Lester Faigley maintains, textual coherence may reduce contradictions in experience "to a 
matter of textual tensions" which must be resolved for the writer to present herself 
"reasonable, authoritative, and objective," thus unified (162). Paradoxically then, while 
the text represents the writer as an autonomous agent, she is nonetheless determined by 
expressive limits which attach to a rationalist view of the self. This paradox is 
compounded when standards of coherence are examined alongside those of decorum and 
respectability—for the former tend toward formality, distance, and subordination in the 
relationship between writer and reader, while the latter mediates against authentic content 
in writing by encouraging students to conceal experiences which may meet with 
disapproval. Thus determinism may extend beyond the act of writing. For example, the 
call to suppress self-reference "is not a matter of stylistic preference" but "voluntary 
assent" to "subjectivity with the dominant ideology" ( 142). Meanwhile, cleanliness not 
only mitigates against slang, dialect, and other uses of authentic voice, but outrage, 
irreverence and other strong responses to experience—as does moderation/temperance. 
Moreover, as Susan Miller points out, because pedagogical focus has shifted to the 
process of writing"' rather than purposes toward which a written product may be put, 
students are "expected to experience processes, activities, strategies, multiple 
perspectives, peer groups, and evaluations that have no articulated relation to actual 
1 As she draws her catalog from Benjamin Franklin, Bloom also includes "thrift, efficiency punctuality. 
delayed gratification, and critical thinking" ("Middle-Class"). 
•' Emerging m the early I960rs and reaching full steam a decade later, the process approach to composition 
has been, in pan. grounded in an impulse to treat students as already writers "entitled to self-expression, 
capable of inspiring and being inspired, and interested in writmg about themselves for an audience larger 
than their teacher" (Schreiner 85); it thus attempts to mediate between students and the institutional 
"atmosphere seen to be unresponsive to their needs™ ( 102). As its name indicates, process method 
approaches writing as a process, "like thinking itself! rather than the end product of thought" (86). It thus 
represents a "shift in the teaching of writing from an emphasis on the product of writing, especially form, 
style, and usage, to an emphasis on the mind of the individual writer" (Faigley 29 cfl Hairston "Winds"). 
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results" ( 100) in the world outside the classroom. This vision of writing as a private act of 
expression rather than a public act of agency is rife with contradiction. On the one hand, 
as literacy so confined is not addressed "in the senses it has most often been measured, as 
an indication of capacities to transmit property, create it. or take political action" (95), 
process pedagogy may reinforce a determinate self construct. On the other hand, focus on 
process may buttress the liberal separation of the individual from the civic context, for it 
privileges the notion of a true self which speaks from outside the messy, human 
context.4 Certainly process theory has contributed much to our understanding of writing as 
a reflexive activity and thus marks an important step away from excess and often 
debilitating emphasis on "correctness" and toward valuing student voices. Yet it 
nonetheless runs the risk of encouraging a ""personal voice* that speaks to no one in 
particular, in no particular settings, and to no particular purposes" (103), so undermining 
student agency as well as ethical responsibility. 
Emphasis on personal voice also raises concerns that the teacher-student 
relationship may be intrusive, as it "tends to honor particular constructions of the students' 
character and to encourage the evaluation of students* lives instead of their work" 
(Spigelman 70-71 cf. Faigley). This concentration on the past rather than on "the 
contradictions of present experience" suggests that students "achieve rationality and unity 
by characterizing former selves as objects for analysis" ( Faigley 129). Under such 
assumptions, "success in teaching depends on making a student aware of the desired 
subject she will occupy" ( 129)—which of course means that students "will be judged by 
the teachers* unstated assumptions about subjectivity" (128). Personal writing thus risks 
becoming a sort of "confessional." 
a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the 
statement that unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not 
confess without the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner... who 
* Faigley maintains that the notion of a "true self" is bolstered by a "pair of seemingly contradictory 
metaphors™—I) the rationalist notion "that language can transmit directly what is signified in external 
reality;" and 2) the romantic notion "that emotions could be transmitted directly as well" ( 112). Faigley 
argues that this notion denies that "the self is constructed in socially and historically specific discursive 
practices" ( 128). 
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requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes. 
(Foucault History 63 in Faigley 130) 
Under such circumstances, self-scrutiny tends to be characterized by the notion of 
•"emotional distance."* which tends to "diminish the political significance of [personal] 
experiences" even as it "moderates strong responses" to controversial issues (161). In the 
end. students are expected to speak authentically, but as authenticity is marked by the 
presentation of an autonomous, rational, and unified self, the student may be unable to 
express the contradictions which threaten to determine her. 
The upshot is that we can't accomplish the task of facilitating the skills needed for 
negotiating cultural differences "simply by teaching humanities texts and skills (such as 
close reading, historical research, or cultural analysis) because negotiated democratic 
practices don't lie prefabricated in such texts or skills" (Gorzelksy 320). Nor can we 
facilitate democratic, dialogical skills if we reduce composition teaching to grammatical 
correctness and development of style, for to do so is to absolve ourselves of any 
consideration of what the written word may be used for. Instead we must "ask students to 
take critical postures toward their own language uses as well as toward the discourses 
dominating school and society" (Shor "Critical Literacy" 19). Critical pedagogy thus 
"questions hegemonic conceptions of disciplinarity, where bodies of knowledge take 
precedence over activities of engaging knowledge with others" (Stenberg and Lee 327 cf. 
Slevin "Disciplining"). Facilitating "the ability to address questions of différence and 
achieve acceptable resolutions" (Mendelson 58), such pedagogy bears potential for "the 
liberation of the knowing subject from the claims of unchallenged assumptions" (57) as 
well as for "consensual action" (58). Of course this is just the sort of education that has 
raised charges of "moral relativism" and/or "ideological abuse" among moral-
traditionalists. But moral-traditionalists are not alone in their concern, for counter-
traditionalists are equally concerned that ideological abuse stems from the unexamined 
claims of moral-traditionalism. 
In keeping with these concerns. Brazilian educator Paolo Freire offers a pedagogy 
which embodies the neo-Protagorean shift in focus from the known object to the knowing 
190 
subject while palliating the risks of rationalism, relativism, and ideological abuse.5 
Recognizing, as does Protagoras, that the names of things are human inventions, Freire s 
aim is to enable students to "name the world" (Oppressed 88), to create their own 
histories. To do so. Freire tells us. students must learn to perceive their limit-situations. 
the objective conditions which limit their ability to act on the world. As Freire describes, 
"limit situations imply the existence of persons who are directly or indirectly served by 
these situations, and of those who are negated and curbed by them" (102). As limit 
situations are cultural "givens." humans become "submerged" in them, "domesticated" 
(51) by a "false consciousness" which ~intemalize[s] the image of the oppressor" as "their 
model of manhood" (46); ~[t]heir ideal is to be men: but for them, to be men is to be 
oppressors" (45). Freire aims to make students aware of this "existential duality" (48) as 
they come to "perceive the reality of oppression not as a closed world from which there is 
no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can transform" (49). Upon this. Freire 
defines the goal of education as conscientizacao or "critical consciousness." the ability to 
"perceive social, political, and economic contradictions, and to take action against the 
oppressive elements of reality"(35). 
In the case of my majority middle-class students, false consciousness directly 
corresponds to the fragmented self. As in any context, here the goal of Freirean pedagogy 
is to enable the individual to mediate between competing self-constructs. With regard to 
the determinate self, laying bare the individual's limit situations enables her to recognize 
that she is ~conditioned but not determined^ (Freedom 26), that she possesses a capacity 
to exceed the forces which determine her. In turn, as the "pure product of genetic, 
cultural, or class determination has no responsibility for — action in the world" and as it 
" Freire takes part in a tradition of Christian-Marxism, a tradition which conceives of Marxism as furthering 
democracy. Christian Marxists, as well as many other contemporary Marxists, extend the philosophy beyond 
the distributive paradigm, that is. the realm of external goods, to include social, spiritual, and psychological 
internal goods such as respect, peace of mind, and governing influence. Nonetheless, contemporary 
Marxists, like their predecessors, largely perceive the social world ~m terms of categories of class as defined 
by relationships to economic and productive processes" and reject "the exploitation inherent in private 
control of productive processes" (Blackburn 232). Contrary to popular rhetoric, Marxism ought not be 
associated with the fascism of modem Communist states, but with democracy, for Marx envisioned a very 
small central, and almost entirely administrative, state in which citizens directly participate in policy 
deliberations, in the workplace as well as in the greater society. For Marx and his followers, therefore, the 
division of labor is determined democratically prior to production. Contemporary Marxism thus places 
emphasis on the deliberative agency of individuals in their diverse contexts. Marx himself emphasized 
change in social relations precedes change in productive force and control. 
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is therefore "impossible for [her] to speak of ethics" (26), Freirean pedagogy seeks to 
reconnect the individual with the world, mitigating the excesses of the autonomous self 
and so reinforcing the individual's ethical and thus political responsibility. As Freire 
argues. 
Education as the practice of freedom denies that man is abstract, 
isolated, independent, and unattached to the world: it also denies that the 
world exists as a reality apart from people. Authentic reflection considers 
neither abstract man nor the world without people, but people in their 
relations with the world. In these relations consciousness and world are 
simultaneous; consciousness neither precedes the world nor follows it. 
(Oppressed 81) 
Finally, education for liberation mitigates the excesses of the rational self by redefining 
the practices of decision-making from agonistic and competitive to dialogic and problem-
solving. Taken together, greater individual agency, increased personal responsibility, and 
dialogic practice hold promise for transforming social, economic, and political institutions 
in ways which promote both greater effectiveness, that is. the means by which we manage 
external goods, and greater justice, that is. the objective of internal good. 
The concept of the self thus envisioned by Freire is the embodiment of neo-
Protagorean sophrosyne. This "liberated" self balances internal social goods against 
external personal goods, engages in practices which promote internal goods, and 
challenges institutions which limit these practices. She possesses the wisdom to 
understand her limitations, even as she strives to overcome them, as well as the self-
restraint to listen to the wisdom of others. She understands the coalescence of the public 
and the private, sustaining her autonomy to benefit the collective. Understanding truth as 
multivalent, she makes way for the least heard. She possesses the courage to voice her 
convictions, the courage to hold her tongue, the courage to admit her error, and the 
courage to change her mind. She attaches justice to means as well as ends, to practices and 
institutions as well as to judgments and consequences. 
Liberatory pedagogy therefore perceives students as capable of measure, 
contextualizes measuring to their concrete social existence, engages students dialogically, 
and poses education as democratic problem-solving. Such an approach as intensely 
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focuses on the relationship between teachers and students as on program content. This 
relationship entails not that we speak to students about "our own view of the world," nor 
"attempt to impose that view on them," but rather that we dialogue with them about their 
view and ours, understanding that "their view of the world," as our own, "manifested 
variously in their action, reflects their situation in the world" (Oppressed 96). Posed in an 
interrogative stance alongside her students, the teacher is thus a collaborator in the 
ongoing project of temporal situated understanding, rather than the source of authoritative 
interpretation: "the teacher-of-the-students and the students-of-the-teacher cease to exist 
and a new term emerges: teacher-student with students-teachers" (80). At bottom, the 
liberatory educator is called upon to model the democratic, dialogic sophrosyne she 
wishes to facilitate in her students. 
Though liberatory pedagogy originated among Brazilian peasant-farmers, it may 
be re-invented for our comparatively affluent American student body—for they, too, 
suffer under a false consciousness. Corresponding to the fragmented self, this false 
consciousness, consists of "manipulated action and reflection which lead people to 
support their own oppression" as they "police themselves by internalizing the ideas of the 
ruling elite" (Shor Critical Teaching 55). Conforming to prescribed behavior, "the 
imposition of one individual's choice upon another" (Freire Oppressed 47), they take all 
the "necessary" steps to achieve their aspirations all the while complicit in maintaining the 
structures which dominate them. One consequence is that students tend to "construe a 
careerist fast track as the only sphere within which individuals make choices, exercise 
power, or have control" (Elshtain 128) and "turn to "striking it rich" as the most lively 
fantasy of liberation" (Shor Critical Teaching 56). In keeping with this fantasy, most 
students construe the purpose of college education as to acquire the skills and bodies of 
knowledge which will aid them professionally and. therefore, materially. They enter 
college accustomed to. expecting, and seeking transmission of these skills and knowledges 
under what Freire calls the "banking" model of education, wherein the master-teacher 
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"deposits" a body of knowledge into the intellectually empty vaults of submissive 
students.6 
By now the correspondence of banking pedagogy to moral-traditionalism should 
be apparent. But in fact, because our students are comparatively so privileged, counter-
traditionalists are at risk of identifying them with oppressors and succumbing to the 
temptation to "bank" a new set of beliefs. Certainly because oppression is usually thought 
of in distributive terms, it may be difficult to think of our well-fed. well-dressed, typically 
middle-class students as oppressed Yet it bears repeating that our vision of oppression 
must not be limited to the distribution of external goods, but must extend to the practices 
which comprise our institutions—for. as 1 have argued, the average citizen has little input 
into the practices and institutions which determine their lives.7 
Students are also oppressed because they are young, inhabiting a culture that fears 
them instead of fearing for them. Labeling them incorrigible, we close down their 
gathering places.8 interpret groups of them as gangs.4 denigrate their culture as ignorant, 
over-sexed. or violent.10 We rear them on violence and apathy, then increasingly try them 
as adults at younger and younger ages. Perceiving government as deaf to their needs, they 
rarely participate, so policy favors their elders. When they do participate, we ridicule them 
° Freire outlines the assumptions of the banking model: "(a) the teacher teaches and the students are taught: 
(b) the teacher knows everything and the students know nothing; (c) the teacher thinks and the students are 
thought about; (d) the teacher talks and the students listen—meekly: (e) the teacher disciplines and the 
students are disciplined: (f) the teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students comply; (g) the 
teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher (h) the teacher 
chooses the program content, and the students adapt to ic (0 the teacher confuses-the authority of 
knowledge with his own professional authority, which he sets in opposition to the freedom of the students; 
(J) the teacher is the Subject of the learning process, while the students are mere objects" (Oppressed 73). 
As the Enron bankruptcy has recently demonstrated, well-fèd or not. the non-elite continue to be at risk for 
exploitation by those with greater socio-economic agency. Moreover, it needn't take something as 
monumental as Enron to identify our students as at risk of exploitation—one need only observe trends 
toward downsizing, reduction of benefits, and the increasing use of contract workers. When the profound 
corporate influence over government policy is taken into account, middle-class Americans, not to mention 
lower-class Americans, have little voice in the decisions that most effect them. 
* In my community, young people are actively discouraged from gathering in parks even for legitimate 
activities. Meanwhile, a well-supervised drug and alcohol-free coffee house which catered to high school 
and college students was closed down by neighborhood activists although the same neighborhood housed a 
very busy tavern. Their main allegation was "drug abuse." evidence for which was the style ofhair. 
clothing, and jewelry sported by some of the young people. 
9 Des Moines once attempted a policy in which three youth gathered in public were suspected of being a 
œmg-
See Allan Bloom. 
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for idealism or pointless activism.11 We lecture instead of listening. We re mediate rather 
than mediate between them and the world Overwhelmed by the demands of jobs or 
careers, we mollify them with external goods. Recognized only by the ad industry, they 
ameliorate their boredom with clothes. CD's, and video games. Then they come to college 
to get a job to get more stuff because stuff seems to fill the hollow. Too often, when they 
arrive at college, we denigrate them as shallow and so contribute to their voicelessness. 
Meanwhile, as Composition is configured as a remedial first step into an "imagined 
continuous and sequenced collegiate curriculum" (S. Miller 87), even the non-traditional 
student is constructed as "a young beginner — presexuaL preeconomic. pre literate" (87). 
Meanwhile, there are among them students easily recognized as exploited. The 
football player recruited despite his lack of college preparedness, pushed to excel on the 
field at the expense of his studies, his dream of fame and fortune potentially exploding 
with his patella. The ag student who dreams of taking her knowledge home to the family 
farm, only to graduate after her farm is swallowed by factory farms—for whom she 
becomes an underpaid employee. Just as we cannot equate our students with Brazilian 
peasants, we cannot reduce their diversity to something we label the "Typical" student, for 
behind every image is a story. The essence of my argument is that our teaching should 
begin with these stories, with exploration of our limit-situations. 
11 In April 2000. in response to the march on D C. against the IMF and World Bank, the media often cited 
the alleged youth of protestors to discredit them. The Washington Post, for one. inaccurately generalized 
protesters as sporting "body piercings and color-splashed hair" (April 14 Bl)—reporter Michael Kelly 
referring to "tens of thousands of magenta-haired nose-ringers" (April 29 A27). Likewise, the San Francisco 
Chronicle identified protesters as "mostly twenty-somethings, some wearing nose rings and blue hair" (April 
17 A IS), while the L-A. Times noted that some protesters "taped down the rings in their pierced eyebrows to 
guard against having them torn off in a melee" (April 16). Given their assumption that protesters lacked a 
legitimate cause, the press explained these events as resulting from the fed factor." an attempt to reach "a 
higher state of cooF" (Montgomery Post April 16 Al)_ On this note, the protest was characterized as "spring 
break:" (New York Times April 14: Washington Post April 18 Bl) and as an "Evils of Globalization' 
protest party* (Wall Street Journal April 14 A20). Michael Kelly sums up the general assessment, "actually 
kids it must by now have occurred to the swifter among you that you don't possess anything that can be 
coherently called a cause" (Washington Post April 19 A27). In fact, peoples of all ages, classes, ethnicities, 
national origins, professions, etc. participated in the protests which were, despite media reports, largely non­
violent. I am deeply in debt to my son Aaron Jorgensen's news analysis, documented as "Re-imagining 
A16.~ Unpublished senior paper. Hampshire College. Amherst. MA (2001). 
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Rhetorical and pedagogical scholarship should also include stories, for "theoretical 
discourse itself — must be concrete enough to be clearly identifiable with practice" 
(Freedom 44). Narrative, therefore, seems a fitting device to narrow the "epistemological 
"distance™ between my "practice as an object of analysis" and my "lived experience" 
(44). As Freire argues, "the diminution of the distance between discourse and practice 
constitutes an indispensable virtue, namely that of coherence" (63)—by which Freire 
means that one should practice what one preaches. In other words, if I fail to reveal myself 
to my audience, including my audience of students, my theory is nothing more than 
words. At the same time, writing or telling a story yields "a dynamic and dialectical 
movement between doing" and "reflecting on doing"" (Freedom 43). The very process of 
selecting what to leave in and what to leave out requires engagement with my own 
internal contradictions. Perhaps most importantly, personal story-telling situates me in my 
social contradictions that my audience may glimpse my students and me alongside one 
another. In a sense then, narrative affords an opportunity to enact neo- Protagorean 
sophrosyrte. testing my courage to endure collective scrutiny, my willingness to expose 
my limitations, and my self-restraint in fairly representing other voices. These things in 
mind for the remainder of this chapter. I will proceed analogically, punctuating my 
theoretical discussion with a narrative of the aftermath of September 11 in my classroom. 
Before the Terror 
Fall 2001 started out like any other semester. When you teach at a place for a 
number of years, you start to catalogue students even though you don't approve of 
cataloguing. The aspiring lawyers and executives with their polo shirts, testosterone, and 
scrubbed good looks. The quiet scholar: with her bare not-yet-beautifid face and quizzical 
expressions. The arty one with black clothes and hand-made jewelry. The ROTC men, 
bristle-haired, square-shouldered, gigline straight even in civvies.12 The swaggering, 
crotch-grabbing athlete. The muscular farm girl in cowboy boots. The impeccable 
sorority sister. The rumpled ball-capped frat boy. The pink-haxred kid Earth boy with 
beads and beard The Young Republican. The Young Democrat. The outspoken feminist 
12 There are ROTC women, too. I just find them harder to pick out when not in uniform. 
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they both lust after. More rarely, the single mom or displaced worker. At my school', most 
are young. Most are white. Most are middle-class. Most are Christian. Most come from 
small communities. Most did fairly well in high school. I wondered—who would they be 
this year? Who would they become? Who would I be and become?13 
When Ifirst started teaching, I admittedly resented the apparent affluence ami 
shallow material aspirations of many of my students. I wanted to transform rather than 
liberate, fearful that I would merely free them to exploit and oppress others. Meanwhile, I 
was appalled at their poor reading and writing skills, in part convinced that their low 
literacy was Jiirther evidence that they neglect the meaningful for the comfortable. Even 
as I have come to see their false consciousness as evidence ofoppression, temptation 
remains to "bank'' my point of view, particularly when I present a moment in history 
which casts doubt on their illusions and am met with a collective "Nuh-uh! " 
Like the peasant farmers Freire worked among, middle-class students clearly 
prefer security to the "risks of liberty" (Oppressed 20). It's probably fair to say that their 
very reason for attending college is to establish security rather than to exercise liberty, for 
they tend to conflate money with both. Because they do not yet perceive their limit-
situations in their "totality.** they "apprehend only epiphenomena and transfer 
to the latter the inhibiting force which is the property of the limit-situation" (104). As an 
example, because students do not yet perceive the inequality concealed by the American 
myth (the limit-situation in totality), they view the conditions of poverty (the 
epiphenomena) as evidence (transference of the inhibiting force) that the unfortunate 
among us are "unworthy" or "deficient." Fearing that freedom leads to anarchy (35), they 
thus "erect defense mechanisms and rationalizations which conceal the fundamental, 
emphasize the fortuitous, and deny concrete reality" (104)—the elite deserve the fruits of 
their labor, college is the path to elite membership, corporate interest is the people's 
This narrative is itself a process of reflection rather than a product of documentation. It is not my purpose 
to precisely reenact each moment, but to expose both my practice and reflection. This narrative is thus best 
regarded in the vein of creative nonaction, rather than case study or ethnography. Two liberties were taken 
to increase narrative cohesion and mask the identity of individual students. First, the narrative classroom is a 
composite of three classrooms of twenty-six students each. Therefore, particular exchanges may not have 
taken place in the same classroom. Second. I created character composites of students from different 
classrooms. So while the dialogue is representative of each exchange, the input of any given character 
cannot be attributed to a single student. Nevertheless, the content and style of group presentations are 
reconstructed from extensive notes I took for the purpose of grade evaluation, rather than for research. 
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interest. When faced with ways in which their prescribed behavior sustains this limit 
situation, "their tendency is to remain on the periphery of the discussion and resist any 
attempt to reach the heart of the question" (104). Armed with culture war rhetoric, they 
often refuse to engage in or with analysis they see as "political." 
Hence, to achieve liberation they must come to perceive the ways in which the 
narratives of rational liberalism maintain their privilege at the expense of others as well as 
maintain the privilege of the elite at their expense—for the goal of liberatory pedagogy is 
to free both the oppressor and oppressed within each individual. However good our 
intentions, we cannot accomplish this task by banking, as banking merely reproduces the 
conditions liberatory pedagogy poses to remedy. 
I'm also the mother of young adults, so I'm not only drawn to my students. I 
understand many of their limit-situations and recognize their capacity for incipient 
critique. Sometimes they see me as a mother figure, a rare adult connection in a world of 
huge lecture halls. I am not only old enough, but small classes and my personal approach 
to writing create a sense of intimacy. Relatedly. non-traditional students often connect 
with me as parents. .Vfv students have stories and I. the lover of language, appear to them 
a collector of stories. As they share these stories, we begin together to see the forces that 
determine their lives and their resistance against these forces. 
To claim that students are subject to false consciousness is not to say they don't 
possess a "true" consciousness as well, nor is it to lay claim to an exclusive "true 
consciousness** possessed by the educator and scholar. Education for liberation requires 
that we recognize our students' ability to measure—as says Freire. that we "trust in the 
oppressed and their ability to reason** (Oppressed 66). Students' expectations do have 
merit, for assimilation will certainly invest them with greater economic agency, which is 
likely to bring about greater cultural and political agency. To deny these reasonable 
expectations is to deny what they know. Moreover, when engaged dialogically, students 
frequently reveal a latent "feel" for their limit situations. The student who switches majors 
from engineering to education knows his future gamfngs have dropped. The student 
rejected from an elite institution knows her resume will carry less weight. The student 
working his way through school knows his college experience is vastly different from that 
of his peers. We cannot "name the world on behalf of [them]" (89), for we thereby rob 
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them of the act of creation, their attempts to resist the forces which determine them. The 
new education major may be resisting forces that equate job satisfaction with income. The 
rejected student may be aiming for an elite graduate school. The working student may be 
avoiding debt or pressure from parents in selecting a major. 
Youth are also proficient language learners. Far from being unsophisticated, they 
master complex and ever-changing vocabularies of their culture—which express nuances 
and contexts inaccessible to and inexpressible by their elders. This language reveals their 
incipient critique, as well as their resistance to an adult world they often see lacking in 
values. It also reveals their need for belonging, identification with an elite. Their language 
therefore speaks to them of power in ways our language cannot. 
Meanwhile. I suffer from my own false consciousness. I want to believe that I have 
socio-political agency—that in teaching and writing I am naming the world I want to 
believe I understand my students better than they understand themselves. I warn to 
liberate my students from the demands of market assumptions and I want to believe I can 
do so without diminishing their agency in the marketplace. 
Like Protagoras. Freire reminds us that "one of the requirements for correct 
thinking is a capacity for not being overly convinced of one's own certitudes™ (Freedom 
34). We must therefore approach teaching with recognition of the limits of our knowledge 
and we must not confuse our authority with the authority of knowledge (Oppressed 54). In 
our attempts to unsettle our students* subject positions, we must be willing to and 
expecting to upset our own: through our reflective practice come to grips with ways in 
which we misinterpret both the nature and degree of false consciousness in our students as 
well as ourselves. Education for liberation therefore requires a problem-posing pedagogy 
in which in which intellectual growth stems from "acts of cognition" rather than 
"transferrais of information" (79). The mutual goal of students and teacher is to "develop 
their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which 
they find themselves ... to see the world not as a static reality, but as a reality in process, 
in transformation" ( 83). Teacher and student become "coinvestigators" (81), who create 
together "the conditions under which knowledge at the level of doxa [subjective opinion] 
is superseded by true knowledge, at the level of logosr (81). In this way. the classroom 
becomes a microcosm of the greater democracy, a space in which students and teacher 
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together try out their roles as equal citizens faced with mutual problems in the midst of 
diverse needs and perspectives. 
I also bring to my classroom a deep concern for social justice, a needfor my 
students to recognize our complicity in global injustice. I want them to perceive 
oppression and to remember that the people of the United States came together to escape 
oppression: that our government is founded on principles contrary to oppression: that we 
have a moral imperative to dismantle that which reproduces oppression I want to believe 
that liberated students will share my views. 
It is not the goal of the liberatory educator to transform students but to work with 
students to transform objective reality. Freire points out. ~[i]n its desire to create an ideal 
model of the good man.* a naively conceived humanism often overlooks the concrete, 
existential, present situation of real people** (Oppressed 93). At bottom, we are not in the 
classroom to "save** our students or to "win them over.** but to "come to know through 
dialogue with them both their objective situation and their awareness of that situation**: to 
"fight alongside [them] for the recovery of [their] humanity'* (95). 
At the same time. I am responsible for passing on the skills which will provide for 
them in the market. / do not wish to replace one manifestation of oppression (false 
consciousness} with another (no money). But I am painfully aware that insistence on rigid 
standards may silence them. I am also poignantly aware that learning to write Standard 
Academic English may represent assimilation to the middle-class virtues of academia 
and or the workplace—behavioral expectations which may conceal conflict, silence 
outrage, and generally reconstruct the passive, fragmented self. Faced with this dilemma, 
education for critical consciousness seems the only ethical alternative. 
By analogy to cooking. Freire points out that all practices ~presuppose[s] certain 
kinds of knowledge" (Freedom 29). One must know how to light the stove, regulate the 
flame, etc. As do cooks, writers must also learn to "balance the ingredients in a 
harmonious and pleasing synthesis" (29). Likewise, both cooks and writers must "be 
immersed in existing knowledge" even as they remain "open and capable of producing 
something rhar does not yet exist" (35). It is. therefore, simply "good sense" to recognize 
the teacher's authority to direct activities, assign tasks and set goals (60). 
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The teacher also has a responsibility to pass on the "methodological exactitude" 
(33) of inquiry, to facilitate students* movement from "ingenuous curiosity™ (37), which 
we naturally possess, to "epistemological curiosity™ (32)—a capacity for reflection, for 
self criticism, for "restless questioning7* (37) which moderates "the excess of a rationality 
that now inundates our highly technologized world" (38). This, in turn, requires that we 
respect the "aesthetic linguistic and syntactical" diversity of students* curiosity, encourage 
their lines of questioning, and be "respectfully present in the educational experience" (59), 
even as we expose students to divergent points of view. Liberatory education thus 
"recognizes not only the possibility of making a new choice or a new evaluation but the 
right to do so" (39). Moreover, because the critical thinking'4 which follows from this 
imperative requires a capacity for "comparing, evaluating, intervening, deciding, [and] 
taking new directions™ (38). "the teaching of contents cannot be separated from the moral 
formation of the learners" (39). We should not. therefore, "confuse authority and 
authoritarianism, freedom and license" (60). but understand freedom and authority as 
bound in cautious tension. At bottom, we have an ethical imperative both to avoid 
authoritarianism and to impose standards—both disciplinary and moral. 
The writing class is a particularly appropriate place for such an education, for 
thinking critically is "not an isolated act or something to draw near in isolation but an act 
of communication" (42). Critical thinking requires not only that students learn the surface 
practices of "good" writing, but that they reflect on these practices, what they represent, 
and how they operate in the world. Certainly such reflection will bring about change, for 
critical thinking "implies the existence of subjects whose thinking is mediated by objects 
that provoke and modify the thinking subject" (42). Moreover, this change must not be 
"simply rhetorical" (Freedom 39). for "[t]here is no true word that is not at the same time 
a praxis" (Oppressed 87). Words without action are no more than "idle chatter." mere 
~verbalism — alienated and alienating blah " (87), just as action without reflection is 
mere "activism action for action's sake" (88). Praxis is action; words are praxis. 
Meanwhile, although I've finally risen to the status of homeowner. I have only 
precariously reached the middle class. lam temporarily employed, therefore vulnerable to 
14 Although Freire alternates the use of "critical thinking" and "correct thinking," I prefer "critical" as it 
does not bear epistemological baggage which I deem contrary to Freire's position. 
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recession, student enrollments, and institutional politics. While my socio-economic agency 
is clearly strained I meanwhile do not possess the classroom agency of a tenured 
professor, either in the eyes of the institution or. ifself-revealing, in the eyes ofstudents. 
As liberatory education challenges traditional assumptions. I run the risks of losing my 
job or. if not my job. my classroom authority. In short. I bring into the classroom multiple 
selves, as clearly at risk of fragmentation, exploitation, and oppression as my students. As 
I enter the classroom on this hot August day, 1 wonder which of these selves will. despite 
my best efforts, dominate this semester. I wonder which students will trigger my resistance 
and which will test my patience. I wonder what they will teach me. 
Fresh Faces 
As I look around at the faces, little surprises me. Minority representation is. as 
usual, minimal—either the respective x. y. and z percentages of African-Americans. 
Latinos, and Asian-Americans who populate our state aren't attending college, went to 
other colleges, or ended up in another class. Of course. I have a hunch where they are15— 
and as usual, it will be difficult this semester to address issues of race, class, and 
ethnicity without feeling counterfeit. A quiet little Asian kid who lacks American trappings 
sits in the corner. One girl looks vaguely Latino. A woman about my age stumbles into the 
back row. Even were her face not careworn. I'd recognize her as a "non-traditional" 
from her look of bewildered panic—first semester, for sure. Two more non-traditionals. a 
man and a woman A young black man—international by name. One fashionably 
American Asian girl. 
A blond lowegian motormouth makes it hard to move through introductions. It 
isn ~t long before his classmates and I know more about this kid than anyone needs to 
know—haw his car broke down on the way to LA, the make/model/year of the car, the one 
he later bought, how he modified it, why he sold both of them, and what he drives now 
a maestro of irrelevance, he will require my patience and everyone else s this semester. 
15 In 2001. only 7 Native Americans. 27 African Americans, and IS Latinos from Iowa were reported miring 
the SAT test (www.collegeboard.com). Des Moines newspaper publisher Jonathan Narcisse reports that 
"fewer than 15% of African American students leaving Iowa schools (graduates and dropouts) are prepared 
either to enter the military and not get expelled; college or a vocational education program and complete the 
course of study; or to get a job and keep it" ("State"). 
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I go through my usual introductions, share my credentials, talk about my family. 
This year I 'm an empty-nester for the first time. They laugh sincerely when I tell them that 
their parents, like me. have probably already taken their bedrooms for office space. When 
I announce that we will be addressing socio-political issues in education, the aspiring 
lawyer pipes up. "So what are you? A liberal? " 
"Honey. " I respond with the moniker I always use when I cop an attitude, "I'm so 
far to the left I'm coming around on the right. " 
"Figures. " he mutters. 
"I take it you 're not. " I raise my eyebrow and smile. "Don't worry, some of my 
best students have aggressively disagreed with me. I've even taught them how to do it 
better. You '11 be surprised how much we have in common " 
Moral-traditionalists suggest that by revealing my position I impose upon my 
students a set of beliefs they may not share, that I "politicize" the classroom. But as Freire 
points out. the teacher must also deal with her own freedom and authority, while at the 
same time preserving the freedom of students and attending to development of their 
autonomy—"not forgetting that they are also in the process of building up their own 
authority" (Freedom 88). Should I "omit or hide my political stance by proclaiming a 
neutral position that does not exist." I deny my own "capacity to analyze, to compare, to 
evaluate, to decide, to opt. to break with" (90) even as I deny my students the "right to 
compare, to choose, to rupture, to decide" (68). Indeed, because the ethical subject cannot 
live "without being permanently exposed to the risk or even the choice of transgression" 
(25). it is my responsibility to engage in this risk alongside my students. At the same time, 
the democratic context demands that I not transform my classroom into "either a 
campaign for political revolution or a space totally given over to an analysis of what is 
going on in our world" but create a space in which together we "try out. with conviction 
and passion, the dialectical relation between a reading of the world and a reading of the 
wonf* (79). The educator who considers education to be "no more than an instrument for 
education as "simply an instrument for the reproduction of the dominant ideology" (91)— 
for liberation entails the capacity to peer behind the mask of any and all ideology. 
ideology™ is equally in error as the educator who sees 
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Meanwhile. Freire reminds us that "dialogue cannot exist in the absence of a 
profound love for the world and for people" (Oppressed 89). An act of courage, this love 
"cannot be sentimental" (90). for it requires sufficient respect to challenge the subjects of 
our love. An act of freedom, "it must not be a pretext for manipulation." for to manipulate 
is to dominate. Dialogic teaching thus requires humility (90). for dialogue assumes a 
willingness to learn. It also demands "an intense faith in humankind their power to 
make and remake their vocation to be more fully human" (90). This is not a naïve 
faith, but a critical faith which takes on individual impairment of this power as a challenge 
rather than as conflict (91). Dialogue therefore also requires hope, for to see disagreement 
as cause for despair negates the possibility of humanization. 
Over the course of the next two weeks, I begin to sort out my cast ofcharacters as 
they sort me out. The atmosphere is amicable. As is my custom, I alternate content and 
practice days with issue exploration. At this point, content and practice are focused on 
principles of argument and rhetorical analysis. I balance the mandated Classical 
approach with a neo-Protagorean/ Freirean "problem-solving " approach that I call 
"reasoning together. " Exploration days are spent in group discussion—some in response 
to readings about reasons for writing, language and social class or ethnicity, the purposes 
of liberal education, the purposes of Composition class: the relationship between rhetoric, 
philosophy, and politics. Most of them aren t particularly thrilled that my focus is 
political, yet some are relieved that they don t have to read "literature. " Not many of 
them like "English "—it s too hard too subjective, never finished 
September 11 
I 'm on the way out the door when the phone rings—must be EJ. only my sister 
would call at this time of the morning. "Turn on the TV right now/ " she commands in that 
voice that always make me want to dig in my heels. "Something just hit the World Trade 
Center '. I think it's a small planeI " 
"An attack? " My voice breaks like a boy: fourteen. I'm awash in memories of 
"duck and cover, " the gold and black shield on the Penney's store. EJ called me on the 
grounded line, but I don't want to separate from her: I nearly pull the phone out of the 
wall, trying to reach the remote control. There s nothing we can say anyway. "I gotta 
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go, " I blurt and hang up. As the TV blinks on, I stare slack-jawed then scream, "Oh God 
oh God oh God! " Phone rings. EJ. "Another one just hit! A big one! " Like a knife 
through soft butter, a diver through water, Alice through the looking glass. Only with 
flames. We ramble a thousand things we will repeat a hundred times in days to come but 
never remember as part of this moment. One thing I remember, my best jriend Stephanie s 
husband John. Is he at the towers? Hang up. Try Stephanie. E-mail Stephanie. Stare some 
more in dry-eyed stupor. Phone rings. "They just hit the Pentagon! " EJ sounds like she 
wants me fix it. 
All I can do is pace, smoke cigarette after cigarette. Pete 'sat a gig. Does he 
know? Is it saf e to go to Ames? Will they attack the federal labs? Is it an attack? I have to 
see Pete first. My kids are in class and at jobs, hundreds ofmiles away. What are they 
thinking? Is Eva crying? Is Jorgen angry? Can Aaron stand more tragedy? I pretend to 
get ready to leave, repeating motions, overpacking my purse. I call Mom. For the first 
time in memory, I hear her fall apart. "The children, " she weeps, "things will never be 
the same for them. " I know she especially means her nearly forty grandchildren and great 
grandchildren. She doesn't need to say a word for me to understand she remembers Pearl 
Harbor. I tell her I am afraid to go to school, then kick myself for worrying her. " You 
have to go, " she almost whispers. "Your students need you. " 
I call to cancel office hours, promising myself to be on time for class as long as 
nothing else happens. Pete sweeps into the house. I stumble into his arms, but lean't sit 
still. I look into his brimming eyes and we start pacing together. He points at the screen, 
"They think Tower Two is leaning. " 
"It is! It is! " I cry. "Look at it bow. " Then it happens. Then the other. I begin 
listening to reports intently, taking notes to share with my students. Mom is right, as 
usual—I will be there for them. 
Twelve miles out of Ames. I see rolling black smoke ahead in the distance. I go 
cold slowing almost to a stop, ready to rip off my muffler crossing the median to turn 
around Somehow. I convince myself to go to the exit. As I pull closer to the smoke, I see 
the highway patrol then an old pick-up in flames and I start to bawL 
I pause outside my building waiting to read the sign a student is taping on the 
door. They closed the federal labs. Oddly, I'm relieved that I wasn't being silly: I am 
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amazed to find nearly all students present. I offer to let them go. but they stay; the need to 
be near others outweighing all else. Billie, a non-traditional student, has been in class all 
morning and isn 't yet sure what has happened She s heard but doesn 't quite believe until 
she hears it from me, our weatheredfaces drawing needed connection. She blurts what 
I've been thinking all morning—"I need to call my sonI " 
The class is electric. I am shaking and crying as students fire questions and 
comments across the room. I do my best to coordinate their thoughts; the natural 
collaboration of thoughtfid individuals in crisis does better. A shaven-scalped boy at the 
back of the room punches out a partisan jab. something about China and Hillary Clinton. 
For a moment. I am frozen, torn between a red-faced admonishment and my need to 
educate. Something of both seems to happen as 1 stumble through a segue that feels like 
minutes, then breathe relief when the momentum of the class takes over. "Yeah, like 
Hillary Clinton signed up the terrorists. " I hear a male voice say. 
I get stronger watching their self-restraint in the midst of confused terror. They 
take turns. They listen to one another and respond germanely. Then I notice the absence 
of my Asian, perhaps Muslim, student and wonder why. I manage to direct the class to 
consider their Islamic peers and teachers. to extend an extra hand of friendship through 
these next weeks. I pause to reconsider the shaven-scalped boy. He needs to lash out. 
What can I do for him ? 
"Motor Mouth. " who by now I know as Bradley, provides a wealth of 
information—CNN junkie, it seems. He reminds me that just last week I was trying to 
explain the Taliban to students and he had to remind me what country they 're in. Mostly 
my students want to know ifthis means we 're going to war. One kid pipes up. "I'm 
scared If they reinstate the draft„ my mom will shoot myfoot off " By the end ofclass. I'm 
pretty certain the only thing I conveyed is. "I'm scared " 
Finally. I return home, drained hut animated I only want to talk to my kids. I dial 
Eva. my heart clenched at the thought that her casual idealism might die. We spend an 
hour, she firing questions I cannot adequately answer, never losing her compulsive 
curiosity, compassion, and relaxed confidence. She mentions Nostradamus and I shrug. 
This. too. she will process through her mill wheel of common sense. 
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Jorgen calls. On fire with this as he is with everything. This one will die for peace 
if someone doesn 't save him. I think of Eva again and realize it is not in her nature to 
remain casual for long. She, too, may die for peace. I think about my students—how many 
of them may die for retribution? 
I finally reach Aaron. I ramble, the day's dialogue spilling out in a desperate 
purge. He wonders how to speak of this to the two little boys he nannies: I talk about 
security. He talks calmly about U.S. culpability and for a moment I wonder how he can be 
so callous. He seems too calm. Then he talks about making peace from crisis. I realize he 
is calm because he has been fighting a non-violent war for so long.161 find myself 
thinking as I have so many times before, "Be carefid what you teach your children. They 
may listen. " This one. above all, may die for peace. Until now. I have been frantically 
seeking something to do. something to make the world change back again. Now it is all so 
clear. Make peace. Create it in my classroom. Do not go on as usual. Do not go back to 
normal. Live this moment as a community struggling to find meaning among the ashes. 
Freire recommends that the educational experience begin with a "coded existential 
situation." a "representation of that situation, showing some of its constituent elements in 
interaction" (Oppressed 105). A "codification" may be a sketch, a photograph, an essay, 
any illustrative item in which the subjects in the classroom can imagine themselves. 
"Decoding" consists of moving from the abstract representation of a situation to the 
concrete situations in which students find themselves along with others. As the group 
breaks down this situation into its constituent parts, individuals begin to "exteriorize their 
view of the world." generating themes about "the way they think about and face the 
world" (106). The task is to reflect upon these themes, to identify links between themes, to 
consider their "historical-cultural context." and to pose them as problems (108). The 
teacher in this context both listens to and challenges students to see as problems both "the 
codified existential situation and their own answers" (118). From this process emerge the 
contradictions which define limit-situations. In ~divid[ing] and reintegrating] the whole," 
the group approaches more closely "the nuclei of the principal and secondary 
contradictions" ( 112). As this process is dialogical. "the teacher-students also have the 
16 The author's son is an activist with the International Movement for Tibetan Independence, as well as a 
number of other global justice organizations committed to non-violent social change. 
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right to participate by including themes not previously suggested" (120). By means of 
these "hinged themes." teachers "may either facilitate the connection between two themes 
in the program unit, filling a possible gap between the two; or they may illustrate the 
relations between the general program content and the view of the world held by the 
people" (120). 
The vision ofthose planes cutting through the towers is one lulu of a coded 
situation. 
September 12 
Missives ride the electronic highway from everywhere. John was in Manhattan, 
but is safe. He and Stephanie were to fly to Paris Tuesday. Debate breaks out on the 
departmental chat list as to whether to cancel classes. "Don Y give in! Then they've won! " 
I still wonder who "they " are and what the hell they could have won. My fellow peaceniks 
offer crucial information people should know before beating war drums. War drums, how 
ironic. Drums. The voice of my beloved. The sound of home. Iforward e-mail and turn to 
redesigning my syllabus. 
I can Y imagine working on my dissertation. On the one hand current events seem 
excessively relevant to my work. On the other hand my dissertation seems somehow 
irrelevant to current events. A pointless and futile task ofhyper-theorization when we 
have to live with the specter of war. I begin to realize that I may not graduate this term. 
Then I realize l don Y care. I either have to throw the whole thing out or make it relevant. I 
can Y do it in eight weeks. How can my students help but be as fatalistic as I am? 
Like the Brazilian peasants among whom Freire worked, our students often 
respond with "What can I do? F m only a These students are accustomed to 
seeing the problems of government and economics as out of their hands. They know that 
our wealth exploits others. But they either can't figure out how to carry out their lifestyles 
without the products these "others" provide or they feel powerless to do anything about 
oppression. As Freire points out, "oppression is domesticating" (Oppressed 51) and in this 
case, the domesticating factors are a combination of "stuff" and a sense of futility. Indeed, 
Freire warns that ~[i]f individuals are caught up in and are unable to separate themselves 
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from these limit-situations, their theme in reference to these situations is fatalism, and the 
task implied by the theme is the lack of a task" (113). 
Freire also reminds us. however, that "[fjatalism in the guise of docility is the fruit 
of an historical and sociological situation, not an essential characteristic of a people's 
behavior" (61). Obviously, this "historical and sociological situation" is more immediate 
and threatening than any we have ever experienced. Nevertheless, as "immobility 
represents a fatal threat" (84), we must seize this moment to develop the critical capacity 
to examine this situation, to find a means to act. As the teacher. I must pose the limit-
situations represented by this crisis as problems, rather than "as fetters or as 
insurmountable barriers" (84). The task ahead of us may not transform the world in which 
terrorism takes place, but by untying this particular Gordian knot, by looking beyond the 
received interpretations, we can identify the contradictions in our own experience. By this 
means, we can replace "immobilist fatalism" with "critical optimism" (Heart 58) and so 
transform our immediate world 
September 13 
So here we are faced with a nightmare image, a coded existential situation in 
which grief terror, and anger vie for primacy. Thrust instantly into the same reality, I 
have had no opportunity to establish a predetermined starting point (Oppressed 108). We 
simply start with the questions that plague us. Will there be another attack? Should we go 
to war? Why do they hate us? What will life in the U.S. be like now? What are the effects 
of trauma? Are we preparedfor another catastrophe? Do we have enough blood 
equipment, and heroes? Patriotism quickly emerges as a generative theme. Retribution 
quickly follows. "Bomb them back to the Stone Age! " a student pronounces. I assign a 
PBS documentary on Afghanistan—they need to see that Afghanistan is the stone age. I 
prod them to examine the motivations, as opposed to motives, of the terrorists, reminding 
them that argument is the alternative to flying planes into buildings. 
A young woman. Gail, identifies herself as the girlfriend of an Islamic student and 
gingerly suggests thatfrom the terrorists perspective we may be the evil ones. 
The aspiring lawyer. Richard spits out a response. "We don'tfly planes into 
buildings full of innocent people! " 
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Gail is quickly cawed, but Sam. whom I labeled "ROTC" speaks out, "Look, I 
went through basic training. They break you down until you have only a single vision. 
These terrorists have been even more indoctrinated, so they believe what their leaders tell 
them. " I find myself a bit taken aback I expected this one to be unquestioningly patriotic. 
"Yeah, at least we represent freedom. We still thinkfor ourselves, we just have to 
follow orders. " Judging from the "we. " this one, Bobby, must also be in the military. 
I begin to speak about the treatment ofsoldiers returning from Nam—the shame of 
blaming the soldier. I repeat that, whatever they did they were following orders. 
Richard pipes up, "So you don't think soldiers don't support war? " 
"That s not what I mean. " I almost stammer. "What I mean is that a soldier must 
follow orders no matter what. And even a war hero might change his mind later. " 
"My dad was in Viet Nam and he never changed his mind " James replies, 
smoothing his hair as he replaces his baseball cap—backwards, naturally. 
I realize how hard it will be to be a pacifist in this classroom, in this country, in 
this moment. But I'm pleased to see a major contradiction emerging—an attack on our 
own soul, our victimization, stands posed against our country's history of violence and 
occupation. I provide a "hinge-theme. " 
"Perhaps we should explore the relationship between religion and the current 
crisis. My religion makes me a pacifist. Right now. it s really hard to be a pacifist because 
I'm angry and scared I'm also afraid people will think I want to do nothing. " 
"Religion s a big part of this. " Billie affirms. "But there s a lot more to it than 
that. We eat. often at their expense, while they starve. Why wouldn 't they hate us? " 
The class picks up steam as further concerns emerge. I suggest we use the major 
themes to form small research groups for the semester project—class presentations 
exploring the contradictions surrounding September 11. They wilt pose their issues as 
problems, present a diversity of viewpoints on causes, contexts, and remedies in an effort 
to find a direction for action which balances these diverse concerns. 
,-ly I look around and see who is grouped together and what issues they have 
chosen. I'm glad to see that the wiry, elfin redhead seems to have befriended the young 
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man from Africa17 whose name I practice over and over. Ifeel cm inward smile when I 
realize they cmd two other classmates hcrve chosen "U.S. culpability " as their approach to 
the question "Why do they hate us? " I presume—perhaps too much—that an international 
student will bring perspective to the group. Unsurprising, Bobby and Sam have recruited 
another pair of students to explore "How should we respond? " Richard recruits three 
other students to address the setme question "Fine. " I tell them. "As we work out the 
details over the course of the next few weeks. I'm sure we can find different angles to 
take. " 
Billie and Gail form a group to explore the Ibramic religions and their history of 
conflict. Later that day Billie tells me how excited she is to have another "old hippie " 
teaching the class. "Beingface to face with these kids, just makes me want to bring out my 
beret. Army jacket, and bell bottoms. " I'll have to be careful this semester so students 
don t think the two of 'us are ganging up on them. 
Another group selects U.S. energy policy. Another, the economic downturn. 
Finally. I'm left with three young men who seem at a loss. " What worries you? " I ask. 
" What's going to happen to the World Series? " Dan. the pudgy arm-chair ref 
smirks. I've seen this before. Subvert the teacher's plan with something superfluous. 
Justin, the shaven, tattooed kid smirks too. 
"I'm sure a lot of people are wondering what life in the U.S. will be like now. " Cut 
em off at the pass. I always say. Take them where they care and push it. Dan reddens. He 
really didn 't expect me to turn this into a topic. "A lot of issues are at stake. Should we 
gather for large public events? Do people recdly want to watch movies about terrorists 
right now? I'm sure you can make this topic work " 
Paul, a very bright caul eager student, is intrigued "Yeah let s do it. dudes. " 
[f learning is to be genuine, students must produce and act upon their ideas, instead 
of consuming those of others (Oppressed 108). When a student attempts to subvert the 
teacher's program by presenting what he sees as a ridiculous or irrelevant idea, often he 
has merely failed to see the contradictions, thus the complexity, of the context to which 
17 To mask the identities of international students. I refer to them by contment or region rather than country 
of origin-
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his idea applies. But as Freire points out, ™[E]ven if the people's thinking is superstitious 
or naïve, it is only as they rethink their assumptions in action that they can change" (108). 
It s been a long day. I'm exhausted but rejuvenated. My students are beginning to 
see the possibility of their action on the world Though I know that the weeks to come will 
be painful, they seem to have hope again. So do L 
September 16 
Seventy-eight students are too many to get to know quickly, so I sit down to read 
the autobiographies I asked them to write. I realize that the elfin redhead Elvis, is himself 
a international student, perhaps Islamic—must I always look for brown skin? I kick myself 
for not ferreting this out sooner, for not reaching out more. Who else needs me to reach 
out? I should have read the bios days ago. At first lam delighted to have more than one 
international perspective in the group. Hours later, listening to Dan Rather beat his war 
drum on Letterman. I realize the huge risk my international students are taking. I wonder 
whether I am strong enough to protect them. I wonder what I might protect them from. As 
Rather, in an astonishing moment, breaks down. I realize even he can t think straight. 
To recognize the subjectivity of inquiry and education is not to deny objective 
reality, but to recognize the reciprocity of objective and subjective. As Freire points out, 
"[tjhere would be no human action if there were no objective reality, no world to be the 
not F of the person and to challenge them" (Oppressed 53). At the same time, ~[t]o deny 
the importance of subjectivity in the process of transforming the world is to admit the 
impossible: a world without people" (50). It is precisely because the objective world 
imposes itself upon our subjectivities that humans inquire and take action to transform this 
imposition. The capacity to "transcend" our subjectivity, "to perceive reality and 
understand it in order to transform it" (53), is the very capacity which distinguishes us 
from other animals. Reflective response, rather than reflexive reaction, is essential, for 
"action is human only when it is not merely an occupation but also a preoccupation, that 
is. when it is not dichotomized from reflection" (53). 
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September 18 
.4s this objective reality has overwhelmed the subjectivity of even those on whom 
we dependfor both information and perspective, a number of my students are displaying 
misgivings about the press. Janna. a lovely and comic boy-pal. is particularly outspoken 
"Heyl What s with CNN and this 'New War ' crap? It's like they 're taldn ' it upon 
themselves to declare it! " Janna marches into the room and takes her usual place between 
Tom and BilL " Ya ready to go fight in Reallireallibad Afghanistan? " She softly punches 
Bill in the arm. grinning. Ahhh! Incipient critique. We have found our "text. " I hardly 
have to say a word all day. 
Freire reminds us that perhaps our greatest responsibility in dialogic pedagogy is 
listening; that having something to say imposes upon us a duty "to motivate and challenge 
the listeners to speak and reply" (Freedom 104). On the one hand, our silence allows for 
our internal voice "to speak from the depths of its own silent listening" ( 104), so 
expanding our self-knowledge. On the other, our silence allows us "to hear the question, 
the doubt, the creativity" of the person who listens to us; by this means we "learn to speak 
with him or her" (106). Listening "is a permanent attitude — of being open to the word of 
the other, to the gesture of the other, to the differences of the other" (107) that "does not 
diminish my right to disagree" but ~prepare[s]" me to "situate myself vis-à-vis the ideas 
being discussed as a subject capable of presence" (107). 
September 20 
Justin marches into my classroom, red-faced "Didyou hear about those fuckin ' 
peace protesters in Des Moines this week? They fuckin ' marched on the Capitol to protest 
bombing Afghanistan. Are we supposed to sit still and do nothin ? If they don t like our 
country. why don t they fuckin ' move? " I was at the peace vigil but I keep silent. I'm not 
sure whether it's self-protection or an attempt to avoid silencing my student. 
Richard speaks up. "Yeah, we should nuke 'em! " He seems somehow delighted to 
see me pale. He laughs, a "noodge-noodge " on his face. I laugh too, realizing he s just 
trying to get my goat. 
Today, we 're learning about neo-Aristotelian analysis—the identification of 
appeals to emotion, values, credibility, and logic. Students are apt to be a bit suspicious of 
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my motivations at first as I am so vocal about my political and ethical commitments. so I 
try to counteract their suspicion somewhat by analyzing documents which express a 
viewpoint I share. Today I've chosen a Michael Moore commentary on Viet Nam 
addressed to today's college students. They are incredulous as they read about the Tonkin 
Gulf and Ho Chi Min's request for U.S. help in setting up a constitution. I hear a lot of 
"Nuh-uhl " today. We explore how these claims work as appeals and I encourage them to 
research his claims. A student asks. "You believe this guy. doncha? " 
"Yes. I do. What does that tell you about Moore s audience? How does that fit in 
with what I say about audience? " It doesn 't take long for them to suggest that Moore may 
be preaching to the choir. 
"I don t think he's going to persuade anyone who disagrees with him. " the 
bookish girl. Linda, points out. "He s really sarcastic. " 
"But he says he s writing to college students. so maybe he s trying to persuade 
people who don't have an opinion, you know, giving them new information. " offers the 
quiet farm kid Tom. 
"At any rate, what he says is true. " Elvis speaks up. A couple of kids glare. 
" What do you have to do to be sure ? " I proffer. We 're off and running. For the 
rest of the class they bandy back andforth. I see trust building, not only between students, 
but between myself and the students. It will not be until weeks later that Justin will tell me 
how he could hardly even read this article because of his dad and Viet Nam. Standing 
before me in his Army Reserve uniform, he tells me he was angry with me for trying to 
indoctrinate him. He lifts his hat to scratch his head "Thanks. I get it. now. " 
Submerged in their socio-historical contexts, students have great difficulty 
critiquing received knowledge. Give them an essay that reinforces the received view and 
they are unlikely to move beyond identifying that which appeals to them. Thus they will 
not perceive the manipulative dangers of rhetoric. They may even emulate them in ways 
we wish they wouldn't. Give them an acL a genre they recognize as manipulative, and they 
are likely to see these dangers as limited to particular genre. They often fail to connect 
literature with their limit-situations and tend to look to the teacher fbr authoritative 
interpretation. But give them a clearly assertive challenge to received knowledge and they 
tear into it like crows into garbage. In the process, they encounter contradictions— 
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America's bidding is to spread democracy; we denied Ho Chi Min. As a result, they 
"confirm some of the things they already know, correct others that they do not know so 
well, and gradually open up the way" to new knowledge (Freedom 35). 
Anthrax 
The Ames strain. No one in this engineering lab turned English classroom can 
forget how close we sit to dangerous research. I tell them about my sister s postman who 
"chirps " as he delivers mail. Students talk about being afraid to open mail. We all feel 
like canaries. We talk about the value of knowledge, what we do at this university. I don't 
have to pose the question for them, they re already thinking, "perhaps not all knowledge 
is beneficial. Perhaps all motives for research aren't virtuous. " 
When one teaches at a land grant university, it is impossible to forget the 
potentially ominous scientific and social scientific research in which our students may one 
day be engaged To be wary of the rationalistic paradigm upon which this science is 
allegedly grounded is not to demonize science or technology, but to "consider [it] from a 
critically curious standpoint" (Freedom 38). Humans beings are persistently "unfinished." 
in the process of becoming. Our knowledge is likewise unfinished, becoming. And 
because "the process of becoming" involves "observing, comparing, evaluating, choosing 
deciding, intervening, breaking with, and making options, we are ethical beings, capable 
of transgressing our ethical boundaries" (92). We can neither "claim transgression as a 
right" nor "sit idly by and fold our arms in the face of such a possibility." for to do so. as 
Freire warns, is to risk a "fatalistic quietude, which, instead of condemning transgression, 
tries to absorb it as if it belonged to "right* thinking" (92). 
Blame America First 
Have you no sense of decency sir. at long last? Have you left no sense of decency? 
—Senator Joseph N. Welch 
Army-McCarthy hearings 
June 9.1954 
By November, the American Council of Trustees and Alumni—which boasts 
among its founders Joe Lieberman and Lynne Cheney and among its advisorsr both 
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Cheney and William Bennett—produce a report declaring the faculty of America's 
colleges and universities the "weak link in the war on terrorism " and accusing faculty 
and administration across America of anti-Americanism. As evidence they cite a "vast 
number of colleges and universities " which "sponsored teach-ins and other fora which 
have been distinctly equivocal and divided in their response " (8). Blame America First— 
me. That tiny third grader who learned to love America so much because she s free to 
critique. because it's America who first gave her the principles of critique. Moral 
equivalency? I merely see my rights as human rights. I simply see liberty, democracy, and 
equality as "a universal human ethic " (Freedom 25). As Freire warns, one of my biggest 
difficulties this semester will be to do "everything in [my] power to sustain a universal 
human ethic without at the same time falling into a hypocritical moral ism " (25) which 
Jails to recognize my students ' autonomy, their right to reach their own conclusions. 
Meeting in the computer lab. I ask my students to log on and read the report. 
Richard speaks up first. "Guess that s you they 're talkin ' about. Like you 're much ofa 
threat. Imean. I can tell where you 're coming from. It just seems like you have a different 
way of looking at things. " 
"I dunno. " James remarks, "sometimes I feel like she is anti-American. " 
I opt not to defend myself, but let the class take over the debate. It isn't long before 
they start to discuss the nature of the evidence. Joshua speaks softly, looking down at his 
crucifix. "About half these things I was taught in Sunday School " 
"Seems like a lotta name-calling and guilt by association. " Will's voice flies out 
from behind a computer screen. 
Linda already showing herself to be my best writer, looks up. "Aren't you 
supposed to identify the speaker? " 
"The way they got this set up makes it look like it's going on all over the country, 
but there s only a few colleges here. There hasn t been that much at Iowa State. " 
Richard's been working hard on arrangement lately. "Not that I agree with the protesters, 
but..." 
"C 'mon. what happened to 'united we stand'? We should really be pulling 
together right now. " James is mildly indignant. "Sure, some things happened in history 
we 're not so proud of but " 
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"Jesus. James/ " Justin has had it. "Don't tell me she's even brainwashed you! " 
"C mon. Justin. America s done some not-so-good things. " James starts to defend 
himself. "You can love..." 
"/ don't have to sit here and listen to this shitI Does anyone but us know what the 
hell you do in this class? " He slams his hand on the table and turns to march out. 
I try to maintain composure. Justin, please sit down, calm down, and show some 
respect for me and your classmates. If you have something to say, you can say it when 
you re calm. " Justin slumps into his seat with a huge sigh. I thank Mm for staying. He 
rolls his eyes. 
Respecting the autonomy of students certainly does not mean that I should "submit 
myself to the arrogance and stupidity of those who do not respect me" (Freedom 109). It 
does, however, require that I respond with dignity. At the same time. I must recognize that 
"I cannot make education into an indisputable instrument of social transformation just 
because 1 desire it" ( 110). Every student is entitled to his position and I am obligated to 
listen to his position, to speak with him "even if at times it should be necessary to speak to 
him" (110). To do so is not authoritarian, but a legitimate exercise of my authority as 
teacher. As Freire points out "There is no room for discipline either m authoritarianism or 
in unbridled freedom, both lack rigor, authority, and freedom" (83). 
My students continue to sling comments across the room, a few getting a bit 
heated but no real storms. Justin is sullen and silent. 
"Big deal. " someone says. 
"It s pretty repetitive. " 
" What s the big deal, anyway? " Now I identify the "big deal " voice as Hannah. 
"Aren t we supposed to have free speech? " 
"Sure, but the Constitution allows speech to be suppressed in the interest of 
national security. " James looks a bit cornered I'm surprised Have I silenced his allies by 
admonishing Justin? 
"Perhaps I've misled you into thinking that only government critics or the Left is 
being silenced " I intervene. "In fact, ultra-conservative Arm Coulter was fust firedfrom 
the National Review for her views. And a Florida professor was firedfor putting up a 
website calling for a strong military position. " 
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Freire discusses the common fear that "critical consciousness" may lead to 
fanaticism, that the oppressed, made aware of their situation, will fly planes into buildings. 
The contrast between my students and the terrorists should be argument enough against 
such concerns. Having "banked" a vision of the United States which makes no distinction 
between the actions of a government and the actions of its people; between beneficial 
intervention and malignant: between the intentional and the unforeseen, terrorists rob 
others of humanity because theirs has been stolen. They have become sectarian and. as 
Freire points out. sectarianism "is an obstacle to the emancipation of mankind" 
(Oppressed 37). It "mythicizes and thereby alienates" (37), turning "reality into a false 
(and therefore unchangeable) 'reality'" (37). While "the rightist sectarian — attempts to 
domesticate the present so that the future will reproduce this domesticated present" 
(38). the leftist sectarian "considers the future pre-established—a kind of inevitable fate, 
fortune, or destiny" (38). Both are reactionary "because, starting from their respectively 
false views of history, both develop forms of action that negate freedom" (38). Committed 
to their "circles of certainty." both "end up without the people—which is another way of 
being against them" (Oppressed 39). By contrast while my students remain fervently 
patriotic, they are moving from incipient critiques to critical consciousness, retrieving 
their humanity by overcoming sectarianism. 
Office Hours 
My office hours are packed, Many students come to work on papers. others just to 
pick my mind To my delight, often the mind-pickers are those who strongly disagree with 
me. Here among the photos of my family. I learn their stories. Maria reveals herself to be 
a first-generation American, fiercely annoyed with me for criticizing herfamily's country 
of hope. James is called to active duty at semester s end. Just airport security—but there 
wouldn't be a needfor security if his job wasn't dangerous. Justin's dad is called up, 
too—the Mideast. Billie is tempted to take her son to Canada. Tom offers to sell me 
organic lamb and talks about how hard farming is these days. He can hardly afford 
college. Linda has to cancel plans for study in the United Arab Emirate. 
One young man grieves doubly, the attack on his country following only days after 
an accident claimed Ms best friend Two girls lose grandmothers they are very close to. 
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Another girl loses her mother: Still another is rushed home for her father's emergency 
heart surgery. The husband of a non-traditional student loses his job. forcing her to get a 
job—but he still expects her to run the house. An African student shares newspapers from 
home, giving me new insight into the conflicts of his region One girl, struggling mightily 
to learn to write, admits to a learning disability, but refuses testing or counseling forfear 
of being labeled A half dozen other girls struggle to learn to write concretely and 
directly. Their faces light up and they shake their heads in sudden recognition when I ask. 
"Do good girls have strong opinions? " I. too. have suffered from Iowa politeness. Other 
kids are frustrated by my standards. I shrug off their resentment and over time, most lose 
their spite and learn to write. .4 couple even thank me. while a handful eventually just 
disappear from class. One kid comes to office hours twice a week to work on his writing, 
but in the end. hands in nothing despite my assurances he's passing the course. Some kids 
hang around a lot. seeming to need comfort in these difficult times. Seeing pictures of Pete 
and Jorgen with their respective drums and guitars, a jew young men confess they d 
rather be in music school or playing in a band After one young man meets my daughter at 
a L'-lowa frat party, a jew others show up just to see her picture. A number of students 
take time to tell me how grateful they are that I focused the class on September 11. It gave 
them something to do. A lot happens during these office hours. Sometimes we cry. At 
others, we laugh, confess, work hard gripe. We come together. We become a community. 
Students as Teachers 
Weeks passed with difficulty. As I looked out on the faces in my classroom I saw 
dark circles under eyes, sometimes smiles came hard But every day I saw students ' 
eagerly share research, plum for approaches to their presentations. The results were 
remarkable. 
One group gave a complex economics lesson in such clear layman s terms, it 
compensatedfor a semester of high school econ. Another presented our options for airline 
security—complete with a mini-documentary on current security procedures at our local 
airport, accompanied no less, by James in uniform. A group of American and 
international students gave an historical outline of the ways in which U.S. policy has 
inflamed international hostility—without laying blame—examining it as a failure of 
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understanding and communication. They followed by proposing a number ofsteps toward 
remedy from diverse international perspectives which often conflicted Another group 
invited an Islamic student to share his experiences with the terrorist investigations. 
Students were humbled and somewhat ashamed to hear of their peers being awakened for 
interrogation in the middle of the night. Yet they did not hesitate to weigh together the 
pros and cons of racial-profiling and other security measures. A pair of architecture 
students examined the Trade Center—whether design, engineering or construction played 
a role in the collapse. Concluding they did not. they followed by outlining the dangers of 
excavation, the threat of the Hudson River. They finished by debating the merits of a 
number of designs for future construction which take into account the terrorist threat. 
Janna. Bill. Tom. join Hannah to produce a hysterically comic newscast demonstrating 
the ways in which the media both aggravates and mediates the heightened emotions of the 
public. They pondered some collective and individual consequences of media influence 
and explored various options and their consequences for containing the media— 
ultimately concluding that legislated restraints impose too great a risk At semester's end 
I was compelled to tell my students, somewhat tongue-in-cheek that subsequent classes 
are likely to remember them with spite—as they raised the bar in terms of commitment, 
depth, breadth and concrete results. 
A jew presentations in particular stand out. Sam Bobby. Joshua, and Will 
presented the U.S. case for bombing Afghanistan, then offered strategic, economic, 
diplomatic, and moral reasons why it may have been a mistake. They pointed out that we 
were not attacked by a government, not even Afghanistan. They compared the terrorists to 
Timothy \fcVie. arguing that sectarianism in any port can lead to tragedy. They gave 
consideration to the possible déstabilisation of India and Pakistan. They raised the 
specter of escalated Israeli/Palestinian hostilities. They speculated that the difficulty in 
managing tribal conflicts might undermine Afghanistan s new government. They 
expressed concern that innocents might be tilled: that relief might be cut offand 
thousands more die than in the Trade Center. They examined reasons why military 
response could harden the Islamic world against us. 
They made it clear that action had to be taken. They made clear that the Taliban 
and Al-Oaida are evil. They suggested a diplomatic approach to capturing bin Laden 
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based on multicultural understanding.'8 They talked about the effectiveness of education 
and aid They discussed the use of special forces to root out terrorist cells. They promoted 
tightening our borders, particularly our air borders. Through the image of Bertrand 
Russell, they reminded students that great Euro-western scholars have often been firmly 
committed to non-violence. It seemed to me they talked about winning the hearts of the 
world 
In the past. I've had students who played my line to buck for grades. Often Ifoil 
them, for they may not give equal time to other views or their presentation is shallow or 
lacks sincerity. How do I know these young men weren 't merely bucking for grades? 
Because they dug out histories, contexts, and possibilities I had not considered They 
became my teachers. They approached the crisis as a problem and came to shared 
solutions based on consideration of multiple arguments. They presented their case without 
sectarianism as patriots and lovers of humanity. Had I any doubt, the small tears. the 
brief hushed sniffles of their classmates cast it away. 
Of course we did bomb. And many of my students ' concerns are playing out. We 
can t be certain that bombing Afghanistan is causal of certain current events, but we can 
consider the possibilities raised by these young men. More importantly, we can look to 
them as examples of the possibilities that emerge when we shift our paradigm from 
agonistic to problem-posing, from attack and defense to dialogue, from liberal and 
rational to democratic and reasonable. 
Richard's group took a vastly different stance, presenting the class with the 
various military resources at our disposal. They described in detail the aircraft to be used 
the challenges faced by special forces, the methods of the various branches and units who 
would carry out the war. In the midst oftheir presentation, a fellow group member leaped 
up from his seat among the class, shouting, "Break the cycle of violence! No more war! " 
After a brief exchange ofpeacenik platitudes and their dismissal by the presenting 
members of his group, he sat down. 
My response to these students was. I'm certain, a lower grade than they had hoped 
for. The reasons I gave are that they did not engage in argument, but rather, presented 
* I have my students to thank for the information on the Afghani principles of nartg discussed in Chapter 
Three. 
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their position as a given, reinforcing it with multiple tellings, covering over their essential 
agreement by presenting "means " to fulfill the ends of their perspective as 
"perspectives. " I watched Richard as he read my comments surrounded by his partners 
looking over his shoulder. I heard him mutter, "/ knew it, " then throw up his hands and 
pass the paper roughly to his peers. I'm not sure what Richard "knew, " but he did not 
protest the grade and he continued to treat me amicably and with respect. I have a hunch 
his knowledge concerned himself and his peers rather than me. 
While these students resisted both my political position and the parameters of the 
assignment. they. too. named the world In the face of my resistance and my attempts to 
shift their subject positions, they claimed their space. At the same time. in their individual 
interactions with me and their classmates, they showed good wilt, a willingness to 
consider other points of view with gravity. Even more than my students who shifted their 
views, these were my measures. I am deeply moved that they could rise to this level of 
resistance, for doing so they demonstrated the trust I seek What 1 am most proud of is 
that these students learned and I learned again, that we can disagree with our opponents 
without rancor, that even if we succumb to rancor that we can do so in such a way that the 
rancor does not " assume [s] proportions greater than the reasons for the original 
disagreement " (Freedom 40). At the same time, lam disappointed that they didn 't engage 
other views—for each of them had the capacity to do so while maintaining their 
resistance. They seemed to remain afraid—not of disagreeing, for they did that 
successfully—but of inquiry, and that can only mean they were afraid of learning. Yet 
when all was said and done, these students individually produced final research papers 
which maintained views in contrast to my own. while thoroughly engaging, not only my 
view, but diverse others. 
Other would-be disappointments emerged as well. At the last minute, my southeast 
Asian student was abandoned by his entire group. One kid in particular had seemed so 
chummy with him He nonetheless managed to present his thoughts on the global and U.S. 
economies with dignity and new insight. Paid was nearly abandoned by his group, too. 
Dan stayed out of contact with him until the night before the presentation. Justin 
contributed more, but really didn't take the project seriously enough But Paul stayed up 
late, got the job done, and was rewarded for his effort. 
-m 
Over the course of the semester, I discovered a lot. Sometimes the best critical 
thinker is one who doesn't write so well. Sometimes the numbers don't add up in ways 
that seem fair to a student. I followed the numbers and they noticed, so for the first time. I 
amended my grades after handing them in. Others fell under the impression that their hard 
work, my respect and encouragement should add up to a higher grade. I offered honest 
explanations satisfactory to me. satisfactory to academic criteria—but some of these 
students will not understand, for they either were not ready or I put them off somehow. I 
wish to but can't successfully engage them all. Sometimes because of my limit situations, 
sometimes because of theirs. I'm only one teacher and I'm human, so the only thing I can 
promise is that I won't leave the classroom unchanged. 
I have no doubt that some students find my class too "political" and 
"controversial.** On one hand, the natural impulse when faced with issues and perspectives 
that make us uncomfortable is to turn a blind eye. On the other hand, many students are 
simply disinterested in issues of government and economics. But the fact is, few students 
go on to majors where they will write literary research papers. My class is by definition a 
class in research writing, which entails that it is a class on argument. Argument entails 
ethics; ethics entails politics. By addressing political issues which have direct impact on 
their lives. I provide an opportunity for them to engage with their world, to see the 
possibilities for change as well as their potential in bringing about change. 
Meanwhile. I am aware that many students expect me to adopt a "neutral" posture, 
they are uncomfortable dialoguing with me. But I cannot lie to them, neither about the 
neutrality of knowledge nor about my own. Certainly Socrates did not lie, nor did Plato, 
Aristotle, and Protagoras. I also teach in response to my own educational experience, for I 
had many experiences where the teachers adoption of a neutral position merely covered 
over a set of assumptions that fueled the teacher's criteria. I also had many experiences of 
being silenced when my view challenged the teachers. Perhaps I have not yet reached the 
maturity as a teacher to gain the trust of most students. Thus, it continues to be my 
challenge to make way for the least heard as I grow and Ieam. 
Certainly the process we undergo in my classroom is not a comfortable one, for it 
strips away the illusions upon which we build our sense of security. The liberatory 
educator is poignantly aware that a change in consciousness will unsettle a student's 
subject position and must balance this need against the aim of facilitating student agency. 
This dilemma is particularly poignant at a predominately white. Midwestern institution 
where the student population is so unlike the illiterate agricultural workers among whom 
Freire worked. It is one thing to liberate learning when the "oppressed" are hungry, 
exploited peasants. It is quite another thing to liberate when the "oppressed" are well-féd 
American consumers. Critical consciousness is unwelcome when it serves to destabilize 
one's comfort zone. 
Spring 
Autumn 2001 was a time of unspeakable violence, but the violence is not ended. 
The root causes remain. As the months have passed, the violence seems once again very 
tar away. My new crop of students has lost their interest or lost their nerve. They don't 
want to look at world or national problems. But again. I will push them to inquire, for as 
Freire tells us ~[a]ny situation in which some individuals prevent others from engaging in 
the process of inquiry is one of violence to alienate human beings from their own 
decision-making is to change them into objects'" (Oppressed 85). I tried, and will continue 
to try. to engage in "practices where authority and freedom are found and preserved in 
their autonomy ... in a relationship of mutual respect." that we may "speak of a 
disciplined practice as well as a practice favorable to the vocation "to be more" (Freedom 
83). 
In the end. despite some disappointments, we came together and none of us are the 
same for it. We are better. 
Sever ht history has violence been initiated by the oppressed How could 
they be the initiators, if they themselves are the result of violence? How 
could they be the sponsors of something whose objective inauguration 
called forth their existence as oppressed?... It is not the unloved who 
initiate disaffection, bur those who cannot love because they love only 
themselves. It is not the helpless, subject to terror, who initiate terror, bra 
the violent, who with their power created the concrete situation which 
begets the ~rejects of life. " It is not the tyrannized who initiate despotism. 
but the tyrants. It is not the despised who initiate hatred but those who 
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despise. It is not those whose humanity is denied them who negate 
humankind, but those who denied that humanity (thus negating their awn 
as well). Force is used not by those who have become weak under the 
preponderance of the strong, but by the strong who have emasculated 
them For the oppressors„ however, it is always the oppressed (whom they 
never call "the oppressed" but... "those people " or "the blind and 
envious masses " or "savages " or "natives " or "subversives ") who are 
disaffected who are "violent. " "barbaric. " 'wicked " or "ferocious " when 
they react to the violence of oppressors. (Freire Oppressed55-56) 
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